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DISSERTATION ABSTRACT 
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Doctor of Philosophy 
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March 2014 
 
Title: The Self-Help Cooperative Movement in Los Angeles, 1931-1940 
 
 
This case study examines the Self-Help Cooperative Movement (SHCM).  
Largely ignored by social scientists for the past eighty years, the movement took place 
during the Great Depression and, while national in scope, it was concentrated in Los 
Angeles.  This movement combined traditional protest tactics with pre-figurative politics; 
its goal was to provide full employment for all Americans through the proliferation of 
worker and consumer cooperatives.  Despite a very promising start in 1931, the 
movement collapsed and disintegrated by 1940.  This dissertation examines the reasons 
for the SHCM’s early successes and later its failures. 
 The SHCM’s early successes were made possible through their alliances with 
Japanese farmers (who lived on the outskirts of Los Angeles) and people of color in 
general, Los Angeles businesses and conservative business leaders, and with sympathetic 
politicians and state agencies.  These alliances were, in turn, made possible by the 
inherent ambiguity of the SHCM’s politics, which incorporated both conservative 
practices (e.g., self-help) and socialist practices (e.g., workplace democracy).  This 
unique mixture, what the Los Angeles Times called “voluntary communism”, generated 
widespread support among hundreds of thousands of unemployed workers and among 
conservative, socialist, and liberal political actors. 
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  In 1933, the SHCM underwent a profound transformation when Upton Sinclair 
and the End Poverty in California movement assumed leadership of the cooperatives and 
the California Democratic Party, promising to place state support behind the cooperative 
movement and in the process both end unemployment and undermine capitalism.  The 
gubernatorial campaign of 1934 became a referendum on the cooperatives.  Over the 
course of the prolonged bitterly fought campaign the cooperatives became associated 
with communism, and their liberal and conservative allies responded by discontinuing 
their support.  With the loss of this political and financial assistance the SHCM slowly 
faded away.  While the movement failed to achieve its specific goals, its impact on 
California politics, along with other Utopian Socialist movements in Los Angeles during 
this period, was immense.  By the 1940s both political parties in California were 
supporting liberal and socialist initiatives (e.g., universal health-care and mass university 
education). 
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CHAPTER I 
POLITICAL AMBIGUITY AND THE SELF-HELP COOPERATIVE MOVEMENT 
 The Self-Help Cooperative Movement was one of the largest unemployment 
movements in the United States in the 1930s.  It was also one of the strangest.  The 
movement can be credibly labeled conservative and socialist; it, at times, had strong 
backing from businesses, during other times strong opposition; it was an ethnically and 
racially inclusive movement in a nativist political environment; it failed to achieve its 
goals but dramatically altered the California political landscape.  This case study raises a 
number of questions for students of American politics.  Why was the movement open to 
multiple interpretations? How could it be, at once, both conservative and socialist? How 
was a movement with few resources able to mobilize the support of both conservative 
business leaders and radical activists? How were the cooperatives able to achieve major 
political change in California, despite failing to achieve their political objectives? 
Addressing itself to these questions, this project can both deepen and complicate our 
understandings of the New Deal, the Great Depression, cooperatives, and political 
change. 
The thesis of this project is two fold.  The first is that the Self-Help Cooperative 
Movement was a lost opportunity for addressing mass unemployment in the United States 
in ways that satisfied both conservatives and socialists.  That was its main appeal.  
Studies of the Great Depression have overlooked this movement, despite being one of the 
largest and most popular unemployment movements in the United States in the 1930s, 
precisely because it does not easily fit into any discernable ideology or tradition—
especially that of New Deal liberalism.  Indeed, studies of the Great Depression 
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frequently lapse into studies of the New Deal.  The two have become one and the same in 
both academic studies and in popular discussions.   
This project examines the years preceding and leading up to the New Deal 
especially and argues that, even before the election of Roosevelt and the implementation 
of the New Deal work programs, new institutional arrangements were emerging to 
effectively address mass unemployment through novel political alliances between 
unemployed workers, private businesses, farmers, and state actors, all of whom felt 
intense pressure to do something about mass unemployment.  These alliances, and the 
novel institutional arrangements they collectively built, did not easily fit into either 
Hoover’s volunteerist response to the Great Depression or the New Deal work programs, 
but contained elements of both.  This cooperative approach to addressing mass 
unemployed was immensely popular with conservatives and socialists from 1931 to 1933.  
For a number of reasons, beginning in the summer of 1933 the popularity of the 
cooperatives began to wane and eventually the movement lost political support.    
Second, theoretically, this case study helps us understand the unstable, contingent, 
and ambiguous nature of political change.  This study understands political authority as 
fundamentally elusive, detached from any group or actor.  In other words, this is not a 
story in which wealthy elites, state actors, or any other group or institution dominated the 
political process, had the final word.  Instead, all of the groups examined here were 
constantly scrambling to keep up with new developments and adequately respond to 
them.  In doing so, they often found themselves in new and unexpected political territory, 
agreeing to alliances and policies they initially opposed.      
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This project also contributes to cooperative studies, which have largely ignored 
this case, despite being the largest movement of urban cooperatives in American history.  
Studies of cooperatives all too often focus on the internal dynamics of cooperatives—the 
extent to which their internal operations are democratic.  Instead, this project draws our 
attention to the political potentials of cooperative movements.  It examines their ability to 
effect political change; to extend access to the democratic workplace beyond their 
membership.  In the case of the Self-Help Cooperative Movement, they were most 
effective when fulfilling basic needs—i.e., food, housing, and other essentials—left 
unaddressed by either the state or private businesses, and when they were able to do so in 
ways that were discursively complementary with, rather than antagonistic to, the state and 
private businesses.  The Self-Help Cooperative Movement was able to achieve this by 
developing both an organization and an identity that positioned itself, however 
precariously, between political dualities:  between the public and private sphere, state and 
civil society, and between conservatism and socialism.                  
The Self-Help Cooperative Movement 
Before the introduction of the Civilian Conservation Corps, Civil Works 
Administration, Public Works Administration, Works Progress Administration, and other 
New Deal work programs, the unemployed had to rely on inadequate municipal welfare 
and private charity; and many did not even qualify for that assistance.  Thus, in Los 
Angeles, as elsewhere, unemployed workers were desperate and willing to try anything.  
It was in this environment that the Self-Help Cooperative Movement (SHCM) emerged.  
Millions of Americans were involved in the movement throughout the 1930s, but the 
majority of its members were concentrated in the county of Los Angeles.  The movement 
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consisted of unemployed workers who formed labor exchanges and later worker 
cooperatives with the help of businesses, farmers, and local, state, and federal agencies.  
The guiding principle of the SHCM was “production for use, not for profit” and all goods 
and services acquired and produced by the cooperatives were distributed according to 
need instead of hours worked.  The SHCM defined the Los Angeles unemployment 
movement during the Great Depression, from 1931 to 1933 especially.   
The earliest known incarnation of the movement began with Unemployed 
Citizens League of Seattle in the summer of 1931.  Eventually, the movement spread 
across the country.  There is no official statistic on the exact number of people involved 
in the cooperatives, only various estimates.  By the end of 1932 there were 330 Self-Help 
Cooperative organizations in 37 states, with 75,000 activists and a general membership of 
300,000.1  The movement peaked in 1933 with more than 400 groups and a general 
membership of 752,000.  Between 1931 and 1938 there were a half-million “families” in 
600 organizations involved in the movement.2  
The primary activities of these organizations were barter, labor exchange, and 
later direct production.  “Participants were organized on a community basis and included 
persons with a variety of skills…Memberships of 100 and even 3,000 persons developed 
in a few weeks time.”3  Many of the early organizations initially developed 
autonomously, without knowledge of each other; others self-consciously patterned 
themselves after groups in other states.  There was no central organization or leader.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Clark Kerr, “Productive Enterprises of the Unemployed, 1931-1938” (PhD diss., 
University of California, Berkeley, 1939), 2, volume 1. 
2 Ibid., 8, volume 1. 
3 Ibid., 5, volume 1. 
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Umbrella organizations eventually formed to coordinate the groups—the most important 
being the Unemployed Cooperative Relief Association (UCRA)—but their power over 
the local organizations was limited.  Despite lacking strong leadership, these groups 
gained significant political influence early on, as local and state politicians began actively 
courting the votes of these groups, especially in Los Angeles, Denver, and Seattle.4   
The cooperatives initially pressed for state intervention in the economy to address 
unemployment—either through direct cash payments or work programs—but the failure 
of Hoover and local political leaders to adequately intervene in the economy led to a 
dramatic rise in membership and a proliferation of cooperatives, which were initially seen 
as a temporary measure.5  The unemployed workers that made up the membership of the 
cooperatives, like many Americans, believed that the depression would not last long.  
Eventually, with the rise of the New Deal welfare state and the work programs, the state 
did intervene and in so doing transformed the movement. 
The early activities, primarily consisting of barter and labor-exchange, ended with 
the implementation of the New Deal programs.  The cooperatives depended on the 
surpluses produced by farms and businesses.  However, with “production control 
programs” like the Agricultural Adjustment Act, National Recovery Administration, and 
Federal Surplus Relief Corporation, farmers and businesses no longer had vast surpluses 
with which to provide to the cooperatives in exchange for labor.6  Moreover, with the 
implementation of the New Deal work programs, the majority of the unemployed left the 
cooperatives for the steady pay of the work programs.  As Table 1 shows, the number of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Ibid., 30-31, volume 1. 
5 Ibid., 30, volume 1. 
6 Ibid., 20, volume 1. 
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activists in the cooperatives dropped from about 72,000 in June of 1933, when the New 
Deal programs were implemented to about 29,000 in December of 1933, and continued 
dropping thereafter.7  As Table 2 shows, the California cooperatives followed the same 
pattern8. 
Table 1. Active Membership of Self-Help Cooperatives in the United States, 1932-
1938  
 Date Active Membership 
1931 December 12,200 
1932 June 
December 
32,550 
75,846 
1933 June 
December 
71,860 
29,043 
1934 June 
December 
18,283 
16,121 
1935 June 
December 
16,811 
12,403 
1936 June 
December 
8,471 
6,992 
1937 June 
December 
5,722 
2,965 
1938 June 
December 
5,858 
5,790 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Ibid., 25, volume 1. “Active members" is used to signify the number reported to have 
retained active status by working during the month, withdrawing compensation or 
attending meetings; but in general it indicates the number which actually worked. "Active 
member" is not synonymous with "registered member." There usually was only one 
member to a family”.   
8 Ibid., 74, volume 1. 
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Table 2. Active Membership of Self-Help Cooperatives in California, 1932-1938  
 
 Date Active Membership 
1932 June 
December 
6,900 
30,355 
1933 June 
December 
30,025 
14,940 
1934 June 
December 
11,625 
9,740 
1935 June 
December 
8,746 
5,715 
1936 June 
December 
3,620 
2,980 
1937 June 
December 
2,115 
1,385 
1938 June 
December 
2,240 
2,290 
 
The cooperative movement was concentrated in California and in Los Angeles 
especially.  Forty-seven percent of all cooperative members were in California and of that 
seventy-seven percent were located in Los Angeles.9  For that reason, this study, like 
most studies of the SHCM, focus on Los Angeles and California.  As with the national 
movement, the Los Angeles cooperative movement underwent several phases.  The first 
was the initial barter and labor exchange phase, in which the unemployed engaged in a 
number of ad hoc activities and alliances to meet their basic needs.  However, with the 
implementation of the New Deal work programs, a new phase was entered, the 
production phase.  While the New Deal programs syphoned off the majority of the 
membership in the summer of 1933, thousands of unemployed workers remained with the 
cooperatives.  Moreover, the New Dealers were eager to support cooperative production, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Kerr, “Productive Enterprises”, 52, 77, volume 1. 
 8 
as they were supporting many other experiments in the 1930s, spending over a hundred 
million alone on intentional communities during this period.10   
The New Deal work programs ended the first phase of the movement, but not the 
second phase, which could have lasted beyond the Great Depression and had a major 
impact on both the California and national economy, like agricultural, financial, 
consumer, and utility cooperatives.  However, in 1933, the SHCM underwent another 
major transformation when Upton Sinclair and the End Poverty in California (EPIC) 
movement assumed leadership of the cooperatives and the California Democratic Party, 
promising to place state support behind the cooperative movement and in the process 
both end unemployment and destroy capitalism.  The gubernatorial campaign of 1934 
became a referendum on the cooperatives and over the course of the prolonged, bitterly 
fought campaign, which became a mass media and national phenomenon, the 
cooperatives became associated with communism and the Roosevelt administration and 
the business community responded by discontinuing their support.  While a great deal of 
support remained for the cooperatives, especially in Los Angeles, political and financial 
support from their former allies dried up and the cooperative movement slowly faded 
away.  The movement finally came to an end in the summer of 1940 when the state of 
California pulled the last of its support (on which the cooperatives had become 
dependent).   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 John Curl, For All The People:  Uncovering The Hidden History of Cooperation, 
Cooperative Movements, and Communalism in America (Oakland, CA: PM Press, 2009), 
315.  Robert Sutton, Communal Utopias and The American Experience: Secular 
Communities, 1824-2000 (Westport, Conn:  Praeger Publishers, 2004).  See chapter 5 of 
Sutton especially, which discusses the New Dealers’ enthusiasm for intentional 
communities. 
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While the movement failed to realize its specific objective, of creating a 
cooperative economy parallel to the capitalist economy, it left a lasting impact on 
California politics.  However, not in the way the cooperatives or its initial supporters, 
especially in the business community, envisioned.  Instead of creating an institution that 
existed in-between and transcended political dualities—of conservatism and socialism, 
public and private, state and civil society—unemployed workers, business leaders, and 
farmers were absorbed into the New Deal welfare state.  The membership of the 
cooperatives, even after the movement ended, had become radicalized by their 
involvement in the early years of the movement and by their involvement in the EPIC 
campaign.  They formed a radical wing not only of the Democratic Party but of the 
Republican Party as well.   
Republicans, who had previously opposed the New Deal in California, began 
supporting it as early as 1934, preferring it to EPIC, which they believed was a 
communist conspiracy.  They viewed the New Deal as the lesser evil.  A sign of this 
rapid radicalization of Republicans in California was the governorship of Early Warren, 
one of the longest serving governors of California (1943 - 1953), the only governor 
elected for three consecutive terms, and also the only governor to win both the 
Democratic and Republican primaries in his 1946 re-election campaign.  The 
Republicans, who vociferously opposed the New Deal in California in the early 1930s, by 
the early 1940s elected a governor who went so far as to propose universal health care for 
California, several years before Democratic President Harry Truman proposed it for the 
entire country.   
 10 
Each group involved began with a specific set of interests.  Businesses sought to 
avoid state intervention in the economy by the New Dealers.  The unemployed wanted a 
cooperative sector that would guarantee employment for anyone out of work.  Over the 
course of the 1930s they experimented with a number of institutional arrangements and 
formed unconventional political alliances to realize these interests.  By the end of the 
1930s, neither businesses nor the unemployed received what they initially wanted:  
businesses were unsuccessful in stopping increased state intervention and the 
unemployed did not get full employment.   
However, what they did get were new interests.  The interests of both groups, 
what they wanted, were transformed during this period.  For businesses, fearing EPIC, 
state intervention in the economy by the New Deal became preferable to communism.  
Indeed, many began to see state intervention, not as something that must be tolerated, but 
as desirable—as Earl Warren’s proposal of universal health-care suggests.  The 
unemployed, on the other hand, remained open to a number of arrangements throughout 
the 1930s:  barter and labor exchange, worker-run production cooperatives, state 
supervised production cooperatives, and finally the New Deal work programs and then 
the defense plant jobs.       
Political Science and Cooperative Studies 
 Contemporary studies of cooperatives in the United States focus on the internal 
operations of the organizations, rarely investigating the political conditions necessary for 
a flourishing cooperative sector or, in turn, the impact of cooperatives on the political 
environment surrounding them.  Even studies of cooperatives outside the U.S., 
Mondragon, for example, are more interested in assessing the extent to which the 
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structure of the cooperative is democratic, than in its role in expanding workplace 
democracy in Spain.  The focus of this study, by contrast, examines the conditions that 
make cooperatives possible and their impact on the political environment in which they 
operate.   
 This focus on the internal operations of cooperatives was not always the case.  
Earlier studies of the cooperative movement, including Richard T. Ely’s The Labor 
Movement in America (1886), which viewed the cooperative movement as integral to the 
labor movement, Herbert Baxter Adams’ the History of Cooperatives in the United States 
(1888), W.E.B. Dubois’ Economic Co-operation Among Negro Americans (1907), and 
John R. Common’s series History of Labor in the United States (1918-1935) all examine 
the relationship between cooperatives and politics.  This tradition of examining both the 
cooperatives themselves and their relationship to their political environment was 
discontinued in studies documenting the flourishing of urban worker and consumer 
cooperatives from the 1960s to the present.   
Supporters of cooperatives (and of communes and collectives) in the 1960s and 
1970s saw these organizations as concrete expressions of the New Left and the counter-
culture.  The literature documenting these organizations is small compared to other fields 
of study, e.g., labor unions, but still significant and growing.  John Case and Rosemary 
Taylor’s Co-ops, Communes, and Collectives (1979), Robert Jackall and Henry Levin’s 
collection Worker Cooperatives in America (1984), Joyce Rothschild and J. Alan Whitt’s 
The Cooperative Workplace (1986), John A.C. Hetherington Mutual and Cooperative 
Enterprises, and Robert P. Sutton’s two volume Communal Utopias and the American 
Experience (2004) spend some time discussing the relationship between cooperatives and 
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politics, but the primary focus of the majority of this scholarship is on the sociological 
content and inner-workings of these organizations, and not on the politics surrounding, or 
produced, by the cooperatives.  Moreover, the SHCM, one of the largest cooperative 
movements in American history, has been virtually ignored in these studies.  John Curl’s 
History of Work Cooperatives in America (1980) and For All The People (2012) and 
Ellen Furlough and Carl Strikwerda’s edited volume Consumers Against Capitalism? are 
notable exceptions to this trend.11  
A contribution of this work to cooperative studies is to reestablish the link 
between cooperatives and the larger political environment.  It is to move the study of 
cooperatives from an over reliance on the descriptive methodology of sociology and 
history towards the more theoretically focused methodology of political science.  Like 
labor unions and other mutual aid organizations, cooperatives only arise when there is a 
pressing need that existing institutions do not meet.  They also arise during periods of 
political turmoil:  the Farmers’ Alliance and Populist Movement were responses to the 
early depressions and the rise of corporate capitalism, the SHCM and EPIC were 
responses to the Great Depression and the breakdown of corporate capitalism, and the 
cooperative, collective, and communal movements of the 1960s and 1970s were 
responses to the crises of legitimacy experienced by mainstream institutions in the 
aftermath of the New Left movements and political developments of that era (e.g., the 
Vietnam War).           	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 See John Curl’s Bibliographic Essay, 469-482, in the appendix For All the People, for 
an extended discussion on the absence of politics from cooperative studies.  Sutton, in his 
discussion of New Deal sponsored intentional communities virtually ignores the politics 
of that era and instead directs our attention to the internal workings of the communities, 
their economic viability, and general statistical data on these communities.  See chapter 5 
of Sutton, Communal Utopias and the American Experience. 
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Studies of the Self-Help Cooperative Movement  
The vast majority of research and publications on the SHCM took place in the 
1930s.  These studies, as well as many contemporary accounts, suffer from three main 
limitations.  First, existing studies over-simplify the nature and influence of conservatism 
on the movement. William Campbell, a contemporary researcher and student of the 
movement, argued in his 1934 article “A Social Revolution Meets Bread and Circuses” 
that the cooperatives possessed the makings of a revolution, but this potential remained 
untapped as a result of adept elite manipulation.12  The Los Angeles unemployed dropped 
their radical demands, were moderated, after being pacified by generous donations of 
food and concerts sponsored by business leaders.  Wealthy elites used the “old Roman 
device” of “Bread and Circuses” to keep the unemployed distracted and prevented them 
from taking radical actions against the wealthy.  Laura Renata Martin’s 2013 article 
“California’s Unemployed Feed Themselves”: Conservative Intervention in the Los 
Angeles Cooperative Movement, 1931-1934”, offers a similar account of the movement.  
Relying on notes from one of the SHCM conventions, Martin argues that conservative 
elites were able to steer the movement away from socialism and towards a conservative 
politics based on “anti-communism, self-sufficiency, and nativism”. Martin 
acknowledges the political openness and possibilities of both the cooperatives and the 
early pre-New Deal 1930s, and the multiple traditions contained within the movement, 
but she still concludes that conservatives destroyed the radical potential of the movement 
to protect their own interests.  Piven and Cloward make a similar argument about the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 William Campbell, "A Social Revolution Meets Bread and Circuses," Commonwealth 
Review, January 1934, 166-167, Carton 3, Folder: “Undated, 1934-1935, History, 
Miscellaneous Cooperatives”, Clark Kerr, Fieldnotes, etc. concerning self-help and 
consumer cooperatives in the United States, 1930-1938.  
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national unemployment movement in Poor People’s Movements.  The radical politics of 
the unemployment movements of the early 1930s were undermined by the New Deal 
work programs.  The work programs provided partial, even token relief, but failed to 
eliminate unemployment.  As with the Los Angeles cooperatives, elite intervention 
redirected national movements from “disruption to organization” and thus pacification.    
Second, previous studies of the Self-Help Cooperative Movement underestimate 
its impact on California politics.  This gap in the literature stems from the failure of 
scholars of the End Poverty In California movement, or EPIC, to connect EPIC with the 
SHCM.13  The EPIC movement, led by Upton Sinclair, was a political movement from 
1933 to 1935 that sought to create state-financed and state-supervised worker 
cooperatives.  EPIC briefly took over the cooperative movement and the Democratic 
Party and sought to take over the state of California as well, by winning a majority of 
state offices, including the governorship, in the 1934 gubernatorial elections.  The 
movement failed to achieve its stated objectives, but was nonetheless pivotal in creating a 
political environment in California that was more receptive to liberal policies and 
socialist initiatives. 
Failure to link the SHCM to EPIC not only misunderstands the political impact of 
the SHCM, but also misses the reasons both movements failed to have an even wider 
political impact.  The politics of the SHCM, in which the conservative tradition of self-
help, which emphasizes self-reliance and individuality, was linked to the cooperative 
tradition, with its roots in the utopian schemes of socialist forerunners like Robert Owen 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 The most recent study of EPIC, by Greg Mitchell, which has attracted a great deal of 
attention in the mainstream press, makes practically no mention of the SHCM.  Greg 
Mitchell, The Campaign of the Century: Upton Sinclair's E.P.I.C. Race for Governor of 
California and the Birth of Media Politics (New York: Random House, 1992). 
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and Charles Fourier, and labor unions like the Knights of Labor, later gave way to the 
dogmatic ideology of EPIC.  EPIC’s proposal to create worker cooperatives financed and 
supervised by the state and its stated intention to use this new cooperative economy to 
destroy capitalism, alienated the early conservative business supporters of the cooperative 
movement as well as the Democratic Party.  Los Angeles and California businesses, 
which initially supported the movement, led the effort to undermine and end the 
movement once the cooperatives became associated with EPIC.  
Third, previous studies underestimate the significance of interracial alliances to 
the formation and development of the SHCM.  Early studies of the movement in the 
1930s provide little analysis but some useful information on the role of race in the 
cooperatives, especially George Knox Roth’s “The Compton Unemployed Co-operative 
Relief Association: a sociological study, 1932-1933”, but none of them explore the 
critical role of race in building the movement, why this movement was so racially 
inclusive, and later the role of race in undermining the movement.  Laura Renata Martin 
discusses the role of nativist appeals from conservative political operatives as one of 
many tactics used by conservative elites in muting the radicalism of the movement.  
However, she underestimates the role of race in building up the movement, in making it 
possible in the first place—i.e., the relationships between the largely White cooperative 
members, Japanese farmers, and Mexican farm workers—and overestimates the impact 
of nativist appeals in undermining the movement.  There is some evidence of rising 
nativism in the cooperatives, but it never took hold of the movement.  The cooperatives 
remained racially inclusive throughout its existence and there is scant evidence that 
nativism or racial tension played a major role in undermining the movement.  It was not 
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conservative intervention, but New Deal intervention that ultimately ended the SHCM.  
New Deal Studies 
 This study critiques three prevailing accounts of the Great Depression and the 
New Deal:  accounts that view the New Deal as breaking with the previous conservative 
Republican order and inaugurating a discrete liberal Democratic order; state-centric 
accounts of the New Deal; and arguments that focus on clear-cut class interests.  I 
examine these accounts of the Great Depression and the New Deal, before turning to my 
own theoretical orientation.  All of these studies help us understand the Great Depression 
and the New Deal, but they also discount the influence of instability, contingency, and 
ambiguity on political developments during the 1930s, to their detriment.  I redirect our 
attention away from political determinacy, from clearly defined identities, interests, 
institutions, and outcomes, towards a politics of ambiguity where all of these factors 
interact in ways that cannot be easily predicted.     
Political Orders 
 Studies of the New Deal that ground their analyses in structural breaks with 
previous political orders help us understand what was distinctive and innovative about the 
New Deal, but at the expense of linkages between the New Deal and previous orders and 
the internal dynamics within the New Deal order itself.  Theories of electoral 
realignment, political orders, and punctuated equilibrium provide long-run, structural 
accounts of political change, leaving little room for agency.  Fraser and Gerstle note, in 
their introduction to the edited volume The Rise and Fall of the New Deal Order, 1930-
1980, “This approach diminishes the importance of particular political 
actors…Fundamental changes in political life—those which produce a change in party 
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systems—are seen as issuing from crises in the nation’s economy, social structure, and 
political culture.”14  New alignments are produced through exogenous shocks to the 
political system, e.g., the Great Depression, and thus create the conditions necessary for 
the rise of a new party system.  In the case of the Great Depression, it created the 
conditions necessary for the Democratic Party to become the dominant national party, 
marginalizing the Republicans for the first time since the Civil War.         
In Building A Democratic Political Order, David Plotke provides a more 
expansive account of political order.  Moving beyond party identification, he also stresses 
the importance of non-party agents.  He writes, “Political orders are built by political 
blocs that include party forces, movements and interest groups, and state-based 
organizations and political currents.”15  Plotke’s conception of the New Deal Democratic 
order is an improvement over theories of realignment that focus solely on party 
identification, but he nonetheless maintains that there was a clear break between the New 
Deal and the policies of Hoover and the prior Republican era.  He writes, “…I stress the 
distinctive character of the reformist progressive liberalism of the Democratic order.  I 
underline its break both with Republican themes and policies from the 1920s and with 
prior Democratic conceptions.”16  Plotke also separates the New Deal Democratic order 
from radical movements during this same period, including:  “Popular Front 
Communism, radical populism, and social democracy.”17 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Steve Fraser and Gary Gerstle, The Rise and Fall of the New Deal Order, 1930-1980 
(Princeton, N.J:  Princeton University Press, 1989), x. 
15 David Plotke, Building a Democratic Political Order: Reshaping American Liberalism 
in the 1930s and 1940s (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 39. 
16 Ibid., 5. 
17 Ibid., 5. 
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The SHCM does not easily fall into either the previous conservative Republican 
political order, in which the role of the federal government in addressing unemployment 
was secondary to municipal agencies and private charities, or the emerging New Deal 
Democratic order, in which the federal government played the leading role in addressing 
unemployment, even as it still relied on state and local government for administrative and 
political support.  The cooperatives contained elements of both orders.  They wanted and 
received support from the local, state, and federal government, for work programs, but 
wanted those programs, i.e., the cooperatives, to be controlled by the workers themselves.  
Moreover, they understood this arrangement as complementary, rather than conflictual, 
with private businesses; they argued that the cooperatives would address unemployment 
in a far more efficient manner than direct cash payments and with less state intervention 
and bureaucracy.  They did not view conservative volunteerism, i.e., “self-help”, as a 
constraint on their action, but merely as a background condition, an inherited tradition, 
that they had to deal with in order to accomplish their goals (i.e., end unemployment).  
Thus, from this point of view, the emerging liberal Democratic order cannot be easily 
separated from the prior conservative Republican order, nor was it necessarily the only 
viable response to mass unemployment.        
State-Centric Accounts of the New Deal  
 State-centric accounts of the Great Depression and the New Deal conflate politics 
and the state.  These accounts link the development and outcomes of events in the 1930s 
to state institutions, especially the Presidency and regulatory agencies.  Such accounts do 
not completely dismiss social movements and other non-state political actors, but view 
them as secondary to the reach and capacities of the state.   
 19 
 For Theda Skocpol and Kenneth Finegold, it’s precisely the reach and capacities 
of the state, or the lack thereof, that determines the success of a political project.  In 
“State Capacity and Economic Intervention in the Early New Deal” they contrast the 
relative ease and success of the New Deal recovery for farmers with the early failures of 
recovery for businesses.  The difference, they argue, was in state capacity, i.e., in the 
resources and relationships of each agency; this allowed the Agricultural Adjustment 
Administration (AAA) to implement the Agricultural Adjustment Act and the National 
Recovery Administration to implement the National Industrial Recovery Act.  
 The former succeeded because the AAA was placed inside an existing 
department, the United States Department of Agriculture.  The USDA, created during the 
Civil War, accumulated over the course of seventy years the resources, relationships, 
administrative culture, and political leadership to both respond to and shape the demands 
of farmers during the Great Depression.  The National Recovery Administration, on the 
other hand, did not possess the same level of resources that the AAA enjoyed from its 
embeddedness within the USDA; it did not have the trust and long-established 
relationships with business leaders, the bureaucratic autonomy, political leadership, or the 
authority necessary to organize business leaders unaccustomed to coordination and 
regulation on a national scale.  In short, arguments for state autonomy and bureaucratic 
capacity point to path dependent, long-term institutional developments in explaining 
political outcomes.   
Piven and Cloward’s Poor People’s Movements also points to the critical role of 
institutions.  However, instead of institutional capacity in state bureaucracies, they focus 
on the relationship between institutional breakdown and mass movements.   They argue 
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that social movements are made possible when governing institutions breakdown.  In the 
case of unemployment movements in the early 1930s, they note the effectiveness of pre-
New Deal actions, of “…sporadic street demonstrations…rent riots, and…the disruption 
of relief centers.”18  These “direct action victories yielded money or food or a halt to 
eviction.”19  They yielded concrete results.   
The movements declined as a result of miscalculations on the part of its leaders 
and the use of token reforms (the work programs), cooptation of leadership, and the 
subversion of protest through the reassertion of institutional control in local relief offices.  
The movement leaders had a small window of opportunity to exploit “…the possibilities 
of the time by pushing turbulence to its outer limits”, but instead they “set about to build 
organization and to press for legislation, and in so doing, they virtually echoed the credo 
of officialdom itself.”20   
Like theories of electoral realignment and political orders, Piven and Cloward’s 
theory, grounded in punctuated equilibrium, argues that political change is highly 
dependent on exogenous shocks to the political system.  For Piven and Cloward, the 
shocks must be strong enough to cause an institutional breakdown.  They thus distinguish 
between brief moments of institutional breakdown and mass uprisings, when political 
change is possible, and the far more common periods of routine elite-driven politics 
characterized by stable institutions and a controlled populace.    
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Francis Fox Piven and Richard Cloward, Poor People's Movements: Why They 
Succeed, How They Fail (New York: Vintage Books, 1979), 72. 
19 Ibid., 73. 
20 Ibid., 91. 
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 The role of the state in the SHCM was not determinative, but one among several 
factors.  The lack of practically any administrative expertise in either the Federal or State 
governments on worker cooperatives did not prevent the rapid build-up of Federal and 
State Divisions of Self-Help Cooperatives, which worked closely with the cooperatives 
and helped guide the movement politically.  This rapid build-up of state capacity did not 
result from long-run trends in the American state, but from institutional cooperation.  
State administrators charged with regulating the cooperatives were able to draw on and 
coordinate the resources of businesses, farmers, universities, voluntary associations, and 
New Deal agencies to accomplish their goals.21  Their collective support and willingness 
to experiment with the cooperatives as solutions to mass unemployment made this 
coordination possible.    
 As Piven and Cloward note, the SHCM was coopted by the New Deal, just like 
other unemployment movements across the country.  Moreover, as they also point out, 
this was made possible, in part, from the incompetence of the unemployment leaders.  
However, the movement did not end with this cooptation.  The New Dealers did not 
coopt the movement to end it, but were very much interested in expanding the movement, 
at least initially.  They shifted from support to opposition only after the cooperative 
movement became associated with communism during the 1934 California Gubernatorial 
campaign.  It was not state cooptation, but political cooptation, by Upton Sinclair and the 
EPIC movement, that undermined and eventually destroyed the cooperative movement.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 For example, much of the research conducted by the California Division of Self-Help 
Cooperatives was carried out by professors and graduate students.  Upon request from the 
Division, their respective universities and departments allowed them to take a leave of 
absence, sometimes for extended periods, to carry out their research and publish articles, 
books, and government reports on the movement.  
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It was not the reassertion of institutional control by the state, but a shift in the politics and 
public perceptions of the cooperative movement that played the decisive role in ending it. 
Settled Class Interests 
 This study also critiques class-driven accounts of the New Deal and the Great 
Depression.  One of the most parsimonious theories is Thomas Ferguson’s investment 
theory of politics.  Taking Macur Olson’s The Logic of Collective Action as his point of 
departure, Ferguson agrees with pluralism and resource mobilization theorists that all 
political groups are able to mobilize some resources and gain some influence and 
representation in the political parties and the state.  However, he argues that if these 
theories are carried to their logical conclusions, it is almost always the case that the 
wealthy possess more resources and thus more political power than other groups.  Instead 
of representing voters and citizens, political parties and the state represent competing 
blocs of wealthy investors. 
 The sole exception to Ferguson’s “Golden Rule” of American politics was the 
New Deal when, for the first and so far only time in American history, average people 
organized and pooled their resources to become an major investment bloc.   During this 
period “voter-investors” effectively competed with wealthy investors for three reasons:  
1) they committed a significant amount of their time and income to political participation 
(including to political parties), 2) secondary organizations (e.g., unions) effectively 
aggregated and channeled their resources, and 3) the costs of campaigning and 
advertising were relatively low in the 1930s.22  However, even in the case of the New 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Thomas Ferguson, Golden Rule:  The Investment Theory of Party Competition and the 
Logic of Money-Driven Political Systems (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995), 
28, 29. 
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Deal, labor had to ally with part of the investor class.  On the ‘System of 36’, Ferguson 
writes: 
Because these firms were mostly capital-intensive, the rise in the power of 
organized labor that the Wagner Act permitted and the very limited intervention 
in market-determined patterns of (lifetime) wage setting that Social Security 
represented posed less of a threat to them.  And their dominant position in the 
world economy made them the leading beneficiaries and most ardent champions 
of the other part of the New Deal’s reform package…[the] reciprocal trade 
program, which broke decisively with the System of 96’s protectionism.23   
Thus, for Ferguson political change cannot be traced back to exogenous shocks, path 
dependency, state capacity, political culture, or the “median voter.”  Instead, political 
change is driven by class interests and class mobilization—even if this sometimes 
produces cross-class alliances as it did in the 1930s between labor unions and capital-
intensive businesses. 
 Unconventional alliances—across race, class, and institutions—is critical to 
understanding the development of the SHCM, especially the cross-class alliance between 
the cooperatives and businesses.  However, this alliance was made possible by two 
factors that Ferguson does not adequately take into consideration.  First, class interests 
alone did not generate the alliance.  Certainly this was a factor in business support for the 
cooperatives.  Businesses viewed the cooperatives as the conservative response to the 
Great Depression, as a means to limit state intervention into the economy.  However, in 
offering their support for the cooperatives, businesses also reconciled themselves to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Ibid., 84. 
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aspects of the cooperatives they had no interest in, such as the cooperatives’ insistence on 
distributing their goods on the basis of need rather than hours worked, or their adherence 
to the slogan, “production for use, not for profit”.  What began as a strategic alliance to 
advance their material interests, led businesses to support ideas and practices they had 
opposed before the Great Depression.  
Second, businesses played a key role in financing and promoting the cooperatives.  
In other words, businesses used their own resources to mobilize the movement.  This 
action is inexplicable if we assume clearly defined and recognizable class interests.  
Instead, this study argues that businesses and the unemployed were in the process of 
trying to figure out where exactly their class interests lay and what actions best promoted 
those interests; if we begin with the assumption that they had no guide posts pointing 
them in the right direction, then we can begin to make sense of these actions.   
Like labor unions, political parties, and farmers, businesses and the unemployed 
spent the 1930s trying to figure out what institutional arrangements, alliances, and ideas 
best promoted their interests.  They spent the 1930s experimenting and in so doing their 
interests—for businesses, limited state intervention into the economy, for the 
unemployed, guaranteed full employment—were transformed.  By the end of the 1930s, 
both businesses and the unemployed found themselves embracing institutional 
arrangements, i.e., the New Deal, which they had initially opposed.  For businesses, they 
came to view the New Deal as the lesser evil, preferable to an increasingly radicalized 
cooperative movement under EPIC leadership; and the unemployed embraced the New 
Deal after the failure of successive groups of cooperative leaders.    
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Political Ambiguity and the Self-Help Cooperative Movement 
There has been a great deal of work in the last three decades addressing political 
ambiguity.  These works move us away from assumptions of clear-cut class antagonisms 
and consciousness; from theories of punctuated equilibrium, critical junctures, electoral 
realignments, path dependency, and regime change; and from state-centric accounts of 
politics, i.e., theories that point to the autonomous power and interests of state actors, 
especially of the presidency and federal bureaucracies.  In searching out the historical 
origins of political authority, they also move away from theories that emphasize rational 
actors and institutional stability.  In short, they move us away from structuralist 
arguments of political order towards post-structuralist accounts of political change.24  
These works argue that political authority, even during periods of seemingly 
stable and routine politics, is more unstable, contested, contingent, and ambiguous than 
prevailing theories of politics have allowed for.  These studies contend that endogenous 
political change and political agency are not the exception but the norm.  This shift from 
an analytics that emphasizes political stability to one that emphasizes political change has 
been brought to bear on the emergence and development of the working class and labor 
unions25, the rise and development of corporate capitalism and the regulatory state26, the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Joseph Lowndes and Victoria Hattam, “The Ground Beneath Our Feet:  Language, 
Culture, and Political Change,” in Formative Acts: American Politics in the Making, ed. 
Stephen Skowronek et al. (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2007), chapter 
10.   They refer to this group as “post-order institutionalists”. 
25 David Roediger, The Wages of Whiteness: Race and the Making of the American 
Working Class (London: Verso, 2007).  Victoria Hattam, Labor Visions and State Power: 
the Origins of Business Unionism in the United States (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1993). 
26 Gerald Berk, Alternative Tracks: The Constitution of American Industrial Order, 1865-
1917 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994) and Louis D. Brandeis and the 
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historical development of marriage27, the rise of ethnicity and its relationship to race28, 
the persistence of whiteness and racial inequality29, the historical development of 
immigration politics30, political entrepreneurship31, and the rise of the New Right in the 
20th century.32  As with this study, a common theme in this scholarship is the argument 
that American political traditions and institutions interact in ways that have been missed 
by scholars looking for “multiple traditions” instead of “the American tradition”, and 
looking for institutional conflict rather than cooperation.33  
One of the major points of debate within this field of study, American Political 
Development (APD), is just how far we should go in unstructuring politics.  How much 
analytical space should we make for instability, contingency, agency, and ambiguity, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Making of Regulated Competition, 1900-1932 (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2009). 
27 Priscilla Yamin, American Marriage: A Political Institution (Philadelphia: University 
of Pennsylvania Press, 2012). 
28 Victoria Hattam, In The Shadow of Race: Jews, Latinos, and Immigrant Politics in the 
United States (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007). 
29 Ian Haney-López, White by Law: The Legal Construction of Race (New York: New 
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before we lose theoretical coherence? This study suggests that we have not gone far 
enough in this direction, in unstructuring politics.  The politics of the SHCM, EPIC, and 
California during the 1930s complicates the dominant narrative of the Great Depression, 
which still argues that the rise of the New Deal and the Democratic Party was a foregone 
conclusion.  They argue that conservatism and the Republican Party were thoroughly 
discredited in the early years of the Great Depression; their defeat and marginalization by 
liberal New Dealers was the inevitable consequence.  With this narrative as the baseline, 
all that is left for scholars is to work out the particulars—e.g., the New Deal’s 
relationship to race.   
Instead, this study argues that not only was conservatism still viable in the 1930s, 
but, in the case of the SHCM, it made itself viable by allying itself with socialist 
movements and ideas, just as liberalism made itself viable again in the 1930s by allying 
itself with populist, progressive, and socialist movements and ideas (and with the 
conservative Southern wing of the Democratic Party, the Jim Crow South).  The SCHM 
could credibly be called both socialist and conservative, just as many New Deal programs 
could credibly be called both liberal and socialist.  If conservatism was eclipsed by the 
liberal New Dealers in the1930s, it’s not because conservatism was automatically and 
irrevocably discredited by the Great Depression, but because, unlike liberals, 
conservatives did not go far enough or fast enough in reinventing conservatism, as they 
did in the post-WWII era.34  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 As Lowndes argues in From the New Deal to New Right, conservatives only regained 
power in the post-war era by opening themselves up to new alliances and by generously 
appropriating from other political traditions in ways that, in the process, transformed 
modern conservatism.  
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This study contributes to this emerging field by advancing a theory of politics that 
places ambiguity front and center.  A theory of political ambiguity assumes that:  1) 
interests, including economic interests, are neither fully formed nor rationale, 2) no 
group, organization, institution, or structure dominates the political process, 3) political 
coalitions cannot be predicted or reduced to pre-political interests (e.g., class interests), 
and 4) political traditions are open to both broad interpretations and novel syntheses.   I 
discuss each of these points and their relationship to the SHCM. 
 First, the alliances discussed in this study, between the unemployed, business 
leaders, farmers, people of color and whites, and state actors was made possible because 
none of these groups possessed fully formed interests.  I am not arguing that they did not 
perceive their interests correctly, but that interests are never fully settled.  There was no 
objective set of interests, for any of these groups, waiting to be discovered.  What each of 
these groups wanted changed over the course of the 1930s; these changes were brought 
about through contingent political events that could not have been predicted or controlled 
by any actor or group of actors.   
Second, none of these groups were ever in control of the political developments 
surrounding them.  The SHCM never became a tool of business leaders, state actors, or 
radical activists.  All of the groups discussed here found themselves struggling to control 
and respond to the events surrounding them and all of them failed.  In doing so, they 
found themselves far afield, reluctantly embracing new interests and new alliances.  By 
the end of the 1930s, business leaders found themselves embracing the New Deal welfare 
state, as the lesser evil, fearing the growing power of the cooperative movement.  
Likewise, the co-optation of the cooperative movement by the Democratic Party of 
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California radicalized both the Democratic Party and the Republican Party of California 
in ways that (certain groups in) both parties did not want.   
Third, cooperation, broadly conceived, was pivotal to building the SHCM.  The 
early movement leaders were able to build powerful coalitions with businesses, farmers, 
people of color, and state actors precisely because they did not pit themselves against 
these groups ideologically.  Instead of ideology, they turned to tradition.  The early 
cooperative leaders were able to gain the support of business leaders, for example, by 
emphasizing their adherence to the conservative tradition of self-help, which signified 
volunteerist and civil society solutions to the Great Depression, rather than state 
intervention.  The history of the conservative self-help tradition is broad enough to 
encompass rugged individualism and the image of the frontier pioneer—often invoked in 
defenses of the SHCM—but also of religious (e.g., Mormonism) and secular (e.g., 
Anarchist) communalism.  The ambiguity inherent in this tradition proved critical to 
attracting both conservative and socialist supporters.   
Later in the movement, when new cooperative leaders, EPIC, argued that the 
cooperative movement was fundamentally opposed to capitalism, both business leaders 
and state actors dropped their support.  However, this was not a total loss for the 
cooperatives.  While political support for a cooperative economy was lost, the EPIC 
movement nonetheless succeeded in generating political support for other radical 
initiatives.  After the cooperative movement ended, the experiences of former members 
of the movement led them to demand more radical policies from state actors and 
conciliation from business leaders.  By the late 1930s/early1940s both the Democratic 
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and Republican Parties were promoting liberal, even socialist, initiatives such as 
universal health-care and free mass university education.   
Fourth, even seemingly inhospitable political environments are open to 
unexpected reinterpretations and repurposing.  The conservative political environment of 
Los Angeles in the early 1930s appeared to be an insurmountable roadblock to radical 
politics, especially before the arrival of the New Deal; but the utopian socialist politics of 
the SHCM, the Utopian Society of America, Ham and Eggs, and the Townsend 
Movement, not only transformed California politics, but had a lasting impact on national 
politics as well.  The need to solve pressing common problems meant that political actors 
were open to moving beyond inherited interpretations of political traditions.  This applied 
to conservatism no less than liberalism in the 1930s.  In 1930s Los Angeles, business 
leaders, farmers, state actors, and the unemployed articulated a political vision that 
incorporated and synthesized the cooperative tradition, with its roots in socialism and the 
labor movement, and the conservative tradition of self-help, with its roots in 
individualism and anti-statism, to address the common problem of mass unemployment.  
This study argues that this interpretation of conservatism—in which worker-run 
cooperatives play a leading role in addressing mass unemployment—was a viable 
alternative to the public works programs in addressing unemployment. 
This is not to say that all things are possible at all times.  However, this is to say 
that we have thus far underestimated what is politically possible.  Interests, traditions, 
institutions, and structures do not speak for themselves and do not automatically update 
themselves; they must be actively updated to address new political developments.  It is 
diverse groups of political actors that must do this interpreting.  Moreover, they do not 
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necessarily do so for strategic reasons, as Kenneth Shepsle suggests.35  Politics is 
inherently ambiguous, regardless of the actor’s intentions.  This ambiguousness not only 
makes political agency and political change possible, even during seemingly stable and 
routine periods, but necessary. 
Sources    
 This study relies on a variety of sources:  the archives of universities and public 
libraries, dissertations and masters’ theses from the 1930s, and newsreels also from the 
1930s. The archives of public libraries provided access to newspaper articles and 
editorials from the 1930s:  the Los Angeles Times (now available on-line through 
proquest), The Los Angeles Record/Los Angeles Post Record (located in the Los Angeles 
Public Library), the Los Angeles Daily Illustrated News (also in the Los Angeles Public 
Library), and the Pasadena Post/Pasadena Evening Post (the Pasadena Public Library).   
The papers of Margaret Workmann (Loyola Marymount University) and Rueben 
Borough (UCLA), and George Knox Roth’s master’s thesis, “The Compton Unemployed 
Co-operative Relief Association: a sociological study, 1932-1933” (USC), proved useful.   
Knox produced the only study of the cooperative movement from that era that gave the 
relationship between the cooperatives and Japanese farmers serious attention; his study 
contains a number of statistics and interviews with both the farmers and the cooperatives 
not found anywhere else.   
  The archives of the Bancroft Library, located at the University of California, 
Berkeley, proved indispensible.   Because of them I was able to access the records of the 
Unemployed Cooperative Relief Council of California, the most important umbrella 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 Kenneth Shepsle, "The Strategy of Ambiguity: Uncertainty and Electoral 
Competition," The American Political Science Review 66, no. 2 (1976): 555-568. 
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organization of the Self-Help Cooperatives, which contained convention notes, official 
correspondence, and movement newspapers.  The papers of Paul Schuster Taylor also 
contained convention notes and a number of in-depth interviews conducted by Taylor 
with the rank-and-file and the leaders of the movement.  The 1971 audio interview of 
Frank G. Taylor, the last director of the California Division of Self-Help Cooperatives, 
provides useful information on how the movement ended.  Finally, the extensive field 
notes to Clark Kerr’s 1939 dissertation Productive Enterprises of the Unemployed:  1931-
1938 and the dissertation itself proved invaluable.   
In addition to these other sources, I heavily rely on Kerr’s dissertation, to fill in 
the gaps.  This is unavoidable.  Much of the information in his dissertation, which 
practically every account of the Self-Help Cooperative Movement since then has relied 
on as their primary source, cannot be found anywhere else—it has been lost.36  As Kerr 
himself noted in the introduction to his four-volume dissertation in 1939, “This study is 
intended in part to achieve the documentation of a social movement. Many of the basic 
records are already scattered and difficult to obtain, while others have been lost or 
destroyed.”37 Kerr, who spent the entire 1930s meticulously documenting the movement 
as a masters and doctoral student, and also as a participant and leader of the movement, 
remains the most important source for studies of the Self-Help Cooperative Movement.  
More than anything else, his dissertation provides a broad history of the movement.  
Where possible, I have double-checked his evidence, with his own archived field notes 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 Indeed, many of Kerr’s contemporaries heavily relied on his Master’s Thesis and field 
notes for their own works.  See William J. Campbell, “Depression Cooperatives:  A 
Study in Social Reorganization” (Master’s Thesis., University of Oregon, 1932). 
37 Kerr, “Productive Enterprises”, vii. 
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and from other sources still available.  However, his dissertation still contains much 
information on the movement not available anywhere else.                          
 In my discussions of the EPIC movement, I analyze fake “newsreels” from the 
1930s, which served as the first political “attack ads”.  Luckily, these can be found on 
youtube.com.  Also, in my studies of the EPIC movement, I analyze the campaign 
writings of its primary leader, novelist and activist Upton Sinclair, which can be found at 
a number of university libraries and some of these writings can be found on-line.  Finally, 
the evidence on the relationship between the cooperatives and the regulatory agency the 
California Division of Self-Help Cooperatives was primarily derived from the surviving 
records of this agency located in the California State Archives in Sacramento.    
Chapter Outline  
Chapter II:  Historical Contingency, Race, and the Origins of the Self-Help Cooperative 
Movement, 1931-1933 
The next chapter examines the relationship between the SHCM and people of 
color in Los Angeles in the 1930s.  The movement in Los Angeles began when a crippled 
war veteran walked out to Japanese farms to offer his labor in exchange for food.  This 
labor-exchange arrangement spread rapidly and soon became the basis of the cooperative 
movement.  These early experiences, between the largely White cooperative movement 
and Japanese farmers and their families, and Mexican farm workers, led the cooperative 
movement to the conclusion that racial inclusion was critical to building a mass 
movement.  To this end, racial discrimination within the cooperatives was banned and 
people of color were actively recruited into the movement.  Despite efforts by 
conservative political operatives to turn the cooperatives into a nativist movement and 
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despite episodic nativist violence and policies (e.g., the mass deportation of Mexican and 
Filipino Americans) in the Southwest during this period, the cooperatives never turned 
away from their early commitment to racial inclusion. 
Chapter III:  Political Ambiguity and Conservative Support for the Cooperatives, 1931-
1933 
This chapter discusses the relationship between the cooperatives and Los Angeles 
businesses.  It examines the reasons for and nature of business support for the cooperative 
movement.  As with their alliance with people of color, the reason for business support of 
the cooperatives is partly based on contingent factors.  Even more so than other regions 
of the United States, by the 1930s Los Angeles businesses had succeeded in 
marginalizing unions.  Unlike other areas of the country, in the early years of the Great 
Depression Los Angeles did not possess experienced union leadership to advocate on 
behalf of workers, to channel mass discontent into concrete demands like better pay and 
union recognition.   
The early years of the Los Angeles labor movement was led by Utopian 
Socialists, who, instead of making such concrete demands, offered a number of 
experimental plans to end the Great Depression.  These plans gained widespread appeal 
in Los Angeles and in some cases across the country—e.g., The Townsend Movement—
precisely because they were politically ambiguous.  It was not obvious how they would 
effect the interests of any particular group or class.  This ambiguity was critical to 
securing business support, and political support in the Democratic Party, in the early 
years of the movement; only when new leadership, i.e., EPIC, took over both the 
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cooperative movement and the California Democratic Party did businesses and the New 
Dealers turn against the cooperatives. 
Chapter IV: Factional Infighting, the Epic Shift, and the Collapse of Political Support: 
Critical Turning Points in the Cooperative Movement, 1933-1934 
 This chapter examines three critical turning points in the cooperative movement. 
First, the initial group of cooperative leaders turned on each other.  After their early 
success in building a racially inclusive mass movement with deep support from business 
leaders, state actors, and farmers, the early leaders split over differing visions of the 
future direction of the cooperatives.  They eventually maneuvered each other out of 
power and in doing so left the movement itself factionalized and demoralized.  These 
power struggles culminated in the summer of 1933, when the cooperative movement split 
into two different factions:  those that wanted to focus on “political protest”, on pressing 
the New Dealers for more aid to the unemployed, and those that wanted to focus on 
“cultural revolution”, on building an apolitical cooperative sector with as little state 
support as possible.   
Second, also in the summer of 1933, the New Deal programs were implemented.  
This had the immediate effect of ending the mass phase of the cooperative movement, as 
the vast majority of its members left the cooperatives for the stable income provided by 
the public works programs.  However, neither the factionalism of the early leaders nor the 
arrival of the New Deal work programs necessarily meant the end of the movement, as 
the New Dealers were initially excited and eager to finance and expand the cooperatives.   
The third development, which also took place in the summer of 1933, Upton 
Sinclair and EPIC’s assumption of leadership of the cooperative movement, did end the 
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movement.  Sinclair and EPIC filled the power vacuum left by the initial group of leaders 
and in doing so transformed the cooperatives from a business-friendly, non-partisan, 
utopian socialist movement to an anti-capitalist, state socialist movement.  This led to 
intense opposition both from business leaders in California and from the Roosevelt 
administration.      
Chapter V:  Last Ditch Efforts in the California Division of Self-Help Cooperatives, 
1934-1940 
This chapter discusses last-ditch efforts to revive the movement in the California 
Division of Self-Help Cooperatives.  This regulatory agency was the state counter-part to 
the Federal Division of Self-Help Cooperatives.  This agency was also created in the 
summer of 1933.  The mission of the agency was to provide the cooperatives with 
financial support (e.g., grants and loans) as well as technical expertise.  The early leaders 
of the agency were major supporters of the cooperatives and tried to secure state support 
to build a large cooperative sector in California, and eventually nationally, as a major 
response to and guarantee against mass unemployment.  However, despite denying any 
connection between their plan and the EPIC plan, the Roosevelt administration believed 
they were one and the same and thus refused to support the plan.  
Losing the majority of its membership after the implementation of the New Deal 
work programs and many of its supporters after EPIC, the cooperatives survived on the 
margins for the rest of the 1930s until state support completely ceased in the summer 
1940 and the movement finally ended.  It was a former EPIC leader, Democratic 
Governor Culbert Olson, that finally pulled the last of the state’s support.  Despite 
accomplishing its goal of electing an EPIC leader to the governorship, the EPIC 
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movement had become discredited, too politically toxic for Olson to support it.  Former 
cooperative members, like other unemployed workers around the country, found work in 
the defense plants. 
Chapter VI:  Conclusion  
The concluding chapter provides a thematic summary of the dissertation, 
emphasizing the roles of political ambiguity, historical contingency, unstable political 
authority, and political leadership in making and unmaking the Self-Help Cooperative 
Movement.  I end with a brief discussion of my personal experiences in contemporary 
organizations similar to the Self-Help Cooperatives and the critical role of politics in 
expanding these organizations.  
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CHAPTER II 
 
HISTORICAL CONTINGENCY, RACE, AND THE ORIGINS OF THE SELF-HELP 
COOPERATIVE MOVEMENT, 1931-1933 
 
This chapter examines the relationship between the Self-Help Cooperative 
Movement, a movement of largely white unemployed Los Angelenos in the 1930s, and 
Japanese Farmers, Mexican farm workers, and unemployed people of color.  Rejecting 
the distinction between race and class-based social movements, these groups constructed 
complex alliances that undermined prevailing racist and nativist political currents and in 
so doing helped build a social movement that included hundreds of thousands of people 
in Los Angeles, and, as the movement spread, millions around the country.   
Rather than understanding race and class as being in tension with each other, the 
unemployed of Los Angeles increasingly came to believe that unless race, specifically, 
was addressed—i.e., creating racially inclusive organizations, actively recruiting non-
whites, contesting nativism and racism both within the movement and in the wider 
political environment—their movement could not succeed.  Previous studies focus their 
analyses only on the economic aspects of the movement, either ignoring or downplaying 
the relationship between the Self-Help Cooperative Movement and race.  On the contrary, 
the early phase of the movement cannot be understood outside of race.  
Japanese Immigrants and California Agriculture 
 Japanese immigrants began arriving in the United States in mass numbers in the 
1880s and 1890s.  Settling mostly in the Western United States and Hawaii, the vast 
majority of Japanese immigration took place from 1885 to 1924; about 380,000 came to 
the United States during this period.  Los Angeles County received more immigrants than 
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any other city in the continental United States, with 35,390 persons of Japanese descent 
living there in 1930; one in four Japanese in the continental U.S. lived in Los Angeles 
County in 1930.38  Since immigration from Japan was drastically curtailed for men as 
result of the “Gentlemen’s Agreement” of 1907-08, negotiated by the Theodore 
Roosevelt administration and Japanese leaders, and later for Japanese picture brides, 
wives, and family members after the 1924 Immigration Act was passed into law, the 
increase in population after the 1920s was due to births in the U.S. rather than 
immigration from Japan.  By 1940, approximately sixty-three percent of persons of 
Japanese descent were American-born.39      
 Japanese immigrants found work in the railroad industry, logging and lumber 
camps, mines, canneries, and domestic service when they first arrived in California in the 
1890s.  However, after 1900 they began to move away from these jobs, towards 
opportunities in labor-intensive agriculture in California, in the Central Valley and on the 
outskirts of Los Angeles especially.  Many had prior experience with farming in Japan—	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 Brian M. Hayashi, For the Sake of Our Japanese Brethren: Assimilation, Nationalism, 
and Protestantism Among the Japanese of Los Angeles, 1895-1942 (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1994), 3. 
39 Robert Higgs, “Landless By Law: Japanese Immigrants in California Agriculture to 
1941,” The Journal of Economic History 38, no. 1 (1978), 205-206.  David J. O'Brien and 
Stephen S. Fugita, The Japanese American Experience (Bloomington: Indiana University 
Press, 1991), 137.  Francis Hilary Conroy and Tetsuo Scott Miyakawa, East Across The 
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(Santa Barbara, Calif:  American Bibliographical Center-Clio Press, 1972), 73; Rebecca 
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Japanese American Community in California, 1919-1982 (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell 
University Press, 1992), 24-25. The effect of the 1924 Immigration Act on Japanese 
immigrants was immediate.  Immigration from Japan went from nearly eight thousand a 
year in the early 1920s to 723 in 1925. Lon Kurashige, Japanese American Celebration 
and Conflict: A History of Ethnic Identity and Festival, 1934-1990 (Berkeley: University 
of California Press, 2002) 17-18.  
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and, as a legacy of anti-Chinese movements, many were excluded from entering white-
controlled industrial jobs in urban areas—and so many began as farm laborers, playing a 
major role in union organizing and strikes.  Most notably, Japanese and Mexican farm 
laborers organized the successful Oxnard Beet Strike of 1903, but their victory was 
undercut by the refusal of Samuel Gompers and the AFL to recognize Japanese 
workers—another legacy of anti-Chinese movements in the 19th century.40   
In the early 1900s, Japanese immigrants slowly moved from farm laborers to farm 
owners and operators.41  It is estimated that two-thirds of Japanese immigrants worked in 
agriculture by 1910.  They specialized in truck farming, which involved smaller acres of 
diverse and specialized cash crops often sold to local businesses.  By 1920, an estimated 
5,000 Japanese immigrants operated their own farms, consisting of more than 450,000 
acres (only one percent of cultivated land in California, but over ten percent of the “dollar 
volume of California agriculture,” amounting to about $67,000,000 worth of produce), 
but only ten percent of them owned their farms.42  While the second generation of 
Japanese-Americans, or Nisei, branched out to other occupations in the succeeding 
decades, by 1940 more than 17,000 Japanese still worked in agriculture, including half of 
all males.  By 1941, Japanese truck farming accounted for an estimated one-third of all 
truck-farmed crops in California. 43     
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41 Higgs, “Landless by Law”, 207-209. 
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 Their success in agriculture led to discrimination in agricultural work and also in 
their ability to achieve ownership.  A number of western states began adopting Alien 
Land Laws in the early twentieth century to prohibit Japanese immigrants from owning 
land and thereby reduce competition for white farmers.  To avoid a direct insult to Japan 
and to prevent its application to European immigrants, the laws only applied to “aliens 
ineligible for citizenship”.  This category only applied to Japanese and other Asian 
immigrants who were legally prohibited from attaining naturalized citizenship—it was 
reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in the Takao Ozawa v. United States decision of 1922, 
in which Ozawa, and Japanese immigrants in general, were determined to be “clearly of a 
race which is not Caucasian” and therefore not white (or of African descent) and thus not 
eligible for citizenship.44     
California passed an Alien Land Law in 1913 preventing Japanese immigrants 
from owning land and a more stringent law was passed again in 1920 through a ballot 
initiative—by a margin of 3 to 1—prohibiting Japanese immigrants from owning or 
leasing land.45  Other states soon followed suit, modeling their laws after California.  By 
1943, Texas, Nebraska, Montana, Idaho, Washington, Minnesota, Missouri, Oregon, New 
Mexico, Arizona, Louisiana, Wyoming, Arkansas, and Utah all passed versions of the 
Alien Land Law.46  These laws had some effect on Japanese farmers.  Ronald Takaki 
notes, “Between 1920 and 1925, Japanese-owned lands declined from 75,000 to 42,000 
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acres, and Japanese-leased lands declined from 192,000 to 76,000 acres.”47   However, 
these laws, in California and in other states, failed to prevent Japanese immigrants from 
becoming de facto owners.  They worked out informal leasing arrangements with white 
landowners and would often put their property in the name of their American-born 
children.48  
Discrimination against Japanese Americans was an outgrowth of discrimination 
against Chinese laborers in the 19th century.  Chinese immigration to the United States 
was suspended by the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882—which was not repealed until 
1943.  Just as Chinese immigration was falling, Japanese immigration was rising, and 
many Americans could not tell the difference between the two groups.  Japanese, 
Chinese, and other immigrants were lumped together through terms like “Orientals”, 
“Mongoloid”, or “Yellow”, for much of American history.49  Thus, the racial 
discrimination, political repression, and social exclusion were carried over from Chinese 
to Japanese immigrants.  In addition to the legal discrimination of the Alien Land Laws, 
Japanese Americans faced social discrimination in a variety of forms.  Kashu Mainichi, a 
reporter for the Japanese and Asian newspaper Pacific Citizen, recounts the daily 
occurrences of discrimination:  
At a San Francisco bath-house, at a Southern mountain lake, at swimming pools, 
at places of entertainment, Japanese have been refused admittance or have been 	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refused certain services…In the Imperial Valley and in certain other California 
districts are many towns where “white trade only” signs are displayed 
prominently, purportedly directed against the Oriental…There are theaters still 
shunting the Oriental to the side rows or balconies and dining places refusing 
admittance…When cited the many examples of discrimination, and there are far 
too many to enumerate, it is easy to rise in wrath and demand reprisals.50 
This systematic exclusion, called “Jap Crow” by another journalist working at the Pacific 
Citizen, Larry Tajiri, was pushed by an overlapping coalition of labor (the American 
Federation of Labor), agricultural (the California Farm Bureau Federation and the 
California State Grange), civic front groups formed by labor leaders and farmers to 
advance their economic interests (the California Joint Immigration Committee, the 
American Legion of California, and the Native Sons of the Golden West, the Japanese 
and Korean Exclusion League, later the Asiatic Exclusion League, and the Anti-Jap 
Laundry League), and ambitious political elites like James D. Phelan (Mayor of San 
Francisco at the turn of the 20th century and later a U.S. Senator).51  
These movements were always strongest in San Francisco.  It’s no coincidence 
the California nativist movement was centered in San Francisco, and not Los Angeles.  In 
the late 19th and early 20th centuries Los Angeles businesses led a successful drive to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50Kashu Mainichi, “Discriminatory Bugaboos”, in Pacific Citizens: Larry and Guyo 
Tajiri and Japanese American journalism in the World War II era, ed. Greg Robinson et 
al. (Urbana: University of Illinois, 2012), 10-11. 
51 Alexander Saxton, The Indispensable Enemy:  Labor and the Anti-Chinese Movement 
in California (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971), 247-263.  Daniel 
Okimoto, American in Disguise (New York: Walker/Weatherhill, 1971), 15-16. Izumi 
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Brilliant, The Color of America Has Changed: How Racial Diversity Shaped Civil Rights 
Reform in California, 1941-1978 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), chapter 2. 
 44 
marginalize unions and maintain an “open shop” or non-union city.  Without union 
leadership, this not only led the Los Angeles labor movement in Utopian Socialist 
directions during the inter-war period and the Great Depression; it also meant that Los 
Angeles laborers did not possess the organizational base or resources to mount nativist 
campaigns on the same scale as San Francisco.  Moreover, part of the reason the 
unemployed of Los Angeles were able to work so effectively with Japanese Farmers is 
that—unlike white farmers in the Salt River Valley of Arizona, for example—they did 
not present an economic threat to them.  Most Japanese immigrants and Japanese 
Americans living in Los Angeles worked in the niche market of truck farming that had no 
bearing on the job prospects of Los Angeles workers.  They were forced into this field 
because few other fields of employment were open to them, due to pervasive 
discrimination.  Ironically, hundreds of thousands of Los Angelenos would come to rely 
on them in the early years of the Great Depression.     
Japanese immigrants faced unique forms of discrimination in the first half of the 
twentieth century:  they could not achieve naturalized citizenship until 1952, could not 
legally purchase or lease farmland in California (or many other states) from 1913 to 
1956, and were forced into internment camps for three years, from 1942 to 1945.52 It is in 
this context that the alliance between the largely white unemployed of Los Angeles, i.e., 
the membership of the Self-Help Cooperative Movement, and Japanese farmers 
developed.  Given this context, what needs to be explained is why this relationship 
occurred at all, what ended it, and what lasting political impacts it had.              
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The Self-Help Cooperative Movement and Race 
 Japanese Farmers made the Self-Help Cooperative Movement possible.53  It was 
their relationship with first and second generation Japanese-Americans, whose farms 
were located just on the outskirts of Los Angeles, that sustained the cooperative 
movement in the beginning and eventually convinced the largely white and urban 
unemployed of Los Angeles that racial inclusivity was critical to building a mass social 
movement. The famous first act that sparked the movement occurred in February of 1932 
when a crippled war veteran, William “Shorty” Burchfield, with a gunnysack on his back 
went into the fields of a Japanese truck gardener near Compton, California, and offered to 
help harvest the vegetables for a share of the crop. Part of his surplus he took to some 
neighbors who immediately became interested and went out to work on the same basis.”54  
This mutual aid relationship between the Japanese farmers and the White unemployed 
quickly became essential to the movement:  
This was the period of greatest organizing activity, which at times took on the 
aspects of a crusade. Units were started in nearly every sizable town in the county 
and later even in the city of Los Angeles. Obtaining food was a day-to-day 
imperative, and barter of labor for vegetables of 'second' and 'third' grade with the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 There was some exchange with white farmers, especially in Orange County, but the 
vast majority of the exchanges in Los Angeles appear to be with Japanese farmers:  
“Labor exchange was more with white growers [in Orange County] and less with 
Japanese than in Los Angeles County. Of twelve white farmers interviewed in Orange 
County in 1935, six made donations to self-help units and six accepted labor in exchange. 
Nine were favorably impressed with the self-help units”. Kerr, “Productive Enterprises”, 
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54 Campbell, "A Social Revolution Meets Bread and Circuses," 161, 162. Indeed, the 
Compton war veterans were initially in charge of the movement, but quickly lost control 
when the unemployed began flooding into it.  Kerr describes Shorty as “a disabled 
Spanish-War veteran, an inveterate mining prospector since Klondike days and an 
intermittent nomad” (Kerr, “Productive Enterprises”, 89, volume 1).  
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nearby truck gardeners, most of whom are Japanese, became a dominant activity. 
This exchange with the Japanese was the primary activity of self-help 
cooperatives in the vicinity of Los Angeles for the first six months, and has 
remained a major factor ever since.55  
Once the cooperatives were organized, the farmers, like urban businesses, simply 
provided the cooperatives with donations, not requiring any labor in return.  However, the 
increasing number of units, and competition between them for the agricultural surpluses, 
soon led to labor exchange.56  This entailed “preparing the fields, in digging the irrigation 
ditches necessary…and in cultivating and harvesting the crops.”57 Sometimes their work 
ventured into non-agricultural areas.  “In a few instances units traded commodities, such 
as fish, or skilled labor, as in repairing barns or houses, for vegetables.  Several times 
Saki—a Japanese wine—was given the cooperatives instead of vegetables.”58  
The average day for the cooperatives during this early period began at dawn, 
when work crews of varying sizes were sent out to the farms.  “Contact men” had 
reached out to the farmers the day before and made all of the arrangements for the day.  
The work crews would perform whatever work there was for them—the majority of 
which was harvesting crops.  They would head back to the cooperatives around four 
o’clock, and during this same period the contact men would once again scour the 
countryside to talk with the farmers and make arrangements for the next day.  Upon 	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returning to the cooperative’s headquarters with the crops, both those who worked that 
day and those who would not work until some other day that week would fill up their 
burlap sacks with food.59 The food was distributed according to need, which was based 
on the size of one’s family.60 During this early period of the cooperative movement, from 
1931 to 1933, known then as the “vegetable stage”, labor-exchange and donations from 
Japanese farmers provided the members with an estimated “two-thirds of a minimum 
food budget”.  The following account of the Compton unit, in Table 3, for the week 
ending January 16, 1933, provides a snap shot of what the cooperatives received from 
this relationship.61  
Table 3. Exchange Between the Compton Unit and Japanese Farmers, for the Week 
Ending January 16, 1933 
Produce Obtained Pounds Produce Obtained Pounds 
Celery 93 Lettuce 5,450 
Carrots 5,000 Spinach 300 
Parsnips 6,325 Grapefruit 40 
Oranges 10,020 Lemons 1,496 
Rhubarb 4,600 Bread 2,848 
Radishes 210 Soup bones 1,892 
Potatoes 50 Cheese 925 
Mixed Vegetables 736 Bacon rinds 24 
Fish 425 Apples 20 
Milk 10 Beans 10 
Cabbages 2,640   
 
The next table, Table 4, provides some idea of the practical arrangements made between 
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the cooperatives and the farmers.62  This is from the account of one farmer, covering one 
week’s worth of work with the cooperatives.  The farmer’s account reveals the haphazard 
nature of the arrangements between them and the cooperatives.  There was no correlation 
between the number of people sent to the farms, the hours worked, and the payment 
received.  The cooperatives sent as many people as they could spare and the farmers 
provided whatever surpluses they could spare that day. 
Table 4. Accounting Records of Japanese Farmer 
Day Number of Men Hours Payment 
                        
Monday 
4 men worked 8 hours each 11 crates of 
vegetables 
Tuesday 6 men worked 8 hours each 20 crates of 
vegetables 
Wednesday 2 men worked 8 hour each 0 crates of 
vegetables 
Thursday 1 man worked 4 hours 17 crates of 
vegetables 
Friday 3 men worked 8 hours each 22 crates of 
vegetables 
 
 In a 1934 study of “The Relations Between Japanese Farmers and Self-Help 
Cooperatives in Los Angeles County”, by the California Division of Self-Help 
Cooperatives, the researchers interviewed 24 farmers that “had any dealings with the 
cooperatives” to ascertain the nature of their relationship with the SHCM.  The report 
paints a mixed picture of the relationship between the two groups.  Of the 24 farmers that 
had dealings with the cooperatives, only 15, or 62.5 percent, “had satisfactory dealings 
with the cooperatives and wished to continue.”63 For those that wished to continue the 
relationship, the reasons give were: 
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The main reason I started working with the cooperatives was because I felt sorry 
for the fellows out of work, and another reason was that to exchange vegetables 
for labor was profitable to me and better than wasting them. 
We should all help each other in times like these. 
Then I can cut down on the workers I hire for cash. 
Vegetables otherwise would go to waste. 
Their labor is better than nothing. 
They want to help each other so I want to help them. 
When we have surplus we give it to them by truck loads; when we don’t, they 
wait.64 
The researchers concluded that the second reason, cutting down on workers hired for 
cash, was a significant factor for the farmers continuing the relationship, since “although 
not asked the question, several farmers volunteered the information that Co-operative 
labor decreased their demand for other unskilled workers”.  The researchers included a 
similar category in the report titled “favorable comments”.  These included:  
I always try to pick out the easiest work for the inexperienced cooperatives. 
They worked good for me while Mexicans were on strike. 
If they don’t do good work, I make them do it over. 
When they work real good I pay them a little cash. 
They work good when they have a good field boss.65 
For the farmers that stopped working with the cooperatives the reasons given were “they 
came with a big truck and took my melons, but never came back to work” and “They 	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65 Ibid., 174, 175. 
 50 
took my hoes and rakes”.  Similarly, under the “unfavorable comments” section, the 
farmers responded:   
Steal things; talk too much; take too many vegetables; too many men one day and 
none the next. 
Loaf too much, although I do not expect much; inexperienced.  Do not get much 
done.  Slow. 
Not ambitious enough; do not do as I wish.  Mess up the fields.   
Take too much bossing.  Work only from ten to three.66  
Only 7 of the 24 farmers found the “work (not general arrangements) satisfactory”, while 
11 found the work “unsatisfactory”, with 6 having “no comments.”67 As the researchers 
that prepared the report noted, the produce given the cooperatives would have gone to 
waste anyways—since they were dealing with the crisis of overproduction and 
underconsumption.  Thus, this arrangement allowed for a haphazard solution to one of 
the pressing problems of the Great Depression, “starvation in the midst of plenty”.  In 
addition to the 24 farmers interviewed that did have a working relationship with the 
cooperatives, the researchers also spoke with 4 farmers that did not have any dealings 
with the cooperatives.  The reason they gave for not working with the cooperatives was 
they had no spare work or crops.68 
  Interviews of the white unemployed reveal that, at least for some of the members, 
their attitudes about race and the necessity of creating interracial alliances underwent a 
profound change as a result of this experience.  When researchers asked about their 	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relationship with Japanese farmers, responses included:   
Some of our people say, “Oh, I won't work for a Jap,” but the Japanese has been 
one friend of the unemployed in Southern California. They go more than half 
way.69 
We like the Japanese just fine; they are what keeps us going.70 
The Japanese treat us better than the white people do.71 
Their attitudes about Mexican farmer workers, no less than Japanese farm operators, also 
underwent a profound shift.  While working at the farms, in Los Angeles, the cooperative 
members also worked alongside 129 paid employees of the farmers, the vast majority of 
whom were most likely Mexican migrant workers.  Researchers found that “in addition to 
the Co-operative labor, all of the farmers had other members of their own family 
working; usually three to five of them.  Also Mexicans.”72  In a report on the relationship 
between the cooperatives and the farmers in Orange County, the researchers estimate 
1400 family members and 500 migrant workers from “Los Angeles and grape country in 
the northern part of the state” worked during the same time as the cooperatives.73         
As the interviews with the Japanese farmers hinted, the white unemployed would 
often work as strike breakers when Mexican farm workers went on strike.  By 1933, a 
major disagreement erupted in the cooperatives as to whether they could, in good 
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conscience, keep working as scabs against their fellow workers.  By the time of the El 
Monte Berry Strike in June of 1933, when Japanese farmers, white landowners, white 
farmers, the Los Angeles Chamber of Commerce, the Los Angeles Police Department 
(including the “red squad”), and the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s office successfully 
crushed a strike by Mexican farm workers, the cooperatives decided they could no longer 
scab on their fellow workers.74  Those that continued to scab were labeled “right-wing”.  
The “left-wing” units joined the picket lines to “clean out” “chiseling scabs.”75 A 
“dishonor roll” of their names was published and the cooperatives eventually passed a 
resolution on June 16, 1933 going on “record not to take any action that would in any 
way hamper the activities of the agricultural workers in their efforts to obtain better 
conditions.”76  
Even though over 90% of the membership was white, the cooperatives refused to 
become a nativist or a whites only movement.77 Only one unit discriminated on the basis 
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of race; a unit which refused to admit persons of Mexican descent.78 Otherwise, the units 
banned discrimination and actively recruited non-whites into the movement.  Their 
charters either did not mention race or they directly repudiated white supremacy.79 As the 
charter of one cooperative unit put it “Membership shall be open to any person regardless 
of race, creed, age, color or sex.”80 While many units were all white, all black, or all 
Mexican, many others, some of the most successful, were incredibly diverse.81 In annual 
and semi-annual surveys of the groups, no Self-Help Cooperative units listed “racial 
composition” as a problem.82 This was not because they publicly downplayed problems 
within the units.  The units did list “community interference”, “lack of community 
support”, “water rates too high”, and “antagonistic merchants” as problems, for 
example.83 A conversation between two members of Oakland's Unemployed Exchange 
Association summed up the attitude of many whites in the movement: “'Shall I bring in a 
Chinese, Negro, and Filipino'? A member asked.  I replied, 'Why not'? I thought it would 
be necessary to have this thing widespread.”84 
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Table 5 shows the “racial and national composition” of Los Angeles units, in the 
Spring of 1933.85 While most units were only composed of whites, many of these units 
were interracial.  By 1934, the number of “Negro” units had increased to 10.86 
Table 5. Racial Composition of the Self-Help Cooperative Units, Spring 1933 
Racial Composition Number of Units 
White Americans 88 
White American and Mexicans 11 
Mexicans 3 
Jews 2 
Negroes and Mexicans 2 
Negroes 1 
Italians, Mexicans, and Negroes 1 
White Americans and Italians 1 
White Americans, Negroes, and Mexicans 1 
  
Los Angeles newspapers picked up on and celebrated the racial inclusiveness of 
the cooperative movement.  The Los Angeles Record ran a story titled, “Jobless Societies 
Ban Race Prejudice” on September 9, 1932.  The article notes that “Racial prejudice 
doesn’t enter into the co-operative relief system.  One family—white, black, orange or 
maroon—is as good as another, despite race or creed, according to the relief organizers’ 
calculations.”  By listing “orange” and “maroon” as races, the article’s author, Phil 
Freeman, is apparently mocking the very idea of race as a social category.  The article 
continues, “Stressful times have peeled false pride off these people like synthetic varnish 
is stripped from oak, baring the wood underneath…Secondly, to point out the lack of 
color discrimination, it is only the once hungry, destitute person who can appreciate the 
suffering of his brother.”   Freeman’s assumption is that racial discrimination suffered 	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major blows in the movement because all groups were reduced to the same class status:  
unemployed.  He concludes that during the Great Depression, “The black and brown, 
after all, suffer as acutely from hunger as the white.”87   
Freeman is correct in pointing out the leveling role of the Great Depression in 
producing class solidarity.  For whites in the movement their experience of extended 
face-to-face contact with people of color in the farm fields of Compton and other areas of 
Los Angeles and Southern California, and their reliance on people of color early on in the 
movement, was key to convincing them they needed to work with non-whites if they 
were going to be successful.  In the union movement as well, organizers came to realize 
that they needed to actively recruit and work with people of color, African-Americans 
especially, if they were going to succeed.  Echoing Freeman’s argument, Elizabeth 
Cohen’s Making A New Deal:  Industrial Workers in Chicago, 1919-1939 argues that this 
worked, in part, because working-class Chicagoans, equally decimated by the Great 
Depression, found themselves in very similar economic positions.  From that vantage 
point, they “…had learned to see commonalities where once they had seen differences.”88         
  Another source of information on the role of race in the SHCM are the convention 
notes.  The Self-Help Cooperatives held several state-wide conventions, with the intent of 
uniting the northern and southern units and creating a viable state-wide organization.  As 
I discuss in chapter 4, as a result of ideological infighting and power plays that never 
came to fruition.  The convention notes also provide useful information on the internal 
racial dynamics of the movement: how interracial solidarity was sustained and how it was 	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undermined.  It indicates that not only in Los Angeles but across California the 
unemployed workers that made up movement went to great pains to create a movement 
as inclusive as possible.  As one delegate put it, “This is the first time in the history of the 
world that people have buried their human differences to an extent like this. That is why I 
stay with the movement.”89 This desire for inclusivity was not motivated by principle 
alone, but by political calculation; the cooperatives believed that any divisions within the 
movement would only weaken it.   
  The discursive chains formed in the excerpts from the convention notes are 
instructive. The early experiences of the Self-Help Cooperative Movement, of working in 
the fields of Japanese farmers, with the farmers and their families, and with Mexican 
farm workers, led to the development of a movement that was not only racially inclusive 
but racially conscious.  The membership of the movement concluded that a traditional 
Old Left class movement could only succeed by addressing racial hierarchies and 
divisions both within the movement and in their wider political environment.  However, 
the cooperatives quickly elaborated on this position, building on their earlier experiences.  
The delegates pointed to the need to build alliances with Filipinos, just as they had with 
Mexicans and Japanese, since “Filipinos are citizens” too, “An attack on any section of 
the working class is an attack of working class as a whole”, and “We are going to 
Japanese farmers for food.” 90 They make no easy separations between race, class, and 
citizenship but instead view them as interconnected problems.  Moreover, instead of 	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turning on each other, they pointed to specific institutions with an interest in keeping 
people divided.  According to the “Negro delegate”, “The religious people have kept us 
separated, and the capitalists have divided us. Let's get together and get that [federal aid] 
money. To hell with these factions.”91 
  Their solutions to the divisions are also instructive.  Instead of arguing for a pure 
and simple working class movement, delegates offer more inclusive solutions, capable of  
generating not only cross-racial but cross-class support.  C. R. Rogers, one of the leaders  
of the movement, likened successful social movements to public transportation.  “Be 
tolerant. Intolerance has broken more movements than anything else. Everybody is there 
because they want to be. If you get on a trolley car, you don't pick your passengers. Get 
together, stick together and go down the line, but do it together.92 As with public 
transportation, movements can only succeed if it practices tolerance and includes as many 
people as possible; if it includes people from all parts of society.   
 The most important factor that made this movement and these relationships 
possible was the Great Depression.  The desperate need, daily and immediate, to survive 
the fact of mass unemployment—and with it hunger, homelessness, and poverty—led 
whites in Los Angeles to consider alliances that previously, before the depression, made 
little sense.  These alliances, with people of color, proved both beneficial and 
transformative, leading them to ban discrimination in their own organizations, actively 
recruit non-whites into the movement, and to support unions primarily composed of 	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people of color.  In short, they came to the conclusion that alliances with people of color, 
both American born and immigrants, were necessary to advance their own interests.  As a 
result of the Great Depression, and the widespread deprivation experienced by millions of 
Americans, those interests came to be seen as one and the same.  
The exact date the cooperatives and the Japanese farmers ended their relationship 
is not clear.  In 1934 and 1935 there was still significant labor-exchange with the farmers, 
but by 1936 only eight units still exchanged with farmers, by 1937 only one unit, and by 
1938 no units.93 Several factors played a role in ending the relationship: perceived 
laziness and incompetence of the cooperatives in farming, the persistence of anti-
Japanese and nativist movements in the Western United States, and the implementation 
of the New Deal work programs.  The first two factors undermined the relationship 
between the white unemployed and the Japanese farmers, but the last factor, the New 
Deal work programs, was the decisive factor.  I discuss each of them in turn.  
The Laziness and Incompetence of the Cooperatives 
The Los Angeles SHCM began in Compton.  George Knox Roth captured the 
development of the Compton unit in his University of Southern California master’s 
thesis, “The Compton Unemployed Co-operative Relief Association:  A Sociological 
Study, 1932-1933”.  This thesis provides key insights into the early years of the 
movement.  Unlike other students of the movement in the 1930s, Roth focuses on the 
relationship between the farmers and the cooperatives.   
While acknowledging the farmers “hold diverse opinions on the [Compton] unit”, 
Roth nonetheless points to the reckless behavior of the cooperatives as the primary factor 
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that ended their relationship with the Japanese farmers.94 Roth argues that “The Japanese 
have not found the work-exchange as successful as people believe, and they are 
constantly objecting to some of the practices of the unit in its work.”95 The cooperatives 
were aware of this as early as August of 1932.  At an Area meeting—like the 
Unemployed Cooperative Relief Association (UCRA), this was an umbrella group for the 
cooperatives in their dealings with outside organizations, such as businesses, farmers, and 
state agencies—one member recognized that “There have been complaints from Japanese 
that unit members are overstepping bounds dishonestly and Japanese farmers will not 
tolerate this in the future.”96 A “veteran field contact man” and a “Japanese interpreter” 
interviewed several farmers to gauge their reaction to the cooperative units overstepping 
boundaries.97 
 The interviews reveal the farmers’ increasing exasperation with the cooperatives.  
An interview with the President of the Japanese Language Association in Compton 
captures this frustration: 
 If the unit would only do good work, I wouldn’t care.  I have tried these men over 
and over again.  They fixed my trucks up for me.  I let them do it, because they 
said they could and insisted on it.  They didn’t do a good job on them, but I 
couldn’t complain about that, for it didn’t cost me anything.  If they were only 
particular and careful, but they are not.  They come late and leave after a short 
time.  They don’t want to work.  I must employ people I can tell to do things.  	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They only get in the way.  I can’t tell them anything if I am not paying them for 
the stuff isn’t worth anything.  I have no right to complain if I don’t give them 
anything for what they do.  They came to my garden and did some watering, but 
they were not careful to block up the ends and I lost a lot of water.  That’s it; they 
are not careful or particular about their work.  If they would only do something I 
could count on for sure, if it was only pulling weeds.  That they can do with their 
muscles.  Strong work is all right, but skillful work on my garden they cannot do.  
No, I can’t count on them in the future.  I won’t plant anything in the future for 
them.  I don’t think they can learn to do the job.  I don’t mind giving them the 
stuff I can’t sell, though, for I don’t like to see people hungry.  Don’t tell these 
Americans what I think for I like to do what I can, but I have been disappointed 
with them.98           
Another farmer gave a similar explanation for his refusal to work with the cooperatives in 
the future.  He explained,  
I can’t use the U.C.R.A. very much.  They come in large bunches.  They don’t 
know how to do anything.  They know only how to hoe weeds and they don’t do 
that very well.  They don’t care about the job they do for me and I have to do it 
over again when they get through.  If you don’t pull all the weeds, you have to do 
it over again.  I can’t tell them to do anything, because I am not paying them; 
anyway I don’t speak English well enough.  The foreman is as bad as the men.  
The men take things out of my garden without my permission.  They come late 
and some of them sneak off after working a little while.  One Mexican I pay is 
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worth ten Americans I don’t pay.  I haven’t got very much to give them anyway.  
If I can’t sell something, I can give it to them.99        
Even those farmers that were sympathetic to the cooperatives were still critical of their 
work ethic and incompetence.  This comes out in an interview with a “Second-generation 
Japanese, Hawaiian born who speaks English”: 
If the unit can guarantee me good foreman and honest workers to do for me what I 
would otherwise have to pay for, I will agree to raise more produce and give them 
what they earn.  I have done that already for them, especially when I had B___ for 
so long.  I don’t care whether the unit sells it or gives it away or what it does with 
it.  I will make it a straight business deal, if they can supply me with men who can 
do the work and are willing to work for me.  When B___ left, some of the other 
units came in.  I couldn’t stand the kind of work most of the men from these units 
gave me.  They would take all my vegetables everywhere they saw them, and 
wouldn’t take what I told them to take.  I have got to plan on them, if they are 
going to plan on me.  Anything they want to work for the future, if they can 
assure me I can count on them, I will plan.  As it is now, I have some surpluses, 
because I can’t sell it all, and so I give that to them, but even if I could sell all my 
surpluses I would be glad to raise more for them.  If the men would only take their 
time and do work and not try to get through as soon as they can and as quickly as 
possible, everything would be all right.  They can’t come here with their little 
sacks and take what they want for themselves either.  They must take what they 
work for.  They must learn to do work more carefully than even the best of them 
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have done.  I will be glad to give them the stuff I can’t sell for nothing, but if they 
want good stuff, then I must get something back for it.  It won’t pay for me 
otherwise.  I am satisfied with B___, I don’t know where he came from, but he 
knew what to do and how to get the men to do it.  He would work hard, and while 
he didn’t come back in the afternoon as I should have liked, yet I got along all 
right.100 
From these interviews with the farmers, it would appear that the relationship ended, at 
least in part, for the mundane reason that the cooperatives—composed largely of 
unemployed blue and white collar urban workers—had no idea what they were doing in 
the farm fields.  They lacked the farming experience and the initiative to learn.  As a 
farmer above noted, “One Mexican I pay is worth ten Americans I don’t pay”.  Thus, it 
would appear the relationship ended because the cooperatives provided bad workers and 
were simply fired.  However, this does not explain why the relationship lasted for five 
years, from 1932 to 1937.      
Why did the farmers put up with the laziness and incompetence of the 
cooperatives for five years? Why did they continue to work with them? One explanation 
is they were pressured by the Japanese government to do so.  The Japanese Consul in Los 
Angeles wrote a letter to the farmers suggesting, “Wouldn’t it be a good policy for the 
Japanese to assist their American Legion friends to eat”.  A copy of the letter was carried 
by the “chief contactor of vegetables” and in some instances was effectively used as a 
“lever for all sorts of purposes.”101 Part of the job of Japanese consulates was to advocate 
on behalf of Japanese immigrants.  However, part of their job was also to advance the 	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image and interests of Japan.  This meant not only protecting immigrants from 
discrimination, but urging them to maintain good relations with their new community—in 
this case Los Angeles.102   
Why this would be good policy is obvious:  Japanese immigrants and their 
children, first generation American-born citizens, coming to the aid of American War 
Veterans—who started the Los Angeles Self-Help Cooperative Movement in Compton, 
but soon after lost control as the movement rapidly expanded—would improve relations 
between the U.S. and Japan and might ease racial tensions between Japanese and Whites 
in America.  In other words, the Japanese Consul in Los Angeles viewed the movement 
as a political opportunity, to improve the image of Japan and its diaspora.  As already 
mentioned, it worked; but the movement soon went far beyond this and began taking 
racial inclusivity, in general, very seriously. 
However, this letter and the intervention of the Japanese Consul was not the only 
reason the farmers and the cooperatives worked together.  As Roth notes, “It was purely a 
request and a suggestion, not a command.  It is hard to tell whether this had a great deal 
of effect except that it gave an introduction.”103 The letter probably had some impact on 
the farmers, on their initial willingness to work with the cooperatives, but it was not the 
most important factor involved in building this relationship.  The farmers were more 
concerned with their immediate problems, with the Great Depression, than what was 
“good policy” for Japan.  In other words, the farmers were not coerced into working with 
the cooperatives.   
 The most likely reason the farmers kept working with the cooperatives stemmed 	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from the fact that:  1) even with the laziness and incompetence of the cooperatives, for 
the most part the farmers gave them surplus food that would have gone to waste anyways 
and 2) like other people they felt that something had to be done to address the wide social 
problems produced by the Great Depression.  An interview with another farmer points to 
these factors: 
I give a lot of things to the unit, I can’t sell them and why should not someone 
have them? I don’t want to make them do things, I can’t do that.  The vegetables 
aren’t worth very much so what can I do if they don’t work? I can only use a few 
men, but they must be steady all day long and help me all the time.  I can’t use 
many men, because they are in the way, and I don’t have tools for them.  Even if I 
could sell some of this stuff, I feel I ought to give it to people who are hungry.  
We are having a hard time ourselves, and we know what it is for some of these 
people who can’t get anything to eat.  I like to help them out.  Maybe that will 
help us all out.  Sometimes I have given them things I couldn’t make much money 
on.  They are good people, but I can’t count on them much.  The men don’t care, 
even if they are without food.  I can’t stop to teach them or keep after them all the 
time.  The man in charge can’t know himself, so I can’t spend all my time 
showing them.  I’ll help them though, as much as I can.104    
The laziness and incompetence of the cooperatives, at least from the point of view of the 
farmers, was a factor in undermining the relationship between the two groups but it was 
not decisive.  The farmers had practically nothing to lose by working with the 
cooperatives—only produce they could not sell on the market.  Even if the work was 
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often incompetent and the cooperatives did not work the long hours the farmers needed, 
the farmers still gained extra workers for no pay.  Moreover, as many of the farmers 
noted, like businesses in Los Angeles, and municipal agencies, they would have donated 
their extra food to the unemployed anyways, rather than see food go to waste while 
people go hungry.   
Rising Anti-Japanese and Nativist Movements 
The second, and far more important, factor for ending the relationship was rising 
anti-Japanese and nativist movements in the Western United States in the 1930s.  While 
the cooperatives did go out of their way to include people of color in the movement, it 
would be misleading to state that the entire movement was filled with nothing but 
tolerance and inclusivity.  Nativist and racist sentiments existed in the movement, even as 
they were contested by those who saw no reason to exclude people of color.  For 
example, a unit manager, described as an “embryo storm trooper” by Clark Kerr, 
explained why the members of his unit refused to work for Japanese farmers:  “We won’t 
work for Japs.  I won’t subject a white man to the domination of an Oriental.”105 In a 
separate instance, when Winslow Carlton, the director of the California Division of Self-
Help Cooperatives from 1934 to 1936, proposed abandoning labor-exchange with 
Japanese farmers in favor of the Self-Help Cooperatives developing their own 
agricultural cooperatives, “typical expressions of opinion” included, “We’re white men.  
We ain’t going’ to farmin’ in competition with the Japs and Chinks”. However, others 
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countered, “We won’t scab on the Japanese.  They’ve helped us too much.”106 Others 
“won loud applause”, when they similarly declared:  “We won’t scab on the Japanese 
who have supported us for two years.”107 It’s not clear which of these opinions 
predominated in the cooperatives, those who believed whites were too good to work for 
Japanese farmers or those who were so grateful for the work given to them by the 
Japanese in the previous years that they refused to compete with them.  Perhaps the only 
thing we can say for certain is that the political identity of the cooperatives was still an 
open question—there were elements in the movements that were open to nativist appeals 
and others who believed racial inclusion was the only way to build a successful social 
movement. 
However, what is clear is that there were efforts both within the movement and 
across the Western United States during this period to whip up nativists sentiments.  An 
example of this is a speech delivered to a state-wide convention of the California Self-
Help Cooperative Movement in Los Angeles, in January of 1933.  A number of 
politicians from both parties were invited to speak at the conventions—there were six 
over the course of the movement—but in only one case are there detailed convention 
notes of such speeches.  A speech by Colonel Carlos Huntington, a personal 
representative of James Rolph, the longest serving mayor in the history of San Francisco 
and the Republican governor of California from 1931 until his death in 1934, 
demonstrates that many people in the movement were open to racist and nativist appeals.  
 Instead of appealing to tolerance and inclusivity, Col. Huntington instead urged 
the convention delegates to turn against foreigners and adopt an “America first” strategy 	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for getting out of the Great Depression. He exhorted: “Buy American! And live 
American! The Chines and Filipinos are sending money back to China and the Filipines, 
and they don't assume responsibility of American citizenship. They will take bread and 
butter out of your mouth. I am an American first, last and all the time, and I am not ready 
to give our country over to the foreigners”. The note taker points out that “for these 
remarks and others derogatory to China, an apology was demanded and given.”108 
However, the Colonel's speech did resonate with convention delegates. Whoever 
took notes recorded only the above excerpt in whole; for the rest of it he or she not only 
recorded other parts of the speech but also the reactions of the audience. The sections 
with quotation marks indicate a direct quote from Huntington or from the audience; 
otherwise, it is the observations of the note-taker.  They note that Col. Huntington: 
says prosperity is around the corner—upholds “Hearst's principle of buy 
American”—talks against products of cheap labor of foreign countries—“Buy 
American goods, made by Americans, and for Americans and also live 
American”. Convention applauds. Talks against Chinese cooking food and 
Filipinos running elevators—cheap living Filipinos and dirty Chinamen doing 
Americans work-some applause and some say “kill them”--others dissent loudly-
“no”, “sit down”-“you've said enough”--Chairman gets order-speaker 
withdraws statements. “Buy American” will take us out of the depression-both 
applause and cries of “no”. Talks against foreigners-get money here and send it 
back home-“foreigners are here leeching you, taking food out of your mouths and 
clothes off your backs”--we are not ready to give the country to foreigners—says 	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Schuster Taylor Papers, 14. 
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“communism has no place” applause-this enterprise is “American the whole way 
thru”-applause-“You are staunchly behind old glory and are not going to Russia 
for advice”, “that's fine”, he cried,-he cries in his room because of distress-“My 
heart aches and bleeds for the unemployed”--“have cried my heart out”-he 
concluded “Buy American”-applause.109 
Besides his connection to Governor Rolph and the connection to the military suggested 
by his title of colonel, there is very little academic or archival history on Huntington. 
Without video or audio documentation it is difficult to read this speech.  To what degree 
was this purely for show, and to what degree did Huntington actually believe his own 
words?  Were these ideological appeals, delivered by a true believer, or just the empty 
rhetoric of a savvy political operator?  Much of it was likely for show since he targets 
Chinese and Filipinos, but not Japanese and Mexican immigrants who were, by far, more 
numerous and, incidentally, also had the backing of the Los Angeles and California 
business community at the time of the convention. 
 Regardless of the sincerity of Huntington, it’s clear he struck a deep cord with the 
audience.  Fearing the socialist potential of the movement, but reluctant to alienate the 
favorable labor and prices the business community received from Mexican and Japanese 
workers, Huntington nonetheless succeeds in connecting with the largely white 
unemployed members of the audience through racist and nativist appeals.  Beyond the 
fact that this speech appealed to convention delegates, as indicated by shouts of “kill 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
109 Col. Huntington, Speech at Los Angeles UCRA Convention, 10 Jan 1933, Carton 3, 
Folder: “Miscellaneous cooperatives, reports, histories, meeting minutes, etc, 1935”, 
Clark Kerr, Guide to Fieldnotes., Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley.  
The name of this folder is misleading since the speech takes place in 1933 and not 1935.  
Italics added. 
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them” and applause from the audience, it’s still not clear what impact this had on the 
movement.  It’s not clear to what degree this speech, and perhaps others not recorded, 
succeeded in turning the Los Angeles unemployed away from their earlier goals of 
creating an interracial movement. 
However, there were other instances of nativist sentiment and the potential for 
violence against the farmers within the cooperative movement.  By the Spring of 1934 
many units still had good relations with the Japanese, but around this time there were 
rumors floating around the cooperatives that the farmers planned to curtail their 
production and ship excess crops out of state.  The cooperatives responded with threats of 
violence.  One manager stated, “If they do that, we’ll get the Legion to run them all out of 
town”.  Another stated, “We’ll pull everyone of our men out of their fields and they 
won’t like that”.  Clark Kerr had this to say on the deteriorating relationship between the 
cooperatives and the Japanese farmers:  “By this time several units in the southern part of 
Los Angeles were admittedly using the threat of vigilante tactics to secure donations from 
the Japanese without giving any work in return”.  This was not limited to the southern 
part of Los Angeles, as at least one unit in the San Fernando Valley used “the threat of 
vigilante action against gardeners who refused to supply the organization with 
vegetables.”110 Like the charges of laziness and incompetence, these threats were made 
not only against the farmers but also against businesses and local governments.111 In 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
110 Kerr, “Productive Enterprises”, 607, volume 3. 
111 Speaking of the shift from the barter/labor-exchange period to the production phase 
during the New Deal, Kerr notes, “Production also necessitated discipline to which the 
members were not accustomed in their self-help organizations. In fact many members 
considered the lack of discipline an advantage over industrial employment and fought its 
introduction, not fully realizing its relation to productivity. A concomitant of lack of 
discipline was the slow pace and negligent work of the cooperative members in the barter 
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other words, these tactics of using the threat of violence to get food and other necessities 
were not limited to use against the Japanese farmers.   
However, nativist sentiment and the use or threat of violence against Japanese 
farmers became widespread throughout the Western United States in the 1930s.  Placed 
in this political context, neither Huntington’s speech to the convention delegates nor 
threats of vigilante violence against the Japanese farmers by the cooperatives are isolated 
incidents, but must be understood in the context of escalating nativist rhetoric and actions 
taking place in the Western United States during this period.  The arguments used in past 
nativist movements and state actions, centered in the Western United States, such as the 
Chinese Exclusion Act, were the same used in the 1930s to justify the mass deportations 
of Mexican and Filipino Americans in the West and the threats and actual use of violence 
against Japanese Americans in the 1930s:  unfair economic competition.  These actions 
and movements have been, and continue to be, supported by workers and farmers fearful 
of economic competition with these groups, and by political entrepreneurs like Col. 
Huntington and Governor Jim Rolph who use these movements to steer workers and 
farmers away from movements seeking structural changes in the economic and political 
system and instead incorporate them into conservative political coalitions they would not 
otherwise support.      
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
period, as noted by Japanese farmers and business firms with whom they dealt. Higher 
standards of workmanship and greater rapidity of action necessitated a reformation of 
habits. In addition, members customarily worked only 16 hours a week, a policy 
continued into the production period. Full employment of equipment and facilities thus 
required two, or even three shifts of workers, and arrangement of days and hours alone 
was a considerable task”. Ibid, 275, 296, 300 (footnote 30), 304, 387, volume 2.   
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The New Deal Work Programs 
 The third and decisive factor was the introduction of the New Deal and the shift in 
the cooperatives from barter and labor-exchange to collective production.  The driving 
force behind their relationship with farmers, local businesses, and municipal welfare 
agencies were the initial conditions, the early years of the Great Depression.  The 
introduction of the New Deal work programs in 1933, which syphoned the vast majority 
of the cooperatives’ membership into the Civilian Conservation Corps, the Public Works 
Administration, and later the Works Progress Administration, and the grant and loan 
money offered to the cooperatives, by state and federal agencies, to aid in their transition 
to worker cooperatives—for those that remained in the cooperative movement—was the 
key factor in ending this relationship. 
 However, the Self-Help Cooperatives were moving away from barter and labor 
exchange even before the implementation of the New Deal work programs.  In the Spring 
of 1933, in the run up to the implementation of the federal work programs, the 
cooperatives:  1) placed more pressure on local governments and businesses to increase 
food aid, 2) improved inter-unit communication and inter-unit exchange of goods, and 
crucially 3) they began producing food themselves.  During this period ten units began 
baking their own bread, often in abandoned bakeries, half a dozen units began fishing 
from “piers, barges, and boats”, and forty units began planting their own gardens.112  
Moreover, when they did receive food surpluses, instead of receiving it directly from 
farmers, it was delivered by a third party, a “middle-man”, in the form of the Federal 
Surplus Relief Corporation, created, in part, as a result of the Agricultural Adjustment 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
112 Ibid., 229, volume 1. 
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Act.113 As a result of these efforts, data collected by the Los Angeles County Food 
Administration, a department of the Los Angeles County Welfare Department, created in 
part from pressure by the cooperatives and set up to aid them with food and gasoline 
beginning in the Fall of 1932, estimates the average family in the cooperatives received 
170 pounds of food in February, 194 pounds in April, and 222 pounds in July of 1933.114  
In other words, the cooperatives increased their food production by 30 percent during this 
five-month period.  As a result of increased donations by business, local government, and 
successful efforts to produce their own food, they became less reliant on labor-exchange 
with farmers.    
 While this was important, the key to ending their relationship with the farmers 
and ending the movement in general was the increased role of the state in dealing with 
unemployment.  Even before the New Deal work programs, Los Angeles began easing 
resident and property restrictions on who could apply for local assistance, and began 
substituting work programs for direct cash relief which was far more appealing to the 
membership of the cooperatives.115 As a result of these efforts, the number of persons 
receiving County Aid, in either direct cash payments or local work programs, increased 
from 50,000 in the late 1932 and early 1933 to 100,000 by June of 1933.116 During this 
same period, the number of “active” cooperative members in Los Angeles—i.e., the 
activists, the organizers, those most involved and committed in keeping the cooperative 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
113 Frank Taylor, Self-Help Cooperatives in California: Administrative Study 
(Sacramento:  California State Archives, 1939), 13.  
114 Kerr, “Productive Enterprises”, 131, 229, volume 1. 
115 Ibid., 231, volume 1. 
116 Ibid., 231, volume 1. 
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movement going—decreased from 31,900 in March, to 26, 350 in May, to 21,000 in June 
of 1933.117 However, even with this drop, by June of 1933, there were still 60,000 
registered cooperative members in Los Angeles County (including the 21,000 active 
members).118 Tables 1 and 2 show the rise and decline of active membership in California 
as a whole and across the United States.119 
 The tables indicate the importance of the New Deal in ending the movement.  In 
both California and The United States as a whole the movement steadily gained active 
members until June of 1933, when membership fell precipitously.  In cities that created 
work programs before the New Deal, like Los Angeles, the drop in membership began 
earlier.  The New Deal offered assistance on terms the unemployed could accept—i.e., 
work programs—and in doing so lured members away from the haphazard, unstable Self-
Help Cooperative Movement.  The unemployed no longer had to trade their labor with 
Japanese farmers or urban businesses to survive; they did not have to organize mass 
marches and demonstrations to get the attention of municipal authorities; they did not 
have to battle back landlords trying to evict them and utility companies trying to shut off 
their services; and they did not have to build the novel political alliances with people of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
117 Ibid., 233-234, volume 1.  See Kerr, page 26, footnote 1, volume 1, for an explanation 
on the difference between active membership (sometimes referred to as “active families”) 
and registered members:  “Active members" is used to signify the number reported to 
have retained active status by working during the month, withdrawing compensation or 
attending meetings; but in general it indicates the number which actually worked. "Active 
member" is not synonymous with "registered member." There usually was only one 
member to a family”. 
118 Ibid., 234, volume 1. 
119 Ibid., 74, volume 1.  “Active members" is used to signify the number reported to have 
retained active status by working during the month, withdrawing compensation or 
attending meetings; but in general it indicates the number which actually worked. "Active 
member" is not synonymous with "registered member." There usually was only one 
member to a family” (Ibid., 25, volume 1) .    
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color that made the Self-Help Cooperative Movement such a success in its early years, 
before the work programs.  Instead, they could sign up for the steady work and pay 
provided by the Civilian Conservation Corps, the Public Works Administration, and later 
the Works Progress Administration.      
In the next three chapters I explain why the arrival of the New Deal did not have 
to mean the end of the SHCM.  Indeed, the New Deal could have transformed the 
movement into a mass movement of worker cooperatives; had that happened, it could 
have rivaled the agricultural cooperatives for state support.  Instead, through a series of 
critical errors the movement lost the support of businesses and the state and federal 
governments.  As I discuss in the next three chapters, subsequent opposition from these 
groups played key roles in ending the movement.    
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CHAPTER III 
POLITICAL AMBIGUITY AND CONSERVATIVE BUSINESS SUPPORT FOR THE 
COOPERATIVES, 1931-1933 
 The Self-Help Cooperatives not only formed alliances with farmers and people of 
color, but also with Los Angeles businesses.  This chapter explores the nature and 
dynamics of this relationship.  This relationship is puzzling because we do not expect to 
find a conservative business community, one that successfully marginalized unions in the 
late 19th and early 20th centuries, to enthusiastically support a social movement 
advocating “production for use, not for profit” and practicing distribution according to 
need, rather than hours worked.  
 Business support for the cooperatives was made possible by the ambiguity of the 
cooperative movement.  The cooperatives contained elements of both socialism and 
conservatism; and combined them in ways that cannot be easily traced back to either, as 
many students of the movement have tried to do.  The cooperatives were able to generate 
massive support from the business community, and other groups, precisely because they 
were open to multiple interpretations and could potentially advance the interests of 
multiple groups. 
The business community identified with the cooperative movement’s self-help, do 
it yourself mentality; with their emphasis on civic voluntarism and their critiques of the 
welfare state.  Faced with growing calls for increased state intervention by the 
Democratic Party and an upsurge in union organizing, they viewed the cooperatives as 
the conservative response to the Great Depression and threw their support behind them.  
This was helped by the fact that the cooperatives repeatedly emphasized they had no 
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intention of opposing or competing with private businesses.  They also repeatedly 
affirmed their faith in and support of capitalism.   
The cooperatives thus contained within them what appears to be a fundamental 
tension, between socialist principles and practices and their professed faith in and support 
of capitalism.  How did they reconcile this tension? How did they make sense of it? 
Apparently, neither the cooperatives nor their supporters in the business community saw 
this as a problem.  They saw no tension between a cooperative economy for the 
unemployed (for those unable to find work in the private economy) and private for-profit 
businesses.  Business leaders recognized that drastic actions needed to be taken to address 
mass unemployment, but they preferred the cooperatives to state welfare schemes.  They 
did not believe the cooperatives would interfere with private business, but would instead 
serve as an efficient and effective response to unemployment and without increased state 
intervention into the economy.   
The layout of the chapter is as follows.  I first discuss the nature of business 
support for the cooperatives; what this support looked like and why businesses supported 
the movement.  Second, I discuss the contradictory relationship between the cooperatives 
and businesses by explaining why businesses supported a movement that regularly and 
often violently opposed them.  They key to understanding this support is political 
ambiguity.  The principles and practices of the cooperatives were open to interpretation, 
and the business community believed that, in contrast to the emerging New Deal welfare 
state, the cooperatives were the conservative response to the Great Depression.        
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Building Alliances with Los Angeles Businesses 
From 1931 to 1933, business support for local cooperatives was substantial and 
diverse.  First, newspapers provided extensive and sympathetic coverage of the 
cooperative movement—by presenting the cooperatives to the public and covering 
multiple aspects of their operations.  News series of the cooperatives can be found in the 
Los Angeles Times, The Pasadena Post, The San Francisco News, The Los Angeles 
Record, and The Los Angeles Daily Illustrated News.  The best coverage for the national 
movement was found in the New York Times, The Christian Science Monitor, and by 
liberal and radical newspapers like Labor Action, American Guardian, Llano Colony 
News, Vanguard, Daily Worker, and Western Worker.120  
The Los Angeles Times not only encouraged its readers to join the cooperatives 
but went so far as publishing the names and addresses of cooperatives to aid their readers 
in finding them.121 The Los Angeles Times also laid out the most forceful arguments for 
supporting the movement and defended it against conservative critics.  A Los Angeles 
Times editorial titled “The Self-Help Idea” discusses the differences between the Self-
Help Cooperatives and the communist movements of that era.  The editorial explains, 
“Their co-operation has been voluntary, not something imposed from above, as political 
communism's has proven to be.” Unlike the communists “they are not out to upset any 
social system...they'll go back to jobs and businesses and professions as soon as ever 
general conditions will permit.” Moreover the cooperatives are practical, not based on 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
120 Kerr, “Productive Enterprises”, 902-912, Volume 3.  Copies of these papers are 
located in archives throughout California.  I have copies of the issues relevant to the Self-
Help Cooperatives in my possession.  If anyone would like to see them, I would be happy 
to scan and e-mail them. 
121 Harold Finley, “Self-Help Co-operative Plan Gives 100,000 Food”, Los Angeles Times 
1933.  The Los Angeles Times is now accessible through Proquest.  
 78 
“some wild social theory.” The editorial admits that the cooperatives have not “gone it all 
alone” but have received the “kind of help that self-respecting people can accept.” 
They've received help from the state, farmers, and businesses who donated outright or 
exchanged labor because they “admired their pluck and wanted to give them a boost”. 
The editorial continues, “These people are entitled to something more than mere 
applause...Every citizen of Los Angeles county and in every community in which these 
unemployed men and women are helping themselves should have a live interest in their 
efforts.” The business community is, and should, “...do something more than merely 
'lend' their names to movements and causes.” This movement needs “people who do 
things.” The editorial concludes insisting that “This thing they've started is getting bigger 
and bigger” and that the “rest of us must see to it that they do not fail.” For The Los 
Angeles Times this was not merely a dispute over which method is more efficient, which 
groups are more deserving, or a means to advance their own self-interests, but a question 
of identity. The cooperatives were practicing “Americanism”, another label the Times 
gave this movement, which “must appeal to all.”122  
This political support was not limited to the Los Angeles Times.  Newspapers 
across California and the nation firmly placed their support behind the movement.  The 
El Sereno News bluntly laid out the nature of this support when they wrote that: “If there 
are any persons here who wish to start this movement they will find this newspaper ready 
to aid in giving the publicity necessary to gather them together.”123 A Los Angeles Record 
editorial exhorted Californians of all classes to embrace the Self-Help Cooperative 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
122 Editorial, “The Self-Help Idea,” Los Angeles Times, 20 Jan 1933. 
123 Editorial, The El Sereno News, 16 Feb 1933, Editorial, Carton 14, Folder:  Self-Help 
Cooperatives: Field Notes—Typescripts, July 1933, Paul Schuster Taylor Papers, 
Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley. 
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Movement:  “Expanded a bit further, the same system will provide for the needs of every 
person in Southern California this winter who is jobless or short of money. Bond issues 
won't solve our difficulties; handouts make them worse; maudlin sympathy feeds no 
babies. Let us all unite, business, workers, and jobless, and cooperate to exchange 
whatever some of us have too much of, for what the rest of us need.”124   
Second, businesses made donations to cooperatives. As a contemporary observer 
pointed out, the existence of the cooperatives depended on the “vested interests.”125 The 
support was so strong that phone companies violated California state law by providing 
free telephone service. The Los Angeles Street Railways Company donated old streetcar 
bodies, which were used as lunch counters and dining rooms. Before the passage of the 
National Recovery Act, local meat and baking companies donated to the cooperatives in 
exchange for labor.126 Doctors and dentists provided medical care either for free or in 
exchange for labor.127 The local warehouses where the cooperatives stored their goods 
were all donated by local businesses.  In one town, Signal Hill, California, “the Mayor 
gave the self-help cooperatives the use of one-half of a building which he owned.”128  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
124 Kerr, “Productive Enterprises”, 133, volume 1. 
125 Wallace Campbell, “A Social Revolution Meets Bread and Circuses”, in Clark Kerr 
Personal and Professional Papers, Carton 3, Folder: “Undated, 1934-1935, History, 
Miscellaneous Cooperatives”, Bancroft Library, University of California, 166. 
126 The National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933 and other laws passed during the first 
hundred days of Roosevelt’s administration, aimed at recovery, initiated unprecedented 
state intervention into the economy, with the goal of creating a coordinated response to 
the Great Depression.  One of the arguments of this paper is that this coordinated 
response was already happening, and on a massive scale, outside the state.  
127 Roth, “The Compton Unemployed Co-operative Relief Association”, 156. 
128 Taylor, “Self-Help Cooperatives in California”, 9. 
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Local landlords even allowed some cooperatives to live for years without paying rent.129 
The cooperatives made arrangements with local mechanics to help keep up their fleet of 
trucks running and received donated gasoline from businesses and municipal agencies.130  
In one unit, the Unemployed Citizens League in Santa, Monica, 
The rent is donated by the lumber company whose property we use.  The city 
provides light and water; and water on the vegetable gardens…The county pays 
the gas company.  The telephone is donated by the Associated Telephone 
Company.  It is available for local calls only.  The Southern California Edison 
Company donates light in the kitchen.  They wrote us a check as a donation for 
one year, and I endorsed it right back to them.  The garden plot is provided us by 
two people.  Among the activities are:  Production of food:  Garden, kitchen and 
dining room.  We have a staff.  Eighteen to thirty-five people live here in the 
building.131 
As this example shows, the unemployed were able to get around legal restrictions against 
these companies providing free services through tricks of accounting.  Like the telephone 
companies, Southern California Edison was most likely restricted from providing free 
electricity to its customers.  There’s no other logical reason why they would have to 
resort to the practice of giving the cooperatives a check to cover free electricity for an 
entire year, only to have them endorse the check right back to the company. These 
arrangements provide some idea of the interlocking relationships between local 	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130 Ibid., 41-42,155. 
131 Paul Schuster Taylor interview with C.W. Cook, Unemployed Citizens League, Santa 
Monica, California, Paul Schuster Taylor Papers, Carton 14, Folder:  Self-Help 
Cooperatives:  Field Notes—Typescripts, July 1933, 22. 
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government agencies, businesses, and the cooperatives.  As Frank G. Taylor, the last 
director of the Division of Self-Help Cooperatives, put it, “In many communities the 
organization became a distinctly community welfare program and was aided and assisted 
by constituted municipal authorities and the recognized business organizations.”132   
Third, in addition to business donations, the city and county of Los Angeles paid 
the gas, electricity, and water bills not only of the Self-Help units and warehouses but 
often of individuals involved in the movement (i.e., for their homes and apartments).133 
These donations resulted, in part, from businesses lobbying the Los Angeles County 
Board of Supervisors and local agencies to assist the cooperatives.  This assistance was 
not limited to Los Angeles.  As of February, 1939, “At one time or another 33 cities, 5 
counties and the State and Federal government have extended aid to the self-help 
cooperatives in California.”134 
Fourth, businesses assuaged the fears of the public and the police that the 
movement was communist.  An interview with a “leading businessman” in Los Angeles 
illustrates the point: “The police were too suspicious of the movement but I talked to 
them and reasoned with them about it and their characteristic police attitude of suspecting 
everyone.”135 While the cooperative movement was concentrated in Los Angeles, this 
relationship between cooperatives and businesses also existed in San Francisco where 
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local business owners had “become imbued with the spirit of Cooperation.”136 As this last 
point makes clear, material donations were not the only way businesses supported the 
cooperative movement.  Business support was critical to legitimizing the movement for 
the public and ensuring their demands were heard.  
The Ambiguous Politics of the Cooperative Movement and Its Complicated 
Relationship with Businesses and Local Government 
 Explaining business support for the cooperatives is complicated by the fact that 
the cooperatives regularly stole from businesses.  This becomes even more complicated 
since the cooperatives were opposed, on principle, with any interference with private 
businesses, and were committed to the system of private enterprise.  The charter of the 
Unemployed Cooperative Relief Association (UCRA), the umbrella organization of the 
Los Angeles Self-Help Cooperative units, and to a lesser extent the San Francisco units, 
called on its member units “To protect and assist all existing business establishments in 
securing a reasonable return on their investment.”137   
Their decision to avoid antagonizing private businesses was based on the belief, 
one that still persists, that business owners were “job creators.”  They also believed that 
opposing private businesses would harm unions—since unions could not exist without 
businesses and the jobs they created.  Because all of them were actively looking for jobs, 
they did not want to do anything that would harm their prospects.  Moreover, they did not 
view cooperatives as the enemy of private businesses, but only as a form of 
unemployment insurance.  They saw no conflict between production for use and 
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production for profit, but believed the two should exist side-by-side, with the former 
absorbing the unemployed only when the latter could not. 
Even as the cooperators pledged to support private businesses they did not believe 
this prohibited them from placing pressure on businesses for more assistance or, failing 
that, directly appropriating what they needed from businesses.  E.J. Krueger, one of the 
most important leaders of the Los Angeles Self-Help Cooperative Movement, captured 
this position when he wrote that: “True, that we as unemployed are forced to use any of 
the weapons necessary to force a reluctant public to acknowledge our existence but I 
further believe that any attack emanating from our organization upon the cherished ideals 
held by Americans everywhere will mean the utter destruction of the thing thousands of 
us have earnestly labored to perpetuate.”138 For Krueger “cherished ideals” did not mean 
deference to business owners, turning to charity, or a turning away from politics.  It 
meant operating within the conservative political environment that defined Los Angeles 
politics in the early 1930s, even as they reworked them for their own purposes.  It also 
meant building alliances with private businesses and other institutions despite the 
limitations of this environment, and to “use any of the weapons necessary” to enforce 
those alliances.  These weapons included rent strikes opposing landlords and eviction; 
illegally turning back on utilities; marching to city hall to demand food and other 
necessities; and direct appropriation from local businesses or what was called “chiseling” 
at the time. 
The UCRA, for example, successfully presented a petition to the Los Angeles 
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County Board of Supervisors to obtain free gasoline and oil—“the lifeblood of the 
movement”—for the individual units.139 Arguing that they were saving taxpayers money, 
by staying off the County relief rolls, the Board of Supervisors responded by approving 
$10,000 and establishing the Los Angeles Food Administration, a division of the Los 
Angeles County Welfare Department. This provided enough gasoline and oil for the 
cooperatives fleet of trucks to get to and from the Japanese farms, and there was often 
enough leftover “for friends of the manager to fill their tanks at night."140  When the city 
tried to cut off the flow of gasoline to the cooperatives a few months later, mass protests 
were staged and the services were continued.141   
In addition to supplying free oil and gasoline, and later free specialized license 
plates, the UCRA forced the County Welfare Department to pay for the public utility 
bills—for electricity, water, and gas—of their headquarters. They also put pressure on 
local governments to prohibit home evictions of all unemployed workers and to prevent 
public utilities from the “...shutting off of gas, lights, and water in homes of unemployed 
workers.”142 In addition to petitions and mass demonstrations, the UCRA also took direct 
action.  They circulated leaflets that urged people to “STOP EVICTIONS OF THE 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
139 The Self-Help Cooperative Movement was composed of individual units.  These units 
were the constituents of the larger umbrella groups, such as the UCRA.  The units were 
autonomous, similar to union locals, but gained many benefits from joining the umbrella 
groups—both the political power that comes with numbers and immediate benefits such 
as access to warehouses to exchange their goods with other units.    
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Folder: Reports and Accounting (B), “Resolution For Unemployment Relief in Cash”. 
The headquarters were donated, rent free, by private businesses. 
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UNEMPLOYED, Solidarity and Unity Can Do It Now.”143 The UCRA placed stickers on 
utility meters, automobile windshields, and in house windows reading: “PROTEST 
AGAINST CLOSING of Gas, Water and Electric of our people” and “Don't turn this 
water off by order of the Unemployed Cooperative Relief Association.”144 When this 
failed to get results, the cooperatives turned to forcible resistance. Those in the movement 
urging “We should wait for the government to take action” were eventually won over by 
more radical members who argued that “We have tried all other methods and they have 
failed us.”145  
The Cooperatives elected “home guards” and “huskies”—i.e., large men—to lead 
the eviction resistance. At least a dozen units were able to keep their evicted members in 
their homes through the use of force and in one case fourteen units worked together to 
keep one family in its home. These tactics were popular during the winter especially. For 
example, thirty-seven members signed a petition at a UCRA meeting in February 1933 
indicating their willingness to go to jail, if need be, to keep the unemployed in their 
homes and with all of their utilities.  This was no small commitment since at least one 
person was killed when a unit fought against the police, to prevent an eviction.146 There 
exist no official statistics that might indicate the relative success of these actions. We 
have to rely on anecdotal accounts.  One indication of the tactic’s success is that the 
manager of just one unit reported that his “eviction committee” kept 40 to 50 families 
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housed and kept on the water and gas of over 200 people as a result of these actions.147 
While communists were most likely in all of the units and played a role in slowly pushing 
the units to take more radical actions, the average cooperative member never veered far 
from conservatism. As one unit manager put it, “I am not a Red or a Bolshevik. I believe 
in law and order, but only as long as it places the value of a human life ahead of that of an 
old shack or shanty."148  
 While not embracing or advocating direct action and mass mobilizations, business 
owners understood these tactics and maintained the alliance with the unemployed despite 
it.  An interview by Paul Schuster Taylor with a local business owner captures the 
ambiguous politics of the cooperative movement:   
They asked for one vacant store of mine for one day a week, then they began 
using it six without asking; then they began using the furniture store…It makes 
me wonder if we are starting a little Russia...I don't blame a man for getting 
radical when he can't get work or anything to eat. I don't know what I would do, 
until I got into the same position. But our business is picking up, so I don't know 
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why I should complain…I don't want them to get an idea that I am unfriendly. I 
couldn't afford that. No merchant could; there are too many of them.149 
This business owner, identified as “MacDonald” by the interviewer, captures the strange, 
contradictory relationship between the cooperatives and the local business community.  
Business owners were well aware of what they were supporting, “a little Russia”, but 
their intense opposition to labor unions and the emerging New Deal welfare state and the 
pressure placed on them by a well organized mass movement meant they had little choice 
but do something about the Great Depression themselves.  Frank G. Taylor, director of 
the California Division of Self-Help Cooperatives from 1939 to 1940 recounts the 
massive numbers, presence, and pressure the movement placed not just on businesses but 
on local governments: 
In L.A. County they just, actually, they mobbed the board of supervisors. They 
threatened to physically take food and things...I was there when the representative 
of the unemployed got up and said, “we've petitioned here for a long time...and 
we've asked and so forth and so forth and now we want to tell you we're 
organized, we know where the warehouses are on the south end of town and we 
tell you if something isn't done by the end of this week we're going over there and 
we're going to take the food out and we're going to distribute it and you do what 
you want to about it”...there were thousands of people there. I one time walked 
through two or three thousand people to get into my office at L.A. at one time...I 
came down to my office on Monday morning and we had a whole city 
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block...they called a mass meeting of their people. I didn't know if I was gonna 
get beat up or what.150 
Considering the numbers, organizational sophistication, and commitment of its 
membership, we have to consider whether local businesses and government officials 
offered such generous assistance to keep the movement in check—to prevent further 
radicalization of the unemployed—and were not sincere in their efforts to work with 
them to create bottom-up, practical solutions to the Great Depression.  If Los Angeles 
businesses owners had responded the way we expect they should respond to mass rallies, 
direct action, and even direct appropriation—e.g., working with either private or public 
police and military to violently crush the movement, as they have done countless times 
throughout American history—then the movement might have achieved even more than 
it did.  In other words, by placating the movement, businesses and local government 
officials prevented its radicalization.   
 A contemporary researcher, William Campbell, advanced this explanation. 
Campbell argued that the self-help cooperatives were not radical at all, but tools of elites 
who used the “old Roman device” of “Bread and Circuses” to keep the unemployed 
under their control.151 Campbell saw in the cooperatives the potential for an “economic 
revolution”, but believed this revolution was being stalled by the “vested interests”, who 
leveraged their material support to keep the unemployed distracted and from directly 
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challenging their authority.152 The circus came from free concerts held for the 
unemployed at the Hollywood bowl, in which “accomplished musicians, movie stars, 
vaudeville artists, and experts at terpsichoric arts staged spectacles for the 
unemployed.”153 Campbell, who studied the movement first hand, estimates that these 
services were provided for 200,000 persons in Los Angeles alone in the early 1930s.154  
The bread came from the massive material assistance provided to the unemployed 
directly by businesses and by local welfare agencies.  Campbell is correct in pointing out 
that wealthy elites attempted to control the movement, offering “fatherly guidance” as 
“one leading businessman” put it.155 This same businessman sought to keep “down the 
possibility of any communism starting.”156 
However, there are two problems with Campbell’s theory.  First, without the 
support of elites the movement would have never gained the foothold it needed.  It was 
people like Mrs. Hancock Banning, “a representative of one of the old families” in Los 
Angeles who organized advisory groups such as the Hollywood Assistance League, to 
pressure the business community into supporting the movement.  The Hollywood units, 
consisting of some of the “best equipped units” in the movement, were organized by this 	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group because Mrs. Banning was amazed that the cooperatives were “not at all interested 
in cash donations as such but wanted the kind of help and equipment that would help it 
bring in the needed supplies of food and clothing.  Her investigations made her an ardent 
convert and she has since been on the alert against the occasional outcroppings of 
ignorance and prejudice that have threatened the expansion of the movement.” 157 In 
addition to organizing cooperatives—indeed, going so far as to convince welfare officials 
in Riverside and San Bernardino counties to refuse assistance to the unemployed and 
instead direct them to the cooperatives—and defending it against “ignorance and 
prejudice”, this group then immediately and successfully lobbied the Los Angeles City 
Council and Mayor for food donations to the cooperatives.158  
Second, the cooperatives were run on a democratic basis—one person, one vote.  
The membership listened to the advice of the wealthy and worked with them, but groups 
like the Hollywood Assistance League never exercised control over the movement.  
Whenever such groups failed to deliver on their promises or tried to control the 
movement, the cooperatives stopped listening to their advice and repudiated them.  
Indeed, the cooperative units eventually broke ties with the Hollywood Assistance 
League when their material support began to wane and because they “tried to get 	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control.”159 It’s true that elites attempted to exercise control over the movement, even as 
they advanced it, but like other groups that tried to control it—the Communist Party, and 
the American Legion who started the Los Angeles cooperative movement in Compton—
they all failed.  There was something else motivating both business support and the rank 
and file of the movement, which cannot be reduced to material interests alone. 
The Success of Los Angeles Businesses in Crushing the Labor Union Movement in 
the Late 19th and Early 20th Century 
The single most important factor that made the Self-Help Cooperative Movement 
possible was the acute class-consciousness of Los Angeles businesses owners and their 
success in crushing labor unions and keeping the city a non-union “open-shop”. The Los 
Angeles Times and its wealthy owners, Harrison Otis, and later his son-in-law Harry 
Chandler, lay at the center of this battle. In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, Harrison 
Otis rallied local businesses and led a largely successful fight against unions. Otis and the 
Merchant and Manufacturer's Association successfully kept Los Angeles an open-shop 
city. He did so by using the ever-expanding circulation of the Los Angeles Times to 
“...ridicule businessmen too friendly to unions, to harass organized labor at every turn, to 
elevate the nonunion workingman to a pinnacle of nobility, and to commend various 
nonunion organizations of workers.”160 Business owners willing to listen to the demands 
of unions were “verbally browbeaten” and “physically terrorized into line” by Otis.161 
While labor unions were making major inroads in San Francisco in the late 19th and early 	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20th centuries, the Los Angeles labor union movement was losing badly to the Los 
Angeles Times and the Merchant and Manufacturer’s Association.  
A nearly successful organizing campaign to unionize Los Angeles was waged in 
1910-1911. The campaign sought to make Los Angeles a “closed-shop”, or unionized 
town, like San Francisco.  It suffered a major setback when the Los Angeles times 
building was bombed on October 1st 1910. The bombing, which killed 21 and injured 100 
of the Los Angeles Times' employees, was used by Otis and Chandler to stop the 
momentum achieved by labor organizers seeking to unionize Los Angeles. Included in 
the campaign around the bombing was the damage done to Job Harriman, candidate for 
mayor on the Socialist ticket in 1911 and lawyer to the unionists accused of setting off 
the bomb—James and John McNamara. Harriman's narrow loss to the incumbent mayor 
George Alexander is attributed, in part, from the McNamara Brothers' confession to the 
bombing.162 
 With the McNamara Brothers' confession, Harriman's loss, and public opinion on 
their side, the Los Angeles Times and the Merchant and Manufacturer's Association 
redoubled their efforts in destroying unions.  Disillusioned, Harriman foreswore politics 
and instead worked on utopian socialist projects such as the Llano del Rio commune, 
which was located in the Mojave Desert, on the outskirts of Los Angeles.  Harriman and 
other socialist’s turn toward utopian politics, brought about by repeated losses in the 
political arena, would define Los Angeles radical politics for the next generation. Labor 
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unions would not gain a major foothold in Los Angeles until the Second World War.163 
In contrast to the Socialist and then Utopian Socialist politics of Harriman, by the 
turn of the 20th century unions around the country generally shifted from political 
unionism to voluntary or business unionism.  Politically conscious labor movements such 
as the Knights of Labor, whose guiding vision was that of a producer’s republic and who 
were avid supporters of cooperatives, suffered repeated political losses—especially in the 
courts—and by the end of the 19th century declined into insignificance.  By the turn of the 
20th century the American labor union movement, led by the American Federation of 
Labor, shifted its resources to direct action against employers.164 This kind of union 
action marked a shift in the American labor union movement from achieving structural 
change through political reform and party politics to “collective bargaining and industrial 
action on the shop floor.”165  
 Even as the American labor movement turned from political parties and the state 
to shop floor action, unions remained militant in many parts of the country.  In Los 
Angeles by contrast, both in their numbers and their ability to force concessions from 
employers, the Los Angeles labor movement was in the midst of its “darkest years” on 
the eve of the Great Depression.166 Even more so than the rest of the nation, businesses 
maintained the momentum generated after the bombing of the Los Angeles Times 
building in 1910, succeeding in crushing other attempts by the Los Angeles labor 
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movement to end the open shop.167 
 The effects of the successful campaign to maintain the open-shop by the Los 
Angeles business class resulted in a lack of leadership among labor union movement in 
Los Angeles during this period, and thus in Depression-era Los Angeles social 
movements were far more utopian than other cities—e.g., San Francisco.  As early as the 
19th century San Francisco unions were able to gain a major foothold in municipal 
politics, electing mayors and supervisors by the turn of the century; possessing the unity 
and organizational strength to enforce the closed-shop.168 While the national shift from 
political parties and the state to direct action and antistatism also affected San Francisco, 
the organizational power and traditions of San Francisco unions reemerged and were 
reenergized during the Great Depression.  
Instead of drawing on a powerful union tradition to mobilize and fight for bread 
and butter issues, like the San Francisco unions did during their 1934 General Strike,   
Depression-Era Los Angeles social movements were distinctively utopian, with blurred 
class boundaries.  For example, Los Angeles was home to the Self-Help Cooperative 
movement, the End Poverty in California (EPIC) movements, as well as the Technocracy 
and The Utopian Society of America, and The Townsend and Ham and Eggs movements  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
167 Mike Davis, "Sunshine and the Open Shop" in Metropolis in the Making: Los Angeles 
in the 1920s, ed. William Deverell et al. (Berkeley:  University of California Press, 
2001), 102. 
168 San Francisco’s Union Labor Party elected two mayors, one from 1901-1907, Eugene 
Schmitz, and Patrick Henry McCarthy from 1910-1912 (Starr, Endangered Dreams, 26).  
“Of 180 San Francisco assembly-men elected between 1892 and 1910, biographical data 
available for 120 show that 49 were laborers or skilled or semiskilled workers, as 
opposed to 23 lawyers and 31 business or professional men.  By way of contrast, in Los 
Angeles County, still largely rural but rapidly urbanized at the turn of the century, 48 
assemblymen elected in six elections during the same period included 19 lawyers and one 
workingman, a solitary carpenter” (Saxton, The Indispensable Enemy, 235). 
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The Technocracy movement began in the 1910s and 1920s and harkened back to 
the socialist forerunner Saint-Simon and the work of contemporary socialist thinker 
Thorstein Veblen.  The movement sought the creation of a national economy coordinated 
by scientists and engineers—instead of bankers and politicians—that operated on the 
basis of production for use instead of profit, even while maintaining the constitutional 
protections of basic rights, including private property.  The Utopian Society of America 
revived and popularized the ideas of Technocracy, gaining a half-million active members 
and a million supporters by the early 1930s.  The Townsend and Hamm and Egg 
movements both sought to end the Great Depression by placing the elderly on state 
pensions that would have the double effect of removing the elderly from the working 
population—approximately fifteen to twenty million Americans were over sixty in 1930 
and half of them still worked—and would provide an increased and steady flow of money 
into the economy.  Like other utopian movements in Los Angeles during this era, these 
were mass movements—the Townsend movement had approximately 2.2 million dues 
paying members across the United States by 1936 and the Hamm and Eggs movement, a 
direct offshoot of the Townsend movement, had over a million supporters in California as 
late as 1938.169  
 These were not fringe movements but attracted the sustained support of hundreds 
of thousands of Los Angelenos and millions of Californians and Americans.  They also 
had long-lasting impacts on state and national politics, no less than the labor union 
movement.  The mass support generated by the Townsend and Hamm and Eggs 
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movements were decisive in securing the passage of the Social Security Act and in 
expanding and increasing its coverage in post-World War Two America.170 Likewise, the 
Technocratic and Utopian Society of America’s popularization of national planning 
provided further legitimacy for increased regulation of the American economy under the 
New Deal.  Moreover, and crucially, these movements did not receive the same level of 
business opposition as labor unions because it was not obvious how they would impact 
the interests of business owners. 
The success of the Los Angeles Times and the Merchants Manufacturers 
Association in crushing unions not only transformed the Los Angeles labor movement, 
forcing it into utopian directions and without the leadership of labor unions; it also 
produced a political culture among Los Angeles business owners that allowed them to not 
view utopian initiatives as a political threat.  In other words, the vigilance and ultimately 
the success of Los Angeles employers in maintaining the open shop for two generations, 
from the 1870s to the 1930s, shaped the world-view of employers no less than workers.171 
The alliance between Los Angeles business owners and the Self-Help Cooperative 
Movement was made possible by this shared preference for a utopian, grassroots 
response to the Great Depression.   In the 1910s and 1920s utopian experiments in Los 
Angeles, like the Llano del Rio commune, started by Job Harriman, were fringe 
operations that did not attract mass support.  Most workers had no reason to pay attention 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
170 Edwin Amenta, When Movements Matter: The Townsend Plan and the Rise of Social Security 
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2006). 
171 John Laslett, Sunshine Was Never Enough: Los Angeles Workers, 1880-2010 
(Berkeley: University Of California Press, 2012), chapter 1; Perry and Perry, A History of 
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Neither of these works make the argument that L.A. employers did not see anti-statist, 
utopian initiatives as a major political threat. 
 97 
to these experiments, because they did not need them.  Private employment, however 
oppressive, was sufficient.  However, the Great Depression changed the equation.  Faced 
with an inadequate public welfare and private employment, as well as the lack of union 
leadership, the unemployed of Los Angeles decided to give utopianism a try and on a 
mass scale.  Businesses, fearing the rise of a new labor movement or welfare state, were 
happy to accommodate them. 
Conclusion 
In the next chapter I discuss the role of the 1934 California gubernatorial 
campaign and the End Poverty in California (EPIC) movement in shifting the discourse 
and public perception of the cooperative movement.  The EPIC movement accomplished 
in language, theories, images, and abstractions what the Self-Help Cooperative 
Movement could not accomplish in all of its radical actions and opposition to Los 
Angeles businesses: it generated intense opposition from the business class.  In contrast 
to its earlier support, Los Angeles businesses spent the rest of the decade opposing the 
cooperative movement and by the end of the 1930s they played a major role in destroying 
it.        
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CHAPTER IV 
FACTIONAL INFIGHTING, THE EPIC SHIFT, AND THE COLLAPSE OF 
POLITICAL SUPPORT:  CRITICAL TURNING POINTS IN THE COOPERATIVE 
MOVEMENT, 1933-1934 
The mass phase of the Self-Help Cooperative Movement (SHCM) lasted for two 
years, from the summer of 1931 to the summer of 1933.  Facing mounting hardships and 
inadequate responses from local, state, and federal leaders, the unemployed flooded into 
the movement.  It was during this period, before the introduction of the New Deal work 
programs, that the leaders of the SHCM had their best chance to institutionalize the 
cooperatives.  This two-year period was their window of opportunity to make 
cooperatives, and the slogan “production for use, not for profit”, the response to the Great 
Depression in Los Angeles and California.   
Despite generous support from the Los Angeles business class, from local, state, 
and federal agencies, and partially successful efforts to overcome white supremacy and 
build a movement that actively recruited and involved people of color, the early leaders 
were still unable to unify the movement.  Their failure to do so meant that when the New 
Deal money began flowing to the states, they were not in a position to demand that it 
flow to the cooperatives.  This failure was due, in part, to the success of conservatives in 
sowing divisions within the movement.  Conservative generation of anti-communist and 
racist rhetorics and identities played a role in undermining the cross-class and cross-racial 
solidarity that made the mass phase of the movement possible between 1931 and 
1933.   However, that is only part of the explanation.   
The other part is the failure of the leaders of the SHCM, and other social 
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movements centered around Los Angeles during this period, to successfully counter this 
conservative opposition.  They failed to do so because successive waves of movement 
leaders were repeatedly torn apart by ideological infighting.  The leadership of the 
movement passed through several stages and groups throughout the 1930s. The initial 
leaders came from the Self-Help Cooperatives themselves. Largely unknown local 
organizers like Pat May, C.M. Christofferson, E.J. Krueger, Bob Rogers, and Frances B. 
Kroese led the movement from 1931 to 1933.  This initial group of leaders split apart as a 
result of ideological disagreements and power plays.   
The split opened over what direction to take the movement.  The cooperatives 
became divided between those who wanted to focus all of their energy on “political 
protest”, electoral politics, and the New Deal and those who wanted to focus on 
movement building, organizing new cooperatives, and “prefigurative politics”.  This 
group spent the summer of 1933 undercutting and maneuvering each other out of power, 
forcing the movement into opposing factions and driving away both the rank-and-file and 
leadership in the process.   
It was in this environment that the second group of leaders, Upton Sinclair and the 
End Poverty in California (EPIC) movement, emerged and took over the movement. 
While the Self-Help Cooperatives did not formally endorse EPIC, the cooperatives, and 
other Los Angeles-based social movements, formed EPIC’s political base.  Sinclair and 
other EPIC leaders asserted control over the movement in the summer of 1933 just as the 
previous group was walking away from the cooperatives—disillusioned with infighting.  
EPIC, arriving as it did at the same time as the New Deal work programs, sought to 
redirect the New Deal in California away from what they saw as fiscally wasteful public 
 100 
works projects towards worker cooperatives that would only produce what the 
unemployed needed—e.g., food, clothing, shelter, and other necessities.  Unlike the 
SHCM, EPIC set out to both build up the cooperative movement and to destroy 
capitalism.  In doing so, it antagonized the California business class, which previously 
did not view the SHCM as a threat to their interests.  The EPIC movement eventually 
collapsed as a result of overwhelming business opposition and later, like the original 
leaders of the SHCM, from infighting and petty power plays. 
The internal dissension and factionalism produced by this infighting meant that, 
unlike the Labor Union Movement, for example, the cooperatives failed to leave a lasting 
institutional mark on the post-war economic and political structures of California or any 
other state; and worker and consumer cooperatives would not again be considered as 
serious alternatives to corporate capitalism until the 1960s and 1970s. 
The Unemployed Cooperative Relief Association and the Mass Phase of the 
Movement 
The single most important organization of the SHCM was the Unemployed 
Cooperative Relief Association (UCRA), an organization formed in July of 1932. The 
individual cooperatives, or units as they were called, remained autonomous, turning to 
the UCRA to help organize new cooperatives, represent the cooperative movement as a 
whole when dealing with state agencies, businesses, and farmers, and coordinating inter-
cooperative activities (e.g., organizing marches, exchanging goods, information, and 
etcetera).172 The UCRA consisted of two delegates from each unit, who met every week 
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to exchange “information, ideas and methods.”173 Because of its massive numbers and 
presence in Los Angeles, the UCRA was successful in generating public support for the 
cooperatives during this early period.  As discussed in chapter 3, it regularly and 
successfully petitioned local businesses for material support.  When this support was not 
forthcoming, when the petitions failed, they turned to mass demonstrations, direct action, 
and appropriation.  They used these same tactics to force material concessions from the 
state as well.   
The UCRA, for example, successfully presented a petition to the Los Angeles 
County Board of Supervisors to obtain free gasoline and oil—“the lifeblood of the 
movement”--for the individual units. Arguing that they were saving taxpayers money, by 
staying off the County relief rolls, the Board of Supervisors responded by approving 
$10,000 and establishing the Los Angeles Food Administration, a division of the Los 
Angeles County Welfare Department. This provided enough gasoline and oil for the units 
to get their fleet of trucks to and from the Japanese farms, and there was often enough 
leftover “for friends of the manager to fill their tanks at night.".  When the city tried to 
cut off the flow of gasoline and oil to the cooperatives a few months later, mass protests 
were staged and the services were continued.174   
In addition to supplying free oil and gasoline, and later free specialized license 
plates, the UCRA convinced the County Welfare Department to pay for the public utility 
bills—for electricity, water, and gas—of their headquarters. They also put pressure on 
local governments to prohibit home evictions of all unemployed workers and to prevent 	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public utilities from the “...shutting off of gas, lights, and water in homes of unemployed 
workers.”175 In addition to petitions and mass demonstrations, the UCRA also took direct 
action.  They circulated leaflets that urged people to “STOP EVICTIONS OF THE 
UNEMPLOYED, Solidarity and Unity Can Do It Now.”176 The UCRA placed stickers on 
utility meters, automobile windshields, and in house windows reading: “PROTEST 
AGAINST CLOSING of Gas, Water and Electric of our people” and “Don't turn this 
water off by order of the Unemployed Cooperative Relief Association.”177 When this 
failed to get results, the cooperatives turned to forcible resistance. Those in the movement 
urging that “We should wait for the government to take action” were eventually won over 
by more radical members who argued that “We have tried all other methods and they 
have failed us.”178  
The Cooperatives elected “home guards” and “huskies”—i.e., large men—to lead 
the resistance to the evictions. At least a dozen units were able to keep their evicted 
members in their homes through the use of force and in one case fourteen units worked 
together to keep one family in its home. These tactics were popular during the winter 
especially. For example, thirty-seven members signed a petition at a UCRA meeting in 
February 1933 indicating their willingness to go to jail, if need be, to keep the 
unemployed in their homes and with all of their utilities. There exist no official statistics 
that might indicate the relative success of these actions. We have to rely on anecdotal 	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accounts.  One indication of the popularity of this tactic is that the manager of just one 
unit reported that his “eviction committee” kept 40 to 50 families housed and kept on the 
water and gas of over 200 people during this period.179 While communists were most 
likely in all of the units, and played a role in slowly pushing the units to take more radical 
actions, the average unit member, like the average union member, never veered far from 
mainstream institutions or traditions. As one unit manager put it, “I am not a Red or a 
Bolshevik. I believe in law and order, but only as long as it places the value of a human 
life ahead of that of an old shack or shanty."180 
During these early years, before the New Deal Work programs and before many 
political and economic leaders were sure how to adequately respond to the Great 
Depression and mass unemployment, the Self-Help Cooperative Movement attracted 
many people in Los Angeles, and elsewhere, who did not identify with radical groups like 
the Communist Party, but who nevertheless needed some kind of organized response to 
their collective problems.  As the manager says above, these were people who valued 
“law and order” but only if it did not leave them homeless and starving at the end of the 
day.  With political leaders still scrambling to recognize, let alone, adequately respond to 
the severity of the crisis in the early 1930s, organizations like the SHCM were able to 
attract hundreds of thousands, and nationally millions of members.   
The leaders of the movement during this period were able to channel that energy 
into concrete gains for its members—e.g., keeping people in their homes, with all of their 	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worked very closely with communists to push the units in a more radical direction. 
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utilities, and with food—and were able to generate widespread support, coordinating state 
agencies, the business community, and local farmers to accomplish these ends.  Thus, 
with the election of FDR and the arrival of New Deal money and support in mid-1933, 
the leaders of the SHCM found themselves in a position to demand that the cooperatives 
receive a share of that money and support.  However, at the very moment when the 
SHCM most needed a solid and unified leadership, it was torn apart by ideological 
disagreements over the future of the movement.  
The Arrival of the New Deal, Internal Fights, and the End of the Mass Phase of the 
Movement 
The most important governing body within the UCRA was the County Council, 
an executive board which held weekly meetings, open to the public. The County Council 
was critical in building the SHCM and later in tearing it apart. The most influential 
members and the original organizers of the County Council were “…Chris 
Christopherson, a Mormon carpenter, who had been secretary of a Rochdale Cooperative 
in Salt Lake City, Bob Rogers, skilled factory worker and later a CIO organizer; Ernie 
Krueger, railroad conductor, Commander of the Legion in a North Dakota town, and 
candidate for a state office on the Democratic ticket in North Dakota; and Pat May, 
reputed former I.W.W. and union organizer, saw the possibilities of power in the 
organized strength of the units.”181 Under the leadership of these “four horsemen”, the 
UCRA organized new cooperatives with a “missionary zeal.”182 Half a dozen organizers 
established new groups throughout California in the Fall of 1932.  Their slogan and goal 	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was to “organize every man, woman, and child in the State.”183 Early on they made the 
critical decision to include all unemployed workers in the UCRA, regardless of their 
background. This included all occupations—from San Pedro Longshoremen and 
Torrance steel-mill workers to Hollywood Artists—and all races. Black and Mexican 
units were admitted with full voting rights, under the slogan: “no race, no creed, no color 
distinctions.”184  
The pursuance of these policies by the County Council led to the rapid growth of 
members and units in 1932 and early 1933.185 Under the leadership of this first group the 
UCRA became one of the largest organizations of the unemployed in the 1930s.  The 
movement peaked in membership from this period, late 1932, to the implementation of 
the Civilian Conservation Corps in June of 1933.  Over a hundred thousand “family 
heads” in Los Angeles directly benefited from the movement from 1932 to 1938, with the 
vast majority involved in the movement before the introduction of the New Deal.  This 
means that several hundred thousand, and perhaps as many as a million, people in the Los 
Angeles area either directly or indirectly benefited from the SHCM. 
Christopherson, Rogers, Krueger, and May were initially united by the desire to 
expand the movement and to prevent outside groups from taking it over—including 
leftists, e.g., communist groups, and conservatives, e.g., veterans groups.  By early 1933 
these threats had been thwarted, and they then proceeded to turn on each other. They split 
over ideological differences, over the future direction of the movement. The split, one 
that plays out in many social movements, was between what Barbara Epstein called 	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“political protest and cultural revolution”. Christopherson, Rogers, and Krueger were 
advocates of cultural revolution.  As Krueger put it, “I believe our organization has a well 
defined place in the society of to-day and I further believe that that place can be made 
secure and strong by working with and through constituted authority and the present 
tottering economic regime.”186 They contended that the future of the cooperative 
movement lie in building actual cooperatives. To that end they fought to avoid 
radicalism, stay out of politics, and keep the movement mainstream. Pat May, whose 
IWW background was far more radical than the other three, thought the focus of the 
movement should be political:  building up a political movement strong enough to 
control, or at least significantly influence, the direction of the New Deal in California.  
What they could agree on was the necessity of expanding the movement beyond 
Los Angeles and building a genuinely state-wide cooperative movement. To this end, a 
state-wide council was formed to coordinate this drive, and six state-wide conventions 
were held in 1932 and 1933 to firmly unite the Northern and Southern California units. It 
was at these conventions that the leadership conflicts played out, conflicts that destroyed 
the movement by June of 1933, at the precise moment when they needed to be united if 
they hoped to influence the direction of the New Deal in California.  
The first three conventions, held in Fresno, San Jose, and Los Angeles were 
successful events. Each one attracted greater attendance, media coverage, and political 
interest than the last. The momentum began to ebb beginning with the fourth convention 
in Oakland, in April of 1933. It was at this convention that the leadership conflicts, 
originating with the Los Angeles leaders, began to adversely effect the development of 	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the state-wide movement. The conflicts between Christopherson, Rogers, Krueger, and 
May escalated only a month before the Oakland convention, in March of 1933, when 
Rogers and Krueger were accused by May of accepting bribes from the Citizen's 
committee and the local County Welfare Office, and were then repudiated by a 
committee controlled by May.  Rogers left the UCRA, and Krueger decided to leave Los 
Angeles for San Francisco to find work and to organize units in Northern California, 
where the movement was far weaker than in the South.187  
The Oakland meeting ended in a stalemate.  While the Northern movement was 
far weaker than the South, between the units in Oakland and San Francisco, and his 
remaining support in the South, Krueger managed to avoid a recall from his position as 
head of the state-wide UCRA. The recall, pushed by May, ostensibly had to do with 
Krueger “hob-nobbing” with politicians. It was also at this convention that 
Christopherson was maneuvered out of his position as Chairman of the Los Angeles 
County Council.  As Krueger put it in a June 1933 letter to Frances Kroese, another 
influential leader in the movement who appears to have steered clear of the leadership 
battles, “…it is quite apparent to anyone who takes the trouble to see that the organization 
is rapidly approaching the cross-roads of its existence.”188 The splits within the Los 
Angeles leadership, already fractured during the Oakland convention, “ruptured” at the 
next state-wide convention in San Francisco.  To continue Krueger’s metaphor, the San 
Francisco convention took the wrong turn. 
The San Francisco convention, held in July of 1933, signaled the end of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
187 Kerr, “Productive Enterprises”, 172, volume 1. 
188 Letter to Frances Kroese, 10 June 1933, Unemployed Cooperative Relief Council of 
California., et al. 
 108 
campaign to create a powerful state-wide SHCM and it was the beginning of the end of 
the SHCM in general.  In an attempt to reassert control over the movement, Krueger 
called the convention and then invoked a technical rule passed by the previous 
convention—that no unit be seated that has not made monthly reports to the State 
Secretary—to prevent the recognition of Los Angeles delegates controlled by May. The 
unrecognized Los Angeles delegates were ejected from the convention hall.  Immediately 
afterwards, May called for a “rump convention”, which was held a few doors down and 
declared itself the official convention and leadership of the state-wide SHCM.   
This is how the San Francisco convention ended, with the delegates focusing all 
of their time and energy on power plays and political maneuvering, trying to determine 
who will control the future of the movement.  “…Hour after hour, yes, day after day the 
time went without accomplishment other than discussion on minute technicalities 
regarding seating of delegates—“jockeying for power” as it was termed by one disgusted 
delegate.”189 Not long after the convention, many of the movement leaders saw the 
writing on the wall, so to speak.  In a letter to E.J. Krueger two weeks after the 
convention, Chris Christopherson stated:   
In so far as the morale in the unemployed movement in Los Angeles goes, the 
machine is operating but very much as a machine, and not as a group of human 
beings.  Therefore it is only a matter of time until valves and bearings, not being 
of the ball-bearing type, and because the oil is leaking out very fast, will burn 
out—unless I am badly mistaken, and if I am mistaken on this point, “it would be 
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the first mistake I ever made in my life.”190    
This posturing not only produced cynicism within the movement, leading some of the 
best units, members, and leaders to withdraw from the movement all-together191, but, 
critically, political leaders in Sacramento and Washington, facing a fractured, rather than 
a united movement, felt less pressure to direct resources towards the cooperative 
movement—in contrast to the gains made by industrial unions and agricultural 
cooperatives and farmers during this same period, for example. 
Pat May called another state-wide convention in January of 1934, in San Jose, in 
one last attempt at building a strong state-wide movement. May's Los Angeles delegates 
were numerous enough to dominate the convention, but the ideological split which 
caused the rift within the leadership remained and was not resolved at the convention. 
The movement remained split between those that sought to avoid politics, at this point led 
by the San Francisco and northern cooperative units, whose goal was to live the 
cooperative movement and spread the practice of production for use as far as possible 
through this prefigurative practice, i.e., those who sought a “cultural revolution”; and 
those who thought all of their efforts should go into controlling the disbursement of 
federal New Deal relief money in California, focusing their activities on “political-relief’ 
and state politics.  This division, previously only ideological, but with May in charge of 
the Southern California units and Krueger’s influence on the already pre-figurative 	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politics orientation of the Northern California units, became a geographical split.  These 
splits within the leadership generated at the previous convention in San Francisco were 
not resolved at this San Jose Convention—which proved to be the last state convention of 
the movement. 
The leadership conflicts occurred at the top levels of the movement, but the 
divisions generated during this period filtered down to the individual units, to the rank 
and file, as well, leaving them disillusioned with the movement and looking for 
alternatives.  The most active members began leaving the cooperatives during this 
period.192 As I note in chapter 2, the number of active members, those most involved and 
committed in keeping the cooperative movement going, decreased from 31,900 in March, 
to 26, 350 in May, and dropped again to 21,000 in June of 1933.193 This amounts to a 
one-third drop in active membership.  During this same period, the number of 
cooperative units in Los Angeles County increased from 110 in March to 128 in July of 
1933—a one-sixth increase.194 While some of this increase was from new units starting in 
places where previously there were none, the majority of the increase came about as a 
result of factional splintering.  For example, one group in East Los Angeles had four units 
develop out of it and one in Monterey had five develop from it—both without 
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accompanying increases in membership.195 The average unit membership decreased from 
270 in April to 165 in July of 1933.196 This situation meant that by June of 1933, there 
were fewer active members in the organizations—these persons either gained jobs in 
private employment or gained public employment with Los Angeles county and were 
later absorbed into the New Deal work programs—and those that remained in the 
movement were now spread out into more units divided along ideological lines. 
The timing of the failures of the San Francisco and San Jose conventions proved 
disastrous for the Self-Help Cooperatives as a mass movement. The disintegration of the 
state-wide movement in July of 1933 overlapped with the beginning of the New Deal 
programs.  The lack of leadership within the movement, as a result of these power 
struggles, opened the movement to federal leadership.  In a letter from E.J. Krueger to 
Frances Kroese on August 3, 1933, Krueger explains the new dynamics of the movement: 
I held several interesting meetings while in the South [of California], at which 
time our attitude toward the Wagner-Lewis Bill and its effect on our organization 
was taken up and thoroughly discussed…the FERA is going to deal directly with 
the smaller units rather than with the larger or central group.  This is done for 
various reasons, chief among them is that there is so much dissension and 
dissatisfaction among the leaders of the organization.  Also, there is no direct 
representative body of the entire group which can be chosen as spokesmen…the 
Government is right…the dissension so rampant within our organization is the 
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cause of this more or less arbitrary action on the part of the Government.197      
The arbitrary action Krueger refers to is the government going around the umbrella 
organizations like the UCRA and the leadership, and instead dealing directly with the 
individual units and members.  Without groups like the UCRA to speak on behalf of the 
entire movement and collectively make their demands to the government, the cooperative 
movement was forced to follow the leadership of the federal and state agencies regulating 
them.  Unlike the pre-New Deal era, they no longer possessed the leadership or mass 
numbers to force state actors, and business leaders, to listen to their demands.  
Had the New Deal programs began a year earlier, or even six months earlier, the 
cooperatives, still unified and still one of the largest movements of the unemployed in the 
country, would have been powerful enough to both divert massive amounts of New Deal 
money into cooperative infrastructure—i.e., buying buildings and machinery outright—
and maintain the growth and spread of the movement. However, the opposite occurred. 
Instead of controlling the New Deal, the New Deal controlled the movement. The rank-
and-file of the cooperative movement were immediately syphoned into the Civilian 
Conservation Corps (CCC) and other New Deal programs.  By the end of 1933 the 
SHCM was a shell of its former self. 
The EPIC Shift in Discourse and Business Opposition 
At the exact same time that the Self-Help Cooperative leadership splintered, when 
the movement was falling apart and the members were being syphoned into the Civilian 
Conservation Corps and other New Deal Programs, the End Poverty in California (EPIC) 
movement was gathering momentum and eventually took over the leadership of the 	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cooperative movement.  The EPIC movement stepped into the leadership void left by the 
initial group of cooperative leaders.  Led by novelist and activist Upton Sinclair, the goal 
of the EPIC movement was to end the Great Depression in California—and later in other 
states—through systematic state support for cooperatives.  This plan generated enormous 
support within the cooperative movement, especially in Los Angeles.   
To implement this plan, the EPIC movement sought to elect its members to state 
office in the 1934 state elections, with Upton Sinclair as the nominee for governor on the 
Democratic Ticket.  As a result of intense opposition from Republicans and their business 
supporters, Roosevelt’s decision not to endorse Sinclair, unlike every other gubernatorial 
candidate running that year, and opposition from the Democratic Party in general, 
Sinclair narrowly lost the 1934 gubernatorial elections—even though many other EPIC-
supported Democratic candidates did win.  But his brief leadership of the cooperative 
movement had long-term effects on both the cooperatives in the 1930s and California 
politics in the post-WWII era.   
Scholars looking back at the EPIC movement have lamented its failure, viewing it 
as a lost opportunity for socialism to gain a foothold in a major American state.  
However, they fail to examine the complex relationship between EPIC and the SHCM.  
Most EPIC scholars mention the SHCM only in passing, as little more than a prelude to 
EPIC.  Those that do discuss the connection between the two movements make the 
mistake of treating the EPIC movement as the natural extension, the political arm, of the 
SHCM. 
 Failure to understand the relationship between the SHCM and the EPIC has grave 
consequences for their analyses.  Without paying serious attention to the SHCM, the 
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conclusion reached by these studies is that the Los Angeles business class opposed EPIC 
because it was the “high tide of radicalism in the United States.”198 What Greg Mitchell’s 
Campaign of the Century, and several other studies of the EPIC movement, beginning 
with Upton Sinclair’s I, Candidate for Governor, or How I Got Licked, fail to ask is:  
why did the Los Angeles business class mobilize against Upton Sinclair’s candidacy and 
the EPIC movement to begin with? Why didn’t they support the EPIC movement, just as 
they were then supporting the SHCM? 
 The reason is that the EPIC movement presented a new interpretation of the 
cooperative movement, one deeply rooted in anti-capitalism and state socialism.  EPIC 
self-consciously modeled itself on the SHCM except in four crucial aspects.  First, EPIC 
had very different understandings of race than the early cooperative leaders.  Unlike the 
Self-Help Cooperative Movement, Sinclair and the EPIC movement did not prioritize 
racial inclusivity.  As Greg Mitchell notes, in his detailed history of the EPIC movement 
and every single person and event connected to it, “Sinclair did not court a black 
following; Negroes, he said, should support EPIC simply because, as the poorest citizens, 
they had the most to gain.  In many areas, the End Poverty League directed blacks to 
form their own EPIC clubs rather than integrate existing chapters.”199 Part of Sinclair’s 
aversion to race was his Southern identity and its connection to the Democratic Party.  He 
declares that he was “born” a Democrat, and takes pride in the actions of his ancestors, 
who were also Democrats; ancestors such as “Captain Arthur Sinclair, commander of a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
198 Mitchell, The Campaign of the Century, xii.   
199 Mitchell, The Campaign of the Century, 192, 193, 
 115 
U.S. naval vessel that forced Japan to open to the Western World.”200    
In arguing for cooperatively owned farms for the unemployed or “land colonies”, 
Sinclair gave a nod to nativist groups like The Native Sons of the Golden West, whom, 
like many California politicians, he openly endorsed.  Sinclair criticized large-scale 
industrial operations that “…work Chinese, Japanese, Hindus, Filipinos, Mexicans, and 
other kinds of foreigners, under what amounts to peonage.  I propose a third kind of 
agriculture.”201 In this third kind of agriculture, state-financed and supervised land 
colonies, it’s not clear if these groups specifically would be included, he only promises to 
make these farms available to “every unemployed man and woman in the State”.  
Sinclair, who ran for office in California three times previously on the Socialist ticket—
the US Senate in 1922, and for governor of California in 1926 and 1930—was not 
committed to white supremacy but neither was he committed to racial justice.202 Rather, 
he was a socialist, deeply committed to building a common class movement unconnected 
to race. 
EPIC leaders were also at the forefront of calls to intern Japanese Americans.  
Months before the attack on Pearl Harbor, Culbert Olson, one of the top leaders of the 
EPIC movement, who was elected to the California State Senate in 1934 as an EPIC-
Democrat, and elected governor in 1938, publicly questioned the loyalty of Japanese 
Americans.  Speaking before the JACL and the Japanese Consul in Los Angeles, he 
urged them to demonstrate their patriotism by rooting out and exposing traitors in their 	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midst.  After the attacks on Pearl Harbor, Olson closed ranks with Los Angeles’ liberal 
Democratic reform mayor Fletcher Bowron, liberal Republican (and future Governor and 
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court) Earl Warren, and most U.S. Senators and 
Representatives from the West Coast, and pushed for the internment camps.203  
However, there were notable exceptions; some of the former leadership of the 
cooperative movement opposed the camps.  Sheridan Downey, Upton Sinclair’s running 
mate and failed candidate for Lieutenant Governor in 1934—the team was referred to as 
“Uppie and Downey”—who despite this was elected to the U.S. Senate in 1938 with 
strong backing from elderly Californians who supported the Townsend and Ham and 
Eggs Movements (and despite opposition from the Roosevelt Administration), used 
administrative ploys to put pressure on the Roosevelt Administration to speed up the 
closing of the internment camps.204 George Knox Roth, who carefully documented the 
movement in the early 1930s as both a participant, leader, and a Master’s Student at the 
University of Southern California, also opposed the internment camps.  During the 
Second World War Roth became “…a Los Angeles radio broadcaster who devoted 
himself so dearly to defending the constitutional rights of Japanese Americans that he 
was removed from his program.”205  
Second, EPIC proposed to use the power of the state to build up the SHCM.  
Instead of building the cooperative movement through alliances with multiple 	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institutions—i.e., businesses, farmers, and state agencies—Sinclair proposed the 
establishment of state-operated farms and factories.  As outlined in his book, I, Governor 
of California, and how I ended poverty; a true story of the future, “These colonies will be 
run by the State under expert supervision.”206 For the unemployed who have no interest 
or skills in farming, they would work in state financed and supervised factories.  The 
state would acquire them by purchasing “idle, or half idle” factories from their owners.207     
Third, EPIC explicitly sought to use the cooperative movement to challenge and 
eventually overtake capitalism.  EPIC’s cooperative system would be financed by the 
state and would thereby undermine “private industry, by withdrawing the hundred million 
dollars a year which the state is now paying the unemployed, and which they are 
spending for goods.”208 In a national radio address, he proclaimed, “We confront today 
the collapse of an institution which is world-wide and age-old…Capitalism has served its 
time and is passing from the earth.”209 The system to replace it would be state socialism.   
Once the land colonies and factories were established and strong enough to stand 
on their own, the state would relinquish supervision and they would become “free, self-
governing institutions, democratically managed by their members.”210 Sinclair’s book, 
and the EPIC movement it spawned, was a mass media phenomenon, becoming the best-
selling book in the history of California at the time.  However, the book, the EPIC 	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movement, and the business class’s response during the 1934 gubernatorial campaign 
collectively produced a discursive shift in the public’s understanding of the SHCM which 
led to its marginalization and eventually disintegration by the end of the 1930s. 
The Business Response to EPIC:  From “Self-Help” and “Cooperative” to “State 
Socialism” and “Communism” 
The anti-EPIC campaign, managed by political consultants, mass media 
executives, and public relations firms, with the unpopular Republican gubernatorial 
candidate and incumbent Frank Merriam pushed to the background, centered its strategy 
against Sinclair and the EPIC movement on a basic, recurring theme:  fear that the state 
would be captured by a socialist movement.  This propaganda campaign is well captured 
in the literature on EPIC, and this literature has consistently noted the campaign strategy 
to conflate EPIC with communism.  The anti-EPIC propaganda blitz encompassed 
newsreels, newspapers, radio, billboards, posters, leaflets, and other mass media.  It was 
not only unprecedented in its scope and costs, but in its willingness to bend the truth 
beyond recognition.   
The most infamous advertisements of the entire campaign were the fake “man on 
the street” newsreels commissioned by Louie B. Mayer, head of MGM and president of 
the California Republican Party.  They were the first “attack-ads” ever produced and, 
perhaps more than any other feature of the anti-EPIC campaign, glimpsed the future of 
election campaigns.211 These fake newsreels—made on a studio lot at MGM, but 
presented to the public as authentic—feature an unseen talking man behind a camera 
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interviewing people on the street at “random.”212 People who stated their intention to vote 
for Frank Merriam, the Republican candidate, were portrayed as simple folk who were 
just smart enough to know that their interests lie with private businesses and not with 
Sinclair’s proposed land colonies and collectively owned factories.  Those who stated 
their intention to vote for EPIC and Sinclair were portrayed as confused, dubious, and 
dimwitted.   With few exceptions the differences between these two groups were subtle 
but apparent. 
In two of the scenes, Sinclair supporters directly state they are voting for him 
because EPIC will bring communism to California.  In the first, a cordial white working-
class man with a mainstream accent cheerfully states, “He's the author of the Russian 
government. It's worked out well there and I think it'll work here.”213 This scene fails to 
convince because it lacks the subtly and sophistication of the other scenes; it ventures just 
beyond what is believable, what someone would actually say to a random reporter on the 
street corner.  Moreover, the character is too personable, too likeable to actually scare 
people away from communism; this scene could be reused by the Communist Party USA 
to sell communism to Americans.    
However, MGM did produce one newsreel which was both over the top and 
believable.  This newsreel shows a disheveled and surly man just hopping off a train with 
a thick Russian accent telling the cameraman he is voting for Sinclair, because 
“communism worked in Russia and it will work here”.  Unlike the previous newsreel, this 	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one invoked fears and anxieties already at work in depression-era Los Angeles.  First, 
unlike the mainstream white worker in the previous newsreel, this one shows a man, 
dressed like a “bum”, hoping off a train during a time when   Los Angelenos became 
increasingly worried of the hundreds of thousands of “Oakies” and “Arkies” entering the 
state from the Midwestern United States.  They became so fearful that the Los Angeles 
police department set up a “bum blockade” a few years later, in 1936, in which armed 
police officers set up check points along the California border—along Oregon, Arizona, 
and Nevada—and made regular sweeps across Los Angeles to detain and deport poor 
white migrants.214 They “were given the option of forced hard labor in a rock quarry or 
deportation over the State line.”215 Similar to the rationales used in the forced 
deportations of Mexican-Americans and Filipino-Americans during this same period, 
conservatives promoted the idea that white migrants would intensify job competition and 
become a drain on an already overburdened municipal welfare system.   
The thick Russian accent added another dimension to the fear of foreign invaders, 
drummed up throughout the 1930s and reaching its peak with the internment of Japanese-
Americans from 1942-1945.  Fears of a communist take-over resonated with 
Californians, and Americans, in 1934 especially; a year that witnessed the San Francisco 
General Strike, widespread strikes and vigilante violence in the fields of Southern 
California, in addition to union organizing and industrial violence in other parts of the 
country—e.g, in Toledo, OH and Minneapolis, MN.  As with other propaganda produced 
during this campaign, the Los Angeles business class responded to Sinclair’s threat to use 	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the cooperative movement to challenge and eventually overtake private enterprise by 
conflating cooperatives with communism.  This stands in stark contrast to their earlier 
understandings of the cooperative movement, as laid out in the Los Angeles Times, as the 
finest example of “Americanism”.   
Sinclair and successive students of EPIC have portrayed the EPIC movement and 
the 1934 California gubernatorial campaign as a populist crusade, and its failure the result 
of an unprecedented right-wing propaganda campaign financed and overseen by the 
business class.  However, contemporary activists and researchers of the Self-Help 
Cooperative Movement viewed the EPIC campaign very differently.  Constantine 
Panunzio, an Italian immigrant to the United States, anti-fascist activist, professor of 
sociology at UCLA, and student of the cooperative movement, put it thus: “...although 
the intention of those who drew the Cooperatives into state politics undoubtedly was 
good, that move put the Self-Help organizations in a false light and created a widespread 
opposition.”216 Private businesses now “...saw communistic spooks in these organizations 
when they were injected into state politics.”217 Panunzio continues, “Conservative 
elements which had merely looked askance at self-help units now saw a real danger 
lurking in them...the moment they were brought into the political arena, many saw in the 
self-help organizations the forerunners of “Communism.”218 
Not only business support, but also state support began to wane after the anti-
EPIC campaign. As Clark Kerr—a doctoral student who spent the entire 1930s studying 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
216 Constantine Panunzio, “The Future of the Self-Help Coöperatives” (Los Angeles: 
Pacific Southwest Academy of Political and Social Science Publications, 1937), 3. 
217 Borough, Reuben W. Borough Papers, Box 22, Folder 10. 
218 Panunzio, Self-Help Cooperatives in Los Angeles, 110. 
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the Self-Help Cooperatives and other movements, working for the California Division of 
Self-Help Cooperatives within the State Emergency Relief Administration, and as an 
activist within the movement, living, working, and organizing with them—puts it, 
“Political interest also injured the self-help production program by labeling it "Epic," 
which was synonymous with "socialism" to many people. This later influenced some 
state and Federal officials to refuse assistance.”219 Once again, Panunzio adds, “So, the 
heated campaign of 1934 was party directed against the cooperatives…later both State 
and Federal government agencies, evidently prompted by political pressure, placed 
stumbling blocks in the way of the functioning of the self-help units.”220 
Far from being “nothing less than a revolution in American politics” and the 
“high tide of radicalism in the United States”, contemporary scholars familiar with the 
SHCM saw the EPIC movement for what it was:  the unnecessary alienation of friends 
and the creation of enemies when before there were none.221 While there was a great deal 
of support for EPIC in the SHCM, among the unemployed, EPIC’s leadership of the 
cooperative movement nonetheless proved to be its undoing. Sinclair’s reworking of 
previous understandings of the cooperative movement, from a common-sense response to 
the Great Depression whose politics could not be easily defined and whose goals were 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
219 Kerr, “Productive Enterprises”, 347, volume 1.  Kerr, along with Paul Schuster 
Taylor, were both active in various movements in California at this time—as participants 
and researchers.  Kerr also worked in the Division of Self-Help Cooperatives for a time, 
and was part of a group that successfully pushed for more consumer cooperatives in the 
Bay Area—the cooperatives movements in the 1960s and 1970s were, in part, made 
possible by these efforts.  Later in life, Kerr, as President of the University of California 
system, would oppose the Berkeley Free Speech Movement in 1964.  Ironic, since as a 
student himself he fought these same battles—he spent years living and working with the 
Self-Help Cooperatives. 
220 Panunzio, Self-Help Cooperatives in Los Angeles, 110. 
221 Mitchell, The Campaign of the Century, xii. 
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complementary to private businesses, to an antagonistic challenger to private businesses 
whose stated goal was the abolition of capitalism, unnecessarily alienated a business class 
that was previously eager to support the movement. The propaganda campaign aimed at 
cooperatives in the 1934 elections by the Los Angeles business class reflect fears 
originally generated by EPIC. 
The Aftermath of the 1934 California Gubernatorial Election 
There were two immediate political effects, with long-term consequences, that 
resulted from the 1934 gubernatorial campaign in California.  First, even though Upton 
Sinclair lost the governor’s race, other EPIC candidates still won dozens of seats in other 
elections.  “Of Los Angeles County's thirty representatives in the state assembly EPIC 
had elected eighteen; in the remainder of the state, six. Two EPIC endorsed candidates 
for the state senate had been elected. One of them, Culbert Olson, from Los Angeles, was 
elected governor four years later.”222 Instead of working to create a new and separate 
system of land colonies and worker-owned factories, as the EPIC candidates campaigned 
on, they instead pushed through bills, all of them failed, to increase relief funding for the 
existing cooperatives throughout the 1930s.  The bills sought to create the EPIC system 
out of the existing self-help cooperative infrastructure.  They were supported by, and 
often written by, supporters within the California Division of Self-Help Cooperatives.223 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
222 Reuben W. Borough, "Upton Sinclair's EPIC, 1934," The Occidental Review 2, no. 4 
(1965), 38. 
223 The leaders of the Division of Self-Help Cooperatives consistently denied that they 
were either supporters of EPIC or trying to implement the EPIC plan.  The most 
important and active leader of this Division, Winslow Carlton, later went on to found the 
first hedge fund in the United States.  He also spent the rest of his life championing 
cooperatives, pioneered HMOs, and played a role in the passage of Medicare and 
Medicaid.  Carlton was also the inspiration for the protagonist in Sinclair’s 1936 Novel 
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However, their efforts to generate political support and keep the cooperative movement 
going was continually blocked by the cooperative movement’s new association with 
communism.224 
While the EPIC movement was, in part, responsible for the decline of the SHCM, 
it also registered 330,000 new Democrats, pushing both the Democratic and Republican 
Party closer to the New Deal.  It would have been politically impossible for a pre-EPIC 
Republican to push for state-wide universal health-insurance as Earl Warren did in 1943, 
two years before Truman proposed a national health-care system, and sixty-eight years 
before Vermont successfully signed into law a state-wide universal health-care system.225 
Governor James Rolph—the longest serving mayor in the history of San Francisco—and 
his Lieutenant Governor and successor Frank Merriam resisted implementing the New 
Deal in California.  However, Roosevelt, hesitant to endorse Sinclair for governor in 
1934, the only Democratic gubernatorial candidate he did not endorse that year, 
eventually made a deal with Merriam to withhold his endorsement of Sinclair in 
exchange for Merriam supporting the New Deal programs in California after the election.  
Merriam, in a radio speech given after the election, stated, “The people of California are 
progressive…and my election was made possible by the wholehearted and loyal support 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Co-op.  Carlton’s life in many ways parallels the strange relationship between capitalism 
and cooperatives. 
224 Harold Finley, "Is Epic To Be Revived Here?" Los Angeles Times, 1938. 
225Apparently Upton Sinclair was one of Earl Warren’s favorite author’s while a law 
student at the University of California Berkeley from 1912 to 1914, where he also used to 
visit local bars where he would listen to socialist writer Jack London “talk about his 
experiences in the far north and the South Seas” (Mitchell, The Campaign of the Century, 
33).  Vermont’s law will probably not take effect until 2017. 
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of progressives of all shades of political opinion.”226 This deal, and California’s cross-
filling primary system at the time, significantly reduced opposition to the New Deal in 
California, paving the way for governor’s like Earl Warren, and later Pat Brown, to push 
for extensive post-war state planning (e.g., in higher education and freeways) and public 
works projects.   
The 330,000 new Democrats brought into the Party by the EPIC movement were 
a key part of both Democratic and Republican political coalitions in the post-war era.  
The old-line conservative Democrats, lead by William McAdoo, who temporarily lost the 
party to EPIC recaptured the party and with it a new radicalized wing.  This became 
immediately evident in 1938, when McAdoo lost his U.S. Senate seat to Sheridan 
Downey, Sinclair’s running mate in 1934.227 Ironically, the Los Angeles business class 
made this increased role of the state possible, by pulling its support from the SHCM and 
reluctantly supporting the New Deal.  Over the course of the campaign, Roosevelt and the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
226Mitchell, The Campaign of the Century, 534.  More on the Roosevelt-Merriam deal:  
“Meeting with Governor Merriam on 31 October, [James] O’Connor negotiated 
Merriam’s agreement, in return for Roosevelt’s continued boycott of Sinclair, not to 
claim his victory as a repudiation of the New Deal.  Instead, Merriam would describe his 
election as a triumph of bipartisan common sense.  He would also promise to show favor 
to the anti-Sinclair Democrats in appointments and patronage after the election” (Starr, 
Endangered Dreams, 153).  Merriam succeeded Rolph upon his death on June, 2, 1934. 
227 McAdoo was Woodrow Wilson’s son-in-law, indeed the wedding was held at the 
White House.  McAdoo was a pivotal figure in the early days of the Federal Reserve.  He 
was also a key figure in resisting EPIC and in retaking the California Democratic Party 
after the 1934 elections. As for Sheridan Downey, like many of the EPIC veterans, he 
moved to the right after the 1930s.  He reflected the growth-fueled New Deal balancing 
act of the post-war era, of advancing the interests of large corporations and pushing for 
the expansion of state welfare programs like social security and veterans benefits.  Like 
Culbert Olson, he came to be owned by California oil interests.  Nixon, who first came to 
congress by defeating Jerry Voorhis, a former socialist who first entered office as a state 
assemblyman and EPIC/Democratic candidate in 1934, also took the seat of Sheridan 
Downey when he first became a Senator in 1950—Downey lost his primary to Helen 
Douglas (Taylor, California and Relief (Self-Help Cooperatives) in the 1930's, 36:36, 
CD1). 
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New Deal came to be seen as the lesser evil, preferable to EPIC and communism.   
It is highly doubtful that Sinclair would have implemented any program 
resembling Soviet-style communism if he were elected.  First, as already mentioned, after 
the election the EPIC-endorsed candidates that were elected did not attempt to implement 
the EPIC program, but instead worked to support the cooperatives already in existence.  
And by the end of the 1930s California business owners had gained significant influence 
over this group, many of whom arrived in Sacramento in a state of impoverishment.228  
This included EPIC leader Culbert Olson, governor from 1938 to1942.   
Second, and more important, the propaganda generated during the 1934 
gubernatorial campaign worked on the EPIC leaders no less than the general public.  
Rather than leave the public realm and settle down to a quiet private life of writing 
novels, as EPIC scholars have repeatedly suggested, Sinclair instead remained in charge 
of movement for another year, overseeing EPIC-endorsed candidates in local Los 
Angeles elections in 1935—winning more seats on the Los Angeles City Council and 
School Board—and purging EPIC of “communist infiltrators”.  In May of 1935, the 
EPIC movement held a state-wide convention “not to align itself with the living issues of 
the hour but to wrangle over the dubious threat of “Communist infiltration and 
control.”229 The Los Angeles Evening Herald captured the turmoil of the convention: 
“Communists are here,” he [Sinclair] shouted, his figure quivering with emotion 
and his long fingers pointing accusingly at the convention. “They are here for the 
same purpose that they are at every meeting of Epics, Democrats or labor 
organizations. They are here to cause discussion and disruption.” 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
228 Ibid., 36:36, CD 1.  Borough, Upton Sinclair’s EPIC, 1934, 39. 
229 Ibid., 40.   
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“I know I'm right,” he roared. 
“Throw him out,” came the cry. 
“You communists are here to break up the Epics,” Sinclair almost screamed 
above the din. “You are here to cause trouble so that the word will go out that the 
Epic convention was torn by dissension and fights. I have seen Communists on 
this floor with my very eyes. I have seen them actually voting on the motions just 
put” 
“We'll find a way to get them out. They are not going to be seated with our 
delegates and are not going to vote....you Communists are trying to destroy 
democracy.”230 
Ruben Borough, the editor of the EPIC News, which achieved a readership of half a 
million during the campaign, and a leader of the movement, points to this convention, not 
the 1934 campaign and not business opposition, as the moment when the EPIC ended.  
He remembers, “The organization persisted for some time, its headquarters rife with petty 
conspiracies and counter-conspiracies. It was a dwindling force in the state's political 
affairs.”  What happened next is a familiar story to students of social movements.  
Disenchanted members of the EPIC movement left the organization and a number of 
splinter organizations developed—Establish Prosperity in America (EPIA) and United 
Organizations for Progressive Political Action (UOPPA)—neither of which made a 
lasting political impact. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
230 Los Angeles Evening Herald, 18 May 1935 in Reuben W. Borough Papers (Collection 
927), Box 78, Folder 9. 
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Conclusion  
The initial leaders of the SHCM—consisting of unemployed activists directly 
elected by the rank-and-file of the movement—had a two year window of opportunity to 
organize and unify the movement so that when political conditions became favorable they 
could make the most of it.  The initial leaders succeeded in organizing the cooperatives 
but could not unify them behind a common political program.  Their efforts to unite the 
California cooperative movement failed as a result of ideological divisions; between 
those that sought to avoid electoral politics and instead focus all of their energy on 
organizing new cooperatives and building the movement; and those who believed the 
cooperatives could only survive as a mass movement if they entered into electoral politics 
and put pressure on political leaders to direct resources to the cooperatives. 
 A number of factors conspired to remove these initial leaders and undermine the 
Self-Help Cooperatives as a mass movement.  The factional fighting between these 
leaders and their supporters not only tore the movement apart, but at the exact same 
moment, June and July of 1933, that new leaders and alternatives were emerging.  The 
election of FDR and the willingness of the New Dealers to try just about anything to end 
the Great Depression led to Federal and State support for the Self-Help Cooperatives, 
among other initiatives.  This initial political support from the Roosevelt Administration 
and the financial support from the federal Division of Self-Help Cooperatives arrived 
despite the infighting and the collapse of the mass movement.  This support only ceased 
after the EPIC campaign and the shift in the public perception of cooperatives:  from a 
nonpartisan, common sense solution to mass unemployment, to a communist threat to 
capitalism and the Democratic Party.  
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If any one of these factors had been removed, the cooperatives would have likely 
remained a mass movement.  If not for the EPIC movement, for example, the 
cooperatives probably would have continued to receive support from California 
businesses and the Democratic Party and would have likely survived into the post-war 
era.  Had the Roosevelt administration lost the election or failed to implement work 
programs, the cooperatives would have remained a mass movement, though with new 
leadership.  Had the original leaders not turned on each other, they could have prevented 
Sinclair and EPIC from taking over the movement and pressured the New Dealers into 
fully supporting the Self-Help Cooperatives—making “production for use” the response 
to the Great Depression in California. 
The next chapter examines last-ditch efforts by the California Division of Self-
Help Cooperatives to revive the cooperative movement.  As a result of the EPIC 
movement, these efforts were in vain.  The cooperatives survived, as a minor movement, 
until the summer of 1940, when it was shut down and they, like other unemployed 
Americans, were redirected to the defense plants for work.   
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CHAPTER V 
LAST DITCH EFFORTS IN THE CALIFORNIA DIVISION OF SELF-HELP 
COOPERATIVES, 1934-1940 
The last and final group to assume leadership of the movement was the state 
bureaucracy charged with regulating the Self-Help Cooperatives: The California Division 
of Self-Help Cooperatives. This regulatory agency came into existence in 1933-34.  The 
ideological conflicts produced by the EPIC campaign of 1933-34 carried over to the 
division; throughout the rest of the decade, administrators, legislators, and governors 
were divided over whether to implement the EPIC plan or abolish the division altogether.   
The division was eventually abolished in 1940, and along with it the few remaining 
cooperatives that had become dependent on state aid. Ironically, it was governor Culbert 
Olson, a leading figure of the EPIC movement, elected State Senator and later Governor 
partly on the strength of that support, that abolished the division and finally ended the 
movement.   
The state continued its support, however minimal, for the cooperatives, and for 
other unemployment relief programs, throughout the decade because it could not solve 
the problem of mass unemployment and because of widespread fear of what might 
happen without some state support for the unemployed.  This dilemma was solved, at 
least temporarily, in California, and throughout the nation, when the defense plants, war 
mobilization, and eventually war itself began absorbing the unemployed. 
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The Production Phase and Ideological Battles within the State Division of Self-Help 
Cooperatives 
The introduction of the New Deal and increased federal leadership in the national 
response to the Great Depression led to changes in the internal operations of the Self-
Help Cooperatives.  In June of 1933 a Federal Division of Self-Help Cooperatives was 
created.  Like other unemployment programs, state divisions were also created, which 
were given a great deal of autonomy.  The mission of these agencies was to provide 
financing and technical expertise to the cooperatives.  The Federal Division immediately 
urged the cooperatives to move away from relying on direct donations and labor-
exchange with businesses, farmers, and local governments, and move towards direct 
production instead.  The “policy from Washington very definitely set forth their desire to 
use grant funds for the purchase of tools of production to match with the huge labor 
surplus in cooperatives.”231 
Like Los Angeles and California business owners, the federal government 
initially viewed the cooperatives as a common sense response to the Great Depression.  
Between August of 1933 and December of 1934, the Federal government granted the 
state of California almost half a million dollars for the cooperatives to purchase whatever 
they needed to begin collectively producing for themselves.232 The cooperatives “had no 
more to do than make application for whatever amount they thought they needed and 
grants were always made according to their request...there is no record of any application 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
231 State Relief Administration, Study of Cooperatives, February 5, 1938, 2.  By mid-1935 
“Donations of staple groceries and gasoline by governmental authorities were declining, 
and with respect to private industry, also, it was found that the days of chiseling were 
over” (Emergency Relief Administration, Annual Report, Division of Self-Help 
Cooperatives, June 30, 1935, A-16). 
232 State Relief Administration, Study of Cooperatives, February 5, 1938, 2. 
 132 
for Federal funds ever being turned down. On occasions the sums requested were greater 
than Washington would grant; however, ample funds were always forthcoming.”233   
However, three political problems soon strained the relationship between 
cooperatives and the New Dealers.  First, the factional infighting within the cooperatives 
and the lure of steady work offered by the New Deal meant that the cooperatives no 
longer possessed “huge labor surpluses.” Thus, the Roosevelt Administration and the 
New Dealers felt less political pressure to support a cooperative movement with an ever-
dwindling membership.  Second, this support was stipulated on the belief, widespread 
before 1933-34, that the cooperatives were neither liberal nor conservative but a common 
sense solution to the Great Depression, with no other political aspirations than solving the 
unemployment crisis.  The EPIC movement, its brief takeover of the Democratic Party 
and alienation of the Roosevelt Administration—Sinclair was the only Democratic 
gubernatorial candidate in 1934 that Roosevelt did not endorse—and its insistence that 
the cooperative movement could be used to challenge and eventually overtake capitalism, 
weakened public support for the cooperative movement.  Third, as I discuss in chapter 4, 
the shift in the public’s perception of the cooperative movement led to increased 
opposition to the cooperatives, which had previously been negligible.   
Because something had to be done about unemployment, and because the 
cooperative movement still possessed a presence and some political support in California, 
the state and federal government still supported the cooperatives for the rest of the 
decade, but with strings attached.  Thus, from the beginning a major stipulation of federal 
and state support was that the cooperatives confine themselves to a separate cooperative 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
233 Ibid., 5. 
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economy that did not compete with private businesses, but only traded with each other or 
sold their goods to public agencies.234 For the remainder of the decade these political 
setbacks and organizational restrictions would play a major role in sustaining 
conservative opposition and in undermining the cooperative movement. 
Winslow Carlton and the “Unregulated”, “Laissez-Faire” Period 
A young and energetic recent Harvard graduate, Winslow Carlton, was appointed 
head of the California Division of Self-Help Cooperatives in May of 1934.  At the time of 
his appointment, from a federal field agent to state director, more than fifty personnel 
were placed at Carlton’s disposal.235 Federal intervention into the cooperative movement, 
June 1933, occurred at the same time that the EPIC campaign was just getting off the 
ground, August 1933.236 Like EPIC, the federal government viewed the cooperatives as a 
cost effective means of permanently achieving full employment.  The stated goal of the 
Division was that:   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
234 From the FERA manual on self-help cooperatives: “The cooperative must undertake 
to exercise extreme care that its operation shall not in any way reduce the wage of labor 
in the community in which it operates...It is the general intention that goods produced by 
the cooperative under Federal grant shall not find their way into the open market where 
their sale will interfere with going employment. No hard and fast rule can be drawn on 
the sale of goods for cash. It is the intention that cash sale shall be kept at a minimum. 
This general rule, however, does not constitute a barrier to the sale of products by 
cooperatives in non-competitive markets and to local, public or private relief agencies. 
Such agencies should pay the cooperative the same price that they would pay in the open 
market, and may pay in cash or kind; e.g., it frequently happens that the cooperative may 
return to the relief agency clothing in payment for cloth” (Emergency Relief 
Administration, Annual Report, Division of Self-Help Cooperatives, June 30, 1935, A-
41). 
235 Emergency Relief Administration, Annual Report, Division of Self-Help 
Cooperatives, June 30, 1935, A-22. 
236 Sinclair first met with the Los Angeles County Central Committee of the Democratic 
party in Santa Monica in August of 1933, who were apparently instrumental in 
convincing him to run for governor.  Sinclair, I, Governor of California, and How I 
Ended Poverty, 11. 
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The Federal policy is that production, not relief, is the most important task of the 
cooperatives. Only by production can the members become self-sufficient and 
economically independent. To attain this goal economic activity is of paramount 
importance. The present Federal program anticipates the time when the self-help 
cooperatives may produce all the necessities of life, and provide self-employment 
which will result in an adequate standard of living as well as maintain self-
respect. This is our common problem and our common goal.237 
To accomplish this task, Carlton organized the offices of the California Division of Self-
Help Cooperatives to give the cooperatives as much freedom as possible from 
unnecessary regulation while also working very closely with the cooperatives.  To this 
end, the offices of the Division were located “on the East, or industrial side of the city,” 
containing “about 50,000 feet of floor space, a large loading dock with railroad facilities, 
and much warehouse space”.  This warehouse contained the offices, equipment, and 
personnel of the California Division of Self-Help Cooperatives—which included 
“mimeograph, switchboard, teletype, and laboratory for testing cooperative products”, 
room to store the goods produced by the cooperatives, and the offices of the California 
Cooperative Units (CCU).  The CCU was the successor organization to the UCRA which 
formed after the last of the UCRA leaders, Pat May, was repudiated by the rank-and-file. 
Working alongside Carlton and other state administrators, the CCU kept the following in 
the warehouse:  “its executive offices, a garage and machine shop, a sample and scales 
display room, gasoline pumps and tanks, and a wash and grease rack”, all of which were 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
237 Kerr, 426, Volume 2.  Kerr is citing this from a bulletin of the Division.  Here’s his 
footnote:  “Division of Self-Help Cooperative Service, Bulletin 1, June 1934. This policy 
of production entailed discouragement of the desire of the units to distribute groceries 
and of labor exchange activities. (See Bulletin 4 of the Division, June 1934.)” 
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available for use to any cooperatives that wished to use them.238 In addition to the 
warehouse, the Division had field advisors visiting the individual cooperative units to 
provide “technical advice and assistance, and to aid it with whatever practical problems 
arise.”239 Even with such close cooperation between the state and the cooperatives, it was 
the stated “…aim of the Division, however, that the cooperative should manage its own 
affairs as far as possible.  The advice and assistance offered by the Division is not 
obligatory.”240 
Carlton lobbied the federal government to invest almost four and a half million 
dollars in the California cooperatives to provide them with enough initial capital to 
become self-sustaining.  Given the massive amount of financing the federal government 
was providing to agricultural, utility, and financial cooperatives and to intentional 
communities during this same period, Carlton assumed this request was reasonable.  In 
the Prospectus of Program for California Self-Help Cooperatives, 1936, Carlton laid out 
the reasoning behind this proposal, why cooperatives specifically would be necessary to 
permanently end the Great Depression:  
Should the depression lift, it is doubtful whether the increase in business activity 
will be sufficient to reabsorb all the unemployed...The return of prosperity alone 
will not eliminate the problem of unemployment in California, and, in general 
terms, California may expect to have a larger burden of unemployment than can 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
238 Emergency Relief Administration, Annual Report, Division of Self-Help 
Cooperatives, June 30, 1935, A-23. 
239 Ibid., A-26. 
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be met by useful public works.241 
Carlton proposed a decentralized “...system manned by workers grouped into 100 
producer cooperatives and 130 consumer cooperatives. The workers in the producing 
units will comprise the bulk of the consumer units' membership, the rest being workers in 
the stores and service industries.”242 Even though denying any connection to the EPIC 
program, Carlton’s plan called for the implementation of Sinclair’s EPIC in all but name.  
At the writing of this prospectus in 1935 the link between the SHCM and EPIC and 
between EPIC and communism had been well established in public discussions of the 
cooperative movement, as a result of the gubernatorial campaign of 1934.  It was in this 
ideological environment that Carlton sought approval for the prospectus. 
Carlton left Los Angeles for Washington for several months-- October of 1935 to 
February of 1936—trying to persuade top officials in the Roosevelt Administration, and 
the president himself, to support the plan.  While in Washington he lobbied President 
Roosevelt, Rexford Tugwell, and Harry Hopkins.  Carlton was able to secure the support 
of the technical staff in both Tugwell’s Resettlement Administration and Hopkins’ Work 
Progress Administration, and a promise from President Roosevelt to think it over, but in 
the end received no support.243 Upon returning to Los Angeles Carlton reported back to 
the Self-Help Cooperatives that the “…engineers in both Mr. Hopkins and Dr. Tugwell's 
offices, after minute examination, approved the program and passed it to their superiors 
with favorable recommendations.  I am extremely sorry their recommendations were not 	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followed, and that almost three months were wasted by myself in futile negotiations”.   
“Bitterly disappointed”, but not disillusioned, Carlton resigned as director of the 
California Division on March 13, 1936.  While he was unable to secure federal financing 
for the plan to make the cooperatives independent and self-sustaining, he did manage to 
secure ongoing financing of the cooperatives—$30,000 a month from the California State 
Relief Administration (SRA) to the Self-Help Cooperative Division—before resigning.244 
The SRA continued to supply the cooperatives with grant money for fixed equipment and 
loans to cover operating expenses for the rest of the decade.  The cooperatives would 
spend the rest of the decade struggling to expand their production and sell their goods on 
the private market, in the face of conservative opposition from businesses, politicians, 
and California state administrators. 
As with waning business support, the pulling of federal support for the 
cooperatives was not due to the radical nature of Carlton’s plan.  This plan had already 
been in operation, at the insistence of the federal government and with their financial, 
technical, and political support.245  The cooperatives had already shifted from their 
earlier mass movement activities consisting of labor-exchange, bartering, and direct 
action towards creating an alternative economic system of cooperative production.  
Between 1933 and 1935 when this shift took place, the California movement still 
consisted of tens of thousands of active members and other individuals still involved with 
and benefiting from the movement, either directly or indirectly.  During this period, the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
244 Kerr, “Productive Enterprises”, 590, volume 2.  Moreover, Carlton spent the rest of 
the decade lobbying federal agencies to continue funding to the cooperatives, with some 
success. 
245 The FERA grants began in August of 1933.  Washington made its last grant to the 
California cooperatives in October of 1935.  Taylor, Self-Help Cooperatives in 
California, 12.  
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cooperatives were already producing goods for the CCC and the WPA, and with approval 
from certain sections of the business community.  As the California Division of Self-Help 
Cooperatives points out in its Semi-Annual Report in 1935, “These cooperatives have, 
with our assistance, developed an increasing market for their goods with recognized 
agencies such as CCC camps and WPA labor camps...Because of quality, they have 
received offers from private business for their goods, but due to the limitations inherent 
in their program, which they willingly accept, such offers have not been considered.”246 
The internal limitations referred to was the increasing opposition to the movement 
from the business community and later the federal government.  The federal government 
pulled support for the same reasons that businesses pulled support:  the EPIC campaign 
brought to the surface latent and justified fears that the cooperatives could work either 
with or against private businesses and the Democratic Party, depending on their 
leadership.  It was in this hostile political environment that Carlton’s plan failed.  With 
the mass phase of the movement ending, the majority of the membership syphoned into 
the New Deal programs, the EPIC movement imploding, and the old-guard California 	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error. 
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Democratic Party reasserting some control over the platform and leadership positions, 
Carlton had little political leverage to implement his plan.  
The “System of Controlled Cooperatives”  
Carlton was succeeded by Frank W. Sutton, an engineer by profession and 
enthusiastic supporter of the cooperative movement.  Under Sutton both the quality and 
efficiency of the production improved, and he worked hard to build up public support for 
the cooperative movement.  However, Sutton, who maintained Carlton’s belief that the 
cooperatives should maintain as much autonomy as possible in directing their own 
affairs, with the state offering voluntary advice and supervision rather than direct control, 
was soon replaced by the State Relief Administration’s new director, appointed in 1936, 
Harold Pomeroy.247 Pomeroy replaced Sutton with W.B. Hughes in July of 1936.   
Under Hughes, and with backing from Pomeroy, the Division increased their 
efforts to assert control over the cooperatives.248 Unable to eliminate state support for the 
cooperatives all-together, Pomeroy instead sought to transform the cooperatives into 
more “business-like” organizations.  One indication of this new attitude is that by June of 
1937, Pomeroy succeeded in renaming the Division of Self-Help Cooperatives to simply 
the Division of Self-Help.249 He sought to root out the radical potentials of the 
cooperatives—e.g., the slogan “production for use, not for profit” and the use of the word 
cooperative itself—attempting, instead, to turn the cooperatives into non-political jobs 
programs.  To this end, he sought to reduce the autonomy of the individual cooperative 	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units and federations—with the Division for the first time hiring or firing individual 
members or closing entire units—placing the State Relief Administration firmly in 
control of the cooperatives.250 With the vast majority of their former membership 
syphoned into the New Deal work programs and the mass phase of the movement, and 
thus its political influence, over, Pomeroy and his supporters became convinced they 
could assert control over the cooperatives and eventually end the movement altogether.  
As J.C. Byre, an Assistant Administrator under Pomeroy, wrote in a report on the 
cooperatives: “We can do this, for in the long run we make the rules and furnish the 
cash.”251 
Hughes initiated this process by deeming the equipment of the cooperatives—
purchased with grant money from the federal government—to be the property of the state 
and attempted to shut down the central warehouse, making it difficult for the units to 
trade with each other or sell their merchandise to private or public buyers.  However, he 
soon reversed the decision upon realizing the cooperatives could not function at all 
without the warehouse.  A year later, on July 1st, 1937, Hughes was replaced by Albert 
Wheelon, the former director of Self-Help Cooperatives in Idaho.   
In Idaho Wheelon had successfully suppressed the socialist potentials of the Self-
Help Cooperatives, turning them into de facto state-controlled work programs.  Pomeroy 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
250 Ibid., 512, 513, volume 2. 
251 Ibid., 479, 480, Footnote, 367, volume 2.  The number of people in the cooperatives 
continued to dwindle throughout the decade.  The Number of cooperatives active under 
federal and state grants as of June 30 1936 was: 76. Under state grants only: 40.  Decline 
in membership during this fiscal year, the time period covered in the report, 51.8%. 
Membership at this time is 7,472.  Annual Report, July 1, 1935 – June 30, 1936, Division 
of Self-Help Cooperative Service. 
 141 
hoped he could do the same with the California cooperatives.252 However, for reasons 
that are not clear, Wheelon instead continued Carlton and Sutton’s laissez-faire policies, 
allowing the cooperatives almost complete control over their own affairs.  Thus, the 
cooperatives began producing mass quantities of high quality goods, as “equipment and 
funds were available” under Wheelon’s directorship of the Division.  The merchandise 
began piling up at the central warehouse and unable to sell all of their goods to the work 
projects agencies, they began selling to private retailers and set up consumer cooperatives 
to market and sell their goods on the private market.  Apparently they were successful, 
and this activity escaped the notice of Pomeroy until December of 1937, when private 
businesses began complaining to the SRA of unfair competition.253 The SRA responded 
by strictly forbidding the cooperatives from setting up consumer cooperatives or 
competing with private businesses in any way.254 
On January 1st, 1938, Major Harry L. Black, of the Los Angeles Military 
Academy, took over the directorship of the State Division and, according to Kerr, 
“energetically undertook the suppression of the cooperatives.”255 Pomeroy and Black 
lobbied the State Relief Commission, which oversaw the State Relief Administration, for 
the complete cessation of state support to the Self-Help Cooperatives and the abolishment 	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Relief Administration, Annual Report, A-18,).  “...a few producers, such as mattress 
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of the Division of Self-Help.  The commission agreed with them and informed the 
cooperatives in 1938 to begin making plans for the cessation of state support.256 The 
cooperatives resisted this new direction, and in turn lobbied their political supporters in 
the California state government, urging them to maintain state support for the 
cooperatives.  But by this point the cooperatives did not possess the political strength of a 
mass movement and thus did not possess enough political influence to reverse the 
decision. 
The End of the Movement 
However, the influence of Democratic state assembly and senate members elected 
in 1934, as part of the EPIC movement, especially State Senator Culbert Olson, who was 
elected Governor in 1938, forestalled the cessation of state support and renewed the hope 
for a new mass movement.  The election of Olson, the appointment of a new SRA 
director, Dewey Anderson, and a new director of the Division of Self-Help, Frank G. 
Taylor, all supporters of the cooperatives, also meant that there was a real possibility that 
the cooperatives might once again receive major state support.  
 By February of 1939 the SHCM consisted of 33 worker cooperatives.  These 
remaining cooperative enterprises consisted of “7 sewing units, 2 furniture factories, 1 oil 
processing plant, 1 soap factory, 1 chemical plant, 8 farms, 1 confectionary 
manufacturing plant, 3 operating canneries, 4 bakeries, 1 cereal factory, and 1 alimentary 
paste factory.”257 These businesses possessed considerable productive capacity.  The 
farms operated 1,469 “net acres of production” and produced “approximately three 
million pounds of farm products in addition to meat, eggs, and milk in considerable 	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quantities.”258 These products were delivered to consumer cooperative stores set up by 
and for the individual units, which consisted of, “…canned vegetables and fruits, staples 
such as corn meal, sugar, flour, vinegar, salt, etc.; soaps and household supplies such as 
cleaners, bleaches, floor wax…house-dresses and smocks, men’s shirts and work clothes, 
men’s and women’s underwear”.  Unlike the earlier barter and labor-exchange system, 
which distributed goods and services based on need, this new production system 
distributed goods and services according to hours worked.259 
Even as late as 1939, the cooperatives were still able to “operate as a self-
contained system” with financial and technical assistance from the Division of Self-Help 
Cooperatives.  The head of the Division in 1939 was Frank G. Taylor, the ninth director 
of the cooperatives in three years, who, like Winslow Carlton, operated the Division in 
the same warehouse the cooperatives used as their base of operations and primary 
storeroom.  However, unlike Carlton, and as a result of policies under directors appointed 
by Republican Governor Frank Merriam, the Division slowly eroded the autonomy of the 
cooperatives; by 1939, “the important decisions concerning the whole production 
operation of the cooperative units are determined by the administrative staff of the 
Division.”260 Thus, by 1939, the Division had taken over the cooperatives and the 
cooperatives, in turn, had become dependent on state assistance for their continued 
survival.   
Nevertheless, the system proposed by EPIC, of a state-controlled system of 
industrial and farming cooperatives, separated from capitalist production, was fully 	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implemented by 1939, even if on a limited scale.  Taylor, along with other supporters of 
the cooperatives, sought to expand this system.   However, only a year later the state 
pulled the last of its support for the cooperatives.  Despite rhetorical support by Olson 
and his last ditch attempts to convince the California legislature and the Roosevelt 
Administration to reconsider their antagonistic stance towards the cooperatives, Olson 
was unable to reverse the decision to abolish the Division of Self-Help Cooperatives.  
Taylor, the last director of the Division of Self-Help Cooperatives, recalled in a 1971 
interview:   
29th of July by messenger, that was a Friday. The whole department, all of the 
staff, was abolished… Everybody in the warehouse, in the whole property all over 
the state...This sort of a thing, see, could not have been done without collusion 
between people in the relief administration and in the legislature, see. It had been 
worked out, I'm certain, in detail, see...they put in custodial personnel to liquidate 
the program. That was actually the end of it… this equipment all went to the 
prisons and the states and wasn't sold… it reverted to them, the government, and 
the government gave it to the public institutions… We had, oh, I would say, our 
property responsibility there was about $300,000, which would be today [in 1971] 
3 million dollars worth of merchandise.261   
According to Taylor, the staff of the Division was skeletal by the end, with only him and 
a handful of employees running the office and serving as liaisons between Sacramento 
and the cooperatives.  Likewise, the number of persons involved in the cooperative 
movement at this point had also dwindled to a few thousand members. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
261 Taylor and Chall, California and Relief (Self-Help Cooperatives) in the 1930's, 15:00 
CD 1, 43:00 CD 2. 
 145 
Conclusion 
Taylor believed the revival of the cooperatives, as a mass movement of worker 
and consumer cooperatives, and the revival of other radical mass movements were 
inevitable given the failure of the New Deal work programs to end the Great Depression.  
As Taylor put it:   
There was a real belief among the people at least like myself who were in, 
actively in relief programs and so forth, that this thing had not solved the 
unemployment problem. And I think if we had not hopped into the war, we would 
have had a very real problem, of the fact that the unemployment had not been 
solved by these, this type of programs...unemployment started to shift the other 
way, particularly among the older people.262   
Taylor argues that the war not only ended the Great Depression, but it also undermined 
social movements seeking lasting changes in the structures of the American economy—
e.g., a national policy of full employment.  According to Taylor, the defense jobs were 
key to ending any hopes for these structural changes.  He continues: 
Anybody who could stand up and work was employed. This was what took the 
guts out of the reform of anything I was interested in…would employ anybody 
who could stand up and walk and with a much higher income than you could get 
in these programs. In a years time or two they [the public work programs] 
disappeared, they were gone....all of this push for economic reform and even 
listening to alternative economic approaches was gone for the duration and has 
been gone practically ever since. Even though people are talking about 
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unemployment now [in 1971] they're not talking about economic, institutional 
reform.263 
Taylor thus argues that if not for the Second World War the U.S. would have been forced 
to enact structural changes to the economy, e.g., a national policy of full employment, to 
end the unemployment crisis.  Put differently, he argues that the war cut off opportunities 
for radical changes in American society. 
 Taylor is correct in arguing that the Second World War undermined specific 
initiatives aimed at structural change in the United States—e.g., the New Deal work 
programs.  However, radical change itself remained possible.  What changed was the 
terrain on which political actors had to operate.  Many political actors responded by 
linking their goals with the war aims.  Women and African-Americans, for example, saw 
increased access to the workplace during the war.  Moreover, through the “G.I. Bill”, 
veterans returning from the war were provided with increased access to medical care, 
college education, and home ownership, among other benefits.  It is beyond the scope of 
this study to discuss California politics during WWII or the post-war era.  I only suggest 
that, contrary to Taylor, opportunities for radical change did not end with the Great 
Depression and the onset of the Second World War.    
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CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSION 
Prevailing accounts of the Great Depression and the New Deal cannot make sense 
of the SHCM.  They still assume a clear break from the conservative Republican political 
order to the liberal Democratic political order.   This study, by contrast, opens up the 
possibility that there was no clear break between these two orders.  Instead, it suggests 
that Americans spent the 1930s experimenting with novel combinations of political 
traditions and institutions.  The bulk of the literature on the Great Depression details this 
experimentation within liberalism; this study, by contrast, examines these political 
experiments within conservatism.264 
Conservatism, no less than liberalism, was open to reinterpretation during the 
1930s and in radical ways.  The SHCM suggests that conservatives were receptive to 
ideas like “production for use, not for profit” and what the Los Angeles Times called 
“voluntary communism”.  They saw in the cooperatives a brand of socialism they could, 
not only tolerate, but enthusiastically support; one that was rooted in civil society and the 
conservative tradition of self-help; one that complemented, rather than antagonized, 
private businesses.  The appeal of this vision was its political ambiguity:  it could not be 
reduced to any single or discernable ideology or political tradition.  It possessed wide 
appeal among conservatives, socialists, and liberals, and thus could not be easily 
discredited.            
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
264 The argument that Roosevelt’s leadership was essential to ending the Great 
Depression has persisted in this literature.  The classic argument for the centrality of 
Roosevelt’s leadership in breaking with the old order and inaugurating a clearly defined 
liberal new deal order is Arthur Schlesinger’s The Age of Roosevelt.  Arthur Schlesinger, 
The Age of Roosevelt (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1957). 
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 There are three main parts to this chapter.  First, I provide a thematic summary of 
the study.  In doing so, I address themes this study holds in common with other works of 
American Political Development.  These include the crucial roles of:  historical 
contingency, the instability of political authority, and political leadership.  
Thematic Summary of the Self-Help Cooperative Movement 
Historical Contingency   
Historical contingency played a key role in the formation and dissolution of the 
SHCM.  First, the origins of the movement were not planned; it was not the result of 
decades of organizing like the labor union movements.  It began when a crippled war 
veteran walked out to Japanese farms on the outskirts of Los Angeles and asked farmers 
he encountered if he could work their farms in exchange for food.  The veteran returned 
to his neighborhood in Compton with more food than he could eat.  He shared the food 
and how he got it with his neighbors, who decided to contact the farmers to make similar 
arrangements.  Not long after, news spread to other neighborhoods, and the unemployed 
began organizing local “units” to coordinate the increasing amount of food they received 
from the farms and the increasing number of people joining the cooperative units to 
work.  They soon made similar arrangements with local businesses and with municipal 
agencies.  
Second, the experiences of the largely white SHCM, working with Japanese 
farmers and their families and also with Mexican migrant workers, led the cooperatives to 
the conclusion that racial inclusion was critical to building a political movement strong 
enough to end mass unemployment.  Had the movement not started in Compton, with its 
close proximity to Japanese farms, or had the movement not began with labor-exchange 
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on farms, it’s not obvious they would have been so eager to not merely include people of 
color but to actively recruit them and come to the aid of (majority Mexican-American) 
farm unions when they went on strike by refusing to work as strike breakers.  Efforts by 
conservative political operatives to convince the cooperatives to downplay their socialist 
practices and embrace nativism had some effect on the movement but did not catch on.  
The cooperatives remained committed to racial inclusion until the very end.     
Third, the summer of 1933 proved to be the turning point for the SHCM.  Three 
contingent events occurred during this summer that transformed the movement.  First, the 
New Deal work programs were implemented.  These programs gave the unemployed of 
Los Angeles, and the rest of the country, what they wanted:  steady work and steady pay.  
At the very moment these programs were being rolled out, this is precisely what the 
cooperatives did not have to offer.  Second, the fifth convention of the SHCM was held in 
San Francisco in July of 1933.  The movement formally split at this convention, as 
leadership conflicts that had been building for years finally came to the fore and tore the 
cooperatives apart.  The cooperatives split into competing factions, leaving the movement 
too weak to make demands on the New Dealers and other politicians  
Unstable Political Authority   
Third, the End Poverty in California (EPIC) movement began in the late summer 
of 1933.  EPIC dramatically transformed the movement from an ambiguous synthesis of 
conservatism and socialism to a more easily recognizable ideological movement for state 
socialism.  Perhaps the most important thing to note about this development is that the 
EPIC plan was already being put into effect before the EPIC movement even began.  The 
New Deal work programs not only syphoned off the majority of the cooperatives’ 
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membership, but New Deal programs to curtail industrial and farm production meant that 
farmers and businesses increasingly had no surplus goods to donate or exchange with the 
cooperatives.  Thus, the tens of thousands of remaining cooperative members decided to 
engage in direct production of goods and services.  To assist these efforts, New Dealers 
in Washington, eager to finance experiments that might ease or end mass unemployment, 
including massive financing of intentional communities, created the regulatory agency 
The Division of Self-Help Cooperatives to provide technical expertise and funnel money 
to the cooperatives.  All of this began happening in the early summer of 1933, before the 
EPIC movement.  
The SHCM had built up enough good will among politicians, businesses, and the 
public that the New Dealers were still willing to financially and politically support the 
movement, despite the political infighting.  The only difference was that now New Deal 
administrators would lead the movement.  However, this was also not a problem for the 
cooperatives.  The administrators assigned to regulate the movement were young, 
idealistic supporters of the cooperatives and supported the plan to expand the 
cooperatives and transform them from their earlier labor exchange and barter activities to 
direct production (like Mondragon in Spain, Italy’s Emilia Romagna region, and 
agricultural cooperatives in the United States which received massive state support 
during this same period and region in the 1930s).  Thus, the first two developments—the 
political infighting and the introduction of the New Deal work programs—were not 
destructive, not necessarily even detrimental, to the SHCM.     
 The novelty of the EPIC movement was not the proposal to create production 
cooperatives on a mass scale, or to secure state support for them; rather, it provided a new 
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interpretation of existing plans for production cooperatives.  EPIC proposed using the 
cooperatives to challenge and eventually overtake private businesses, the same businesses 
that were, up to that time, actively and enthusiastically supporting the cooperative 
movement.  The intense fear and paranoia generated by this proposition among business 
leaders, and the fact that EPIC briefly took over the Democratic Party—EPIC leaders had 
a major hand in writing the 1934 platform of the California Democratic Party after Upton 
Sinclair gained more votes than all the other candidates combined in the Democratic 
primary for governorship—all of this led to intense opposition from business leaders and 
the Democratic Party.   The 1934 gubernatorial campaign became a referendum on the 
cooperative movement, and the Republican strategy to identify EPIC with communism 
meant that cooperatives and communism became one and the same in public discourse 
after 1934 in California.  No longer a common sense solution to mass unemployment, the 
alliances between cooperatives, businesses, and state actors came to an end.   
 While the EPIC movement was critical to ending these earlier alliances, the EPIC 
plan, or rather enthusiasm for state planning and intervention into the economy it helped 
generate, still enjoyed widespread support among the cooperatives and former members 
of the cooperatives now working in the New Deal work programs.  As the EPIC 
movement itself demonstrated, their allegiances were not settled but remained open to 
new ideas and leaders.  Sinclair lost the 1934 gubernatorial election, but dozens of EPIC-
endorsed Democratic candidates were elected to local office in Los Angeles and to state-
wide office in California, including EPIC leader Culbert Olson, who was elected to the 
California State Senate in 1934.  Culbert was then elected to the governorship in 1938.  
Thus, just over four years after the movement began, EPIC realized its goal of electing a 
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governor.  However, elite and institutional opposition to EPIC, even within the 
Democratic Party, remained.  Olson accomplished little during his time in office.  Even 
more, far from increasing state support for the cooperatives, which he campaigned on and 
attempted to do as a State Senator, it was Governor Olson that pulled the last remaining 
state support for the cooperatives in the summer of 1940.  Instead of worker-run 
cooperatives, the unemployed were directed towards the defense plants and eventually 
the battlefields of Europe and Asia.  
Political Leadership   
 The Los Angeles cooperative movement underwent three distinct phases of 
leadership.  The initial leaders, elected by and from the cooperative members themselves, 
were critical to the early success of the movement.  They actively recruited new 
members, helped start new local chapters or “units”, and formed the UCRA, which 
served as an umbrella group for the individual units.  The UCRA facilitated trade and 
information between the individual units and also presented the political demands of the 
cooperatives to politicians and business leaders.    
The primary ambition of this early group was to build a strong, unified state-wide 
movement.  After some initial success in this direction, they split over disagreements 
about the future of the movement.  Some of them wanted to stay out of politics and focus 
on building cooperatives, with whatever help they could get.  They feared that any 
engagement with politics, especially radical politics, would alienate supporters and 
destroy the movement.  To use Barbara Epstein’s terminology, they preferred “cultural 
revolution” to “political protest”.  To the extent they engaged in politics, it was 
prefigurative politics; they wanted to “build the new world in the shell of the old”, to live 
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their politics.265 The other group argued that this ignored contemporary political 
developments.  The New Deal programs would soon be implemented and they would 
fundamentally transform the American political economy.  Unless the cooperatives 
engaged with the New Dealers, focused their energies on protests, and put their 
movement on the New Deal agenda, like the union movements, then the cooperatives 
would not survive beyond the Great Depression.    
Both strategies could have worked.  The cooperatives had generated enough 
political support, through the discourse of self-help, that even would-be opponents (e.g., 
conservatives) interpreted both of these actions through a sympathetic lens.  However, 
instead of compromising, each of these factions undermined the other, until neither of 
them were strong enough to prevent the EPIC take over of the movement.  EPIC did not 
take over the cooperatives directly, the organizations, but the loyalty of the membership.  
The factional infighting left the majority of the rank and file, and the majority of the 
leadership, disillusioned.  The EPIC movement revived the hope and the possibility of a 
cooperative economy.  However, it did so in ways that alienated previous supporters and 
thus was unable to accomplish its stated goals. 
 The last group of leaders were the administrators of the California Division of 
Self-Help Cooperatives.  This group took over leadership of the cooperatives after the 
collapse of the EPIC movement.  They sought to implement the EPIC plan of state-
financed and supervised cooperatives—even while strenuously denying any connection 
to EPIC—but the political moment had already passed. The most ardent proponent of this 
plan, the young, energetic, and idealistic Winslow Carlton, an avid supporter of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
265 Barbara Epstein, Political Protest and Cultural Revolution: Nonviolent Direct Action 
in the 1970s and 1980s (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991).  
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cooperatives, spent years working closely with the cooperatives and trying, in vain, to 
secure support for the cooperatives from the Roosevelt administration.  Roosevelt and his 
top advisors argued that the cooperatives had become too politically toxic to support.  
Carlton, disillusioned, eventually left his post as director of the California Division of 
Self-Help Cooperatives and de facto leader of the cooperative movement.266 The 
cooperatives continued to receive limited and largely token state support for the 
remainder of the 1930s, until that support finally ceased in the summer of 1940.   
The collapse of the SHCM was overdetermined.  Multiple failures of leadership 
had to transpire for the movement to fail to achieve its stated goals.  Indeed, the timing of 
these failures was no less essential.  Had the initial group of leaders turned on each other 
in 1934 instead of 1933, they might have been strong enough to compete with the EPIC 
movement for the loyalties of the membership and could have maintained the support of 
businesses and the Democratic Party even after their departure.  Had the EPIC movement 
begun in 1932, before the implementation of the New Deal work programs, unemployed 
Californians might have felt desperate enough to elect Sinclair for governor, who 
narrowly lost in 1934, partly because of opposition from FDR, and despite the 
overwhelming resources of California businesses and the Republican Party. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
266 Carlton’s own life mirrors that of the cooperative movement in some ways.  On the 
one hand, he founded the first hedge fund in the U.S, and remained involved in 
investment banking and starting new enterprises his entire life.  On the other hand, he 
was also a pioneer in the field of non-profit medical insurance, remained actively 
involved with the cooperative movement (especially housing cooperatives), and was also 
actively involved in 1960s anti-poverty programs.  Wolfgang Saxon, “Winslow Carlton, 
Official of Agencies And Fund Chief, 86” The New York Times, 1994.  Carlton, along 
with Richard Cloward, and others, apparently played a critical role in pioneering the 
1960s “War on Poverty”.  Noel Cazenave, Impossible Democracy:  The Unlikely Success 
of the War on Poverty Community Action Programs (Albany:  State University of New 
York Press, 2007).    
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However, even with these failures, the cooperative movement made a lasting 
impact on California politics.  Earl Warren was able to draw on this new voting bloc to 
advance his liberal Republican policies.  He was able to do this, in part, because of the 
cross-filling primary system then in effect in California.  Warren is the only governor in 
the history of California to simultaneously win the Democratic and Republican primary 
(in 1946), and to be elected to three consecutive terms.  Warren’s landslide victories 
provided him the political authority to raise taxes and engage in massive public works 
programs (e.g., highway construction and increased access to colleges and universities), 
overriding business opposition, and even to push for socialist programs like universal 
health care.  Even though the cooperatives failed, multiple times, to achieve their goals, 
they still succeeded in altering the California political landscape, opening up new terrain 
for future political entrepreneurs.267  
Personal Experience with Cooperatives 
 Around the same time that I began writing this dissertation, I moved into a student 
housing cooperative—one that was, ironically, started by supporters of the Self-Help 
Cooperative Movement in the 1930s.  Everyone in the cooperative had a number of house 
jobs, a number of hours of housework, they had to complete every week. One of my jobs 
was to act as the contact person for a local non-profit, Food for Lane County.  Similar to 
the cooperatives’ relationship to farmers and businesses in the 1930s, Food for Lane 
County provided our cooperative with leftover food that local businesses could not sell, 
but was still edible, and with food donated directly from the companies themselves (right 
out of the factory).  My experience with the housing cooperative, and as their contact 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
267 Edward White, Earl Warren, A Public Life (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1982). 
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person for Food for Lane County, provided me with some practical understanding of the 
Self-Help Cooperative Movement.  It gave me some idea of how they actually operated 
as well as the role of politics in these organizations. 
 The housing cooperative and Food for Lane County are able to operate effectively 
and smoothly because both organizations are nonpartistan.  Beyond providing affordable 
housing and a community atmosphere, and free food for their low-income clients, neither 
organization have tied their fortunes to any political party or social movement.  There are 
major upsides to this strategy.  So long as both organizations remain nonpartisan, like the 
Self-Help Cooperative Movement in the early 1930s, they will continue to receive 
generous support, or at least no major opposition, from local businesses, law enforcement 
officers, and other groups.   
 However, there are also major drawbacks this strategy.  Without politicizing these 
organizations, their future growth is limited.  The student housing cooperatives have 
operated in Eugene, Oregon since the 1930s and Food for Lane County since the 1980s, 
and their impact on Eugene has been negligible.  Like the Self-Help Cooperatives in the 
early 1930s, both operate at the margins of society, accommodating themselves to and 
picking up the slack of an inadequate social welfare system in the United States.  While 
the EPIC movement played a critical role in undermining the Self-Help Cooperatives, it 
also placed their agenda, the needs of unemployed workers, at the center of politics.  It 
failed to achieve its stated goals, but nonetheless succeeded in creating a political 
atmosphere conducive to radical initiatives.  There are a number of amazing and 
politically active people in both the student housing cooperatives in Eugene and in Food 
for Lane County, and the work of these organizations is commendable, but if these 
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organizations want to move from the margins to the mainstream, if they want to extend 
the benefits of affordable housing and food security to all people in their vicinity, then 
they cannot remain nonpartisan.  They need to enter the political arena and choose sides, 
and they must do so in a way that avoids the pitfalls of EPIC, of unnecessarily 
demonizing an entire class, “capitalists”.   
I left the cooperatives after living there for a year.  While it met the needs of its 
members, providing a community atmosphere and low-income housing for students, its 
benefits were limited to a select few and it ultimately served as an escape from, rather 
than an engagement with, politics.  As prior cooperative movements in the United States 
have demonstrated—e.g., the populist movement in the late 19th century—cooperatives 
possess enormous political potential.  They have been able to generate massive political 
support from a wide swath of the population in the past and can do so in the future as 
well.  I hope this study helps contemporary cooperatives in the United States absorb these 
lessons and tap into their political potential.    
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